The United States has long represented one of Canada's primary international allies. This partnership has remained strong despite turbulent times in the relationship, such as the one brought forth by the Trump presidency. Our article seeks to understand the sources of such continuity through the lens of continentalism. While historical accounts of continentalism have portrayed it as a passive force stemming from Canada's material self-interest, scholars have recently identified the emergence of an evolved form of continentalism that represents a dominant idea and a coherent analytical framework in Canadian foreign policy. Has this new form of continentalism indeed gained widespread acceptance among Canadians? We answer this question by considering continentalism in the ideational realm. Using novel public opinion data, our analysis investigates whether continentalist attitudes have become embedded in Canadians’ national identity and foster closer alignment preferences vis-à-vis the United States. We find significant and robust evidence of such effects.

Liberal democracies are expected to provide residents with both negative rights, such as limitations against the abuse of police powers, and some range of positive (social) rights, such as access to social benefits. These rights are commonly deemed to apply equally, without respect to individuals’ ascriptive backgrounds. Existing research, often in the US context and focused on social programs, shows both support for abstract rights and group-specific prejudices. We interrogate whether similar patterns exist in Canada and innovate by directly examining negative and positive rights in the same study. Using a series of novel survey experiments, we demonstrate the degree to which categorical inequalities based on race and legal status affect public support for rights provision in Canada. Both rights are more recognized for citizens relative to out-of-status migrants, and legal status at times interacts with racialized minority status. Rights appear far from universal in the minds of Canadians.

This article investigates how superpower rivalry affects public perceptions of international organization (IO) legitimacy in the hegemon. We argue that the representation of a superpower rival state at an IO in the form of its key decision maker's nationality can dampen the IO's perceived legitimacy within the rival power. We test this argument using a survey experiment in the United States under President Trump, where we manipulate the nationality of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) judge who casts a tie-breaking vote against the United States. Our results show that when the judge is Chinese, there is a strong and robust dampening of Americans’ perceptions of the ICJ's legitimacy, with no comparable effect arising when the judge is from other countries, including Russia. Replication of the experiment in the United States under President Biden offers external validity for our findings, which may have important implications for the future of the liberal international order.

The stability of divided societies is an important and recurring concern in political science research. It has been suggested that distinctive socialization processes in the different regions of divided societies will lead to diverging trends in public opinion. Therefore, we investigate trends in public opinion on key political issues and attitudes in three divided societies: Canada (Quebec), the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Spain (Catalonia). Using over two decades of survey data, we show that these distinct communities indeed have a particular ideological profile but also that there is no indication these differences become larger over time. In other words, we do not observe any evidence for an increasing lack of public opinion coherence in these divided societies. We conclude with some observations on why divergence could not be observed at the level of public opinion but might still be present at the level of party elites.

Since the #MeToo movement, several countries have taken steps to address sexual harassment in politics (for example, the United States, United Kingdom and Canada). While researchers have evaluated the electability of candidates accused of sexual harassment, less is known about what the public thinks should happen when elected officials engage in this behaviour. Utilizing an innovative module from the 2019 Canadian Election Study, we assess the steps voters believe legislatures should take when an MP sexually harasses someone. Our results demonstrate that a vast majority of the public believes that MPs should face consequences when they commit sexual harassment, including potential removal from office. We also find that women are more likely than men to believe MPs should be punished when they are accused of sexual harassment. These findings have relevance for legislatures globally, revealing the importance of transparent, independent processes to address harassment and violence in the political sphere.

Two of Donald Trump administration’s most salient legacies are the high level of crime victimization and low popularity ratings among groups likely to be targeted by crime, such as females and race and ethnic minorities. To explore crime victimization and public opinion towards the president, the article tests whether gender and race determinants among crime victims were associated with trust in the president and job performance approval. Results indicated that females and female victims of crime were less likely to reward presidential performance and trust Trump. Blacks and Latinos were less likely to trust Trump and less likely to reward his job performance; however, there was no effect when moderating by whether they reported being victims of crime. Victims of crime in unsafe neighbourhoods were less likely to trust and reward presidential performance. More surprisingly, being a crime victim was a significant and positive predictor of trusting Trump and rewarding his job performance. The results tell us about the need to continue studying the public’s wishes for the authorities to respond to the problem of victimization, oftentimes rewarding populist approaches to punitive justice, incarceration and overall tougher criminal policies.

