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Chapter 2 recounts the history of the rise of Deng as the new spupreme leader of China after Mao’s death. It discusses the limits of his power, and the formation of elite factionalism between the reformers and the conservatives. The key players, such as Deng, Chen Yun, Zhao Ziyang, and Li Peng, are introduced.
Chapter 6 returns to focus on Zhao Ziyang and Li Peng, covering the time from the April 26 editorial until the outbreak of the hunger strike on May 13 and the martial law decision on May 17. A moderate approach failed due to both lack of sincereity and elite conflcit.
Chapter 10 addresses the political developments that occurred after the 1989 Tiananmen crisis. Subsequent events provide further evidence to evaluate the three models. The Tiananmen decision proved to be effective in Deng’s long-term plans, such as securing a political leadership loyal to his reform, but it further suggests that military action was used for more purposes than ending the protest.
Chapter 8 explores the true challenges faced by Deng Xiaoping in 1989. He found a political play, in the form of military mobilization in the name of ending the protest, that would satisfy many demands with one stroke. With enhanced power, he ended the protest, removed Zhao Ziyang as general secretary, and prevailed in forming a new leadership to carry bear his reform mantle.
Chapter 9 challenges the notion that the military operation was the right response to the protest. It will do so by describing the manner in which it was carried out on June 3–4. The tasks of “clearing up the square” and securing the city would have required much less. It was “an ox knife to kill a chicken.”
Chapter 4 examines the actions and, as importantly, the inactions of state leaders in the early period of the student protest, from April 15, the day of Hu Yaobang’s death, to April 26, the day of the publication of the government’s first official response in the form of an editorial. The focus is on the first-line leaders in charge of day-to-day governance, especially General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and Premier Li Peng.