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Moral condemnation of hypocrisy is both ubiquitous and peculiar. Its incessant focus on word–action consistency gives rise to two properties that distinguish it from other types of moral judgment: non-additivity and content independence. Non-additivity refers to the fact that, in judgments of hypocrisy, good words do not offset bad actions, nor do good actions offset bad words. Content independence refers to the fact that we condemn hypocrisy regardless of whether we would condemn the words or actions in isolation from one another. To make sense of these peculiar properties, we present a costly signaling model of social cooperation, in which hypocrisy norms allow a separating equilibrium to emerge, thus facilitating reliable communication and higher levels of social trust. We compare our functionalist account of hypocrisy to other philosophical accounts, arguing that a functionalist analysis better illuminates our moral practices and public discourse.
The Introduction lays out connections between Parables unique to Luke and stories about Israel’s founding families. Like Jesus who looked to stories of Israel’s origins when explaining matters relating to himself, Luke reworked well-known Genesis texts to convey ideas.
By 1434, Alberti was in Florence in employ of Pope Eugenius IV, who would also facilitate the return from exile of Cosimo de’ Medici. The art of Florence would ensure Alberti’s rhetorical high notes in De pictura. Alberti’s popularity lies in his invitation to art, not in its execution. Art theory has never perpetuated art process; organic continuum precedes intellectual reflection. The genesis of De pictura, our first modern book on painting, derives from the personal passion of Leon Battista Alberti in the humanist classroom and attendance before the visual majesty of Padua, Bologna, northern Europe, and Rome – witnessed by the acute eye of an illegitimate son, born in exile.
In this chapter we explain how to build a plausible space using the all-combinations algorithm, and how to evaluate its results. When the true model is unknown, what models are plausible? What set of models would a task force of rival scholars embrace? This provides a central foundation for a broader multiverse that develops in later chapters. We also show how to incorporate concepts of necessary controls and estimated consistency.
The Healing on the Sabbath parable’s focus on higher and lower standing at a feast affirms humility over ostentation. Evoked is the grand meal given by Joseph in honor of his brothers who, on account of his high and their low standing, could not sit with him at his table.
The predictive mind makes use of two broadly distinct collections of cognitive systems, types of processing, or families of cognitive operations: an implicit (priming) system and an explicit and active ‘smart route’ to prediction. Though theorists differ greatly in what they mean by two systems and dual processing accounts, there is considerable agreement among most behavioral scientists about the general distinctions. System 1 is assumed to be unconscious, fast, implicit, automatic, and reflexive whereas System 2 is conscious, slow, explicit, controlled, and reflective.