We propose a new, unified approach for comparative research on citizens’ satisfaction with democracy (SWD). It starts with a well-specified individual-level model of the considerations citizens draw upon when answering the SWD survey question. Then we specify the relationship from contextual factors (especially institutions) through these individual-level mediating considerations and on to the SWD attitude. Multilevel structural equation estimation is applied to a merged dataset of European Social Survey (ESS) and country-level contextual data. The results add solidity to theoretical and empirical findings that citizens’ judgments of democracy are driven mostly by policy outputs and lived experience and not much by institutional variation or its political consequences.

Do voters use information about and preferences over who will form government in their vote choices? Voters might have preferences over both which party wins the most seats and what type of government that party can form, which they can use to inform their vote choice. To answer this question, we examine the influence of preferences over government types and compare them to trends in party support in the 2019 Canadian federal election. Using rolling, daily cross-sectional survey evidence from the Canadian Election Study, we find that preferences over government type are strongly related to vote choice and that this relationship depends on the perceived viability of the preferred party. We also find that this relationship differs outside and within Quebec: outside Quebec, only the Liberal Party suffers among voters preferring minority governments, while within Quebec, the Liberal Party, New Democratic Party and Conservative Party all struggle to hold on to voters who prefer minority governments.

Research on the political preferences of lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) voters shows that they are more progressive than heterosexuals. However, few studies consider differences between heterosexual, gay/lesbian, and bisexual men and women. Furthermore, little is known about how these preferences have changed as society has become more accepting of diverse sexualities. We offer an analysis of Canadian LGB voters’ political preferences a decade and a half after same-sex marriage was legalized. Consistent with prior research, we find that gay men, and, to a lesser extent, bisexual men, are more left-wing than heterosexual men. A more novel finding is that bisexual women are the most left-wing group. Lesbian women are only slightly to the left of heterosexual women. While left-wing bisexual women are growing in number, the overall gap between LGB and heterosexual voters has remained stable across generations, because marriage narrows some of the preference gaps.

Close relations with Europe, especially but not only with the United Kingdom, have long been a consensual tenet of Canadian foreign policy, which has supported European integration since the 1970s. The UK's withdrawal from the European Union threatens to upset this consensus. While Liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has consistently cast Brexit in a negative light, Conservative leaders Andrew Scheer and Erin O'Toole have commented positively on the UK's leaving the EU. Did their polarized views resonate in the population? To answer this question, this article analyzes the results of an original survey of voting-age Canadians. Findings show a strong degree of correspondence between positions expressed in party discourse and preferences in the Canadian population. This raises the possibility that the difference between two models of transatlantic relations, which we call Eurosphere and Anglosphere, could emerge as a new fault line in Canadian foreign policy.

Supply management is a long-standing agricultural policy in Canada that applies to dairy, poultry and eggs. To date, there exists no academic research on the correlates or dynamics of public support for supply management. We use data collected from the Digital Democracy Project's study of the 2019 Canadian election, including results from a between-subjects framing experiment, to show that support for supply management is most opposed by economic conservatives. However, we find support to be highly malleable by framing: it increases when respondents are primed to think of the policy as a way of protecting farmers and decreases when they are primed to think of its costs to consumers. Contrary to expectations, framing effects are not stronger when messages are ideologically congenial or among those with high levels of policy knowledge. If anything, effects are stronger among those with lower levels of knowledge.

La littérature sur les tempêtes médiatiques n'a jamais évalué leurs effets sur l'opinion publique de manière systématique. Cet article vise à combler ce vide en mobilisant des données de sondage pour évaluer l’évolution de l'opinion publique en regard de la crise des réfugiés, une tempête médiatique