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Chapter 5 offers the first systemic examination of the strategic considerations that underpin an emerging trend that has not yet gained enough attention in either academic or policy circles – the growing role of counterterrorism in China’s foreign policy. China needs to enhance its force’s counterterrorism capabilities, protect the growing number of Chinese nationals and assets abroad, and build an image as a responsible international stakeholder. However, these goals conflict with China’s desire to minimize grievances arising from its economic activities, which could lead to the country becoming a target for international terrorist groups. Empirical analyses of original data on the counterterrorism joint military exercises held by China and foreign forces indicate that China is highly cautious and selective when it comes to these exercises. Military counterterrorism cooperation tends to closely follow Chinese economic investments.
Chapter 4 documents and analyzes China’s domestic policies aimed at countering Uyghur violence. We discuss the broad securitization of Xinjiang, including budgets and the forces involved. Drawing on the best available data on Uyghur-related political violence and China’s public security expenditure in Xinjiang, we present the first rigorous assessment of the feedback loop of violence and repression in Xinjiang. We demonstrate that government repression is not systematically followed by increased Uyghur violence and that increased security expenditures are excessive and inefficient, especially in the long run. This chapter also traces the recent strategic shift in China’s policies from postattack securitization toward actively and forcibly promoting ethnic mingling and “de-extremification.” While this policy reorientation has been attributed to Beijing’s intolerance of instability, our analysis shows that it is a result of a more complex set of competing priorities within the Chinese government.
Chapter 1 sets the stage for our study, introducing both the political violence and repression endemic to Xinjiang. We provide a brief account of the recent history of Xinjiang and the Uyghurs to contextualize the current situation before introducing the book’s motivations, arguments, and structure.
Chapter 6 concludes the book with a discussion of the future of Xinjiang as well as the implications for both China and US foreign policy. Given the ongoing US presence in Afghanistan, the complexities of US relations with Pakistan, and the increasing presence of Chinese nationals around the globe, it is easy to imagine how a seemingly manageable precipitating event could lead to outsized effects.
Chapter 2 provides an in-depth examination of the political violence occurring within and emanating from Xinjiang. We introduce the most comprehensive data on terrorism in China assembled to date, which we draw upon to argue that the nature of terrorism and counterterrorism in China has evolved in three fundamental ways. First, the nature of this violence has evolved over time from overt armed rebellions and riots to covert attacks. Second, the movement has shifted from separatism to a hybrid of ethnonationalism and jihadism. Third, the official response has partially transitioned from framing terrorism as a domestic issue cloaked by sovereignty to an issue of foreign affairs with increasing prominence in China’s diplomacy and military policy. This chapter also introduces the militant organizations that have been active in the conflict, details trends in violence, and assesses linkages between militants in Xinjiang and competent jihadist organizations active in Central Asia.
Chapter 3 explores government sensitivities to terrorist violence. If the situation in Xinjiang is to escalate into something with broad international implications, it will be because Chinese domestic politics lead it to do so. As a consequence, it is vital to understand Chinese official sensitivities about terrorism. To develop this insight, we turn to official media coverage of terrorist violence to clarify how Chinese government authorities balance domestic and international priorities when approaching terrorist violence. Specifically, we examine media coverage of terrorist events in Xinjiang and provide an empirical account of how quickly and how transparently authorities provide information about these incidents to their domestic audience. We show that while transparency can foster the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy at home and abroad, the Party nearly always prioritizes short-term domestic stability. This reveals the extent to which counterterrorism policy is, and will likely remain, conservative and risk averse.
In 2018, China's general secretary, Xi Jinping, announced a three-year war on “black societies and evil forces” and promised to take down various forms of organized crime and evil forces within society. This article examines the operational features of this particular crackdown and how they diverged from previous “strike hard” campaigns. This campaign adopted novel strategies including embedding instructions on law enforcement within criminal justice institutions, promulgating special rules on the crimes of evil forces in order to “strike” campaign targets early, and deploying intrusive investigation tactics that focused on the person and not the crime. Using democratic centralism as a liberal lens, this campaign showcases the struggle between the imperative of legality and the politics of a major campaign in China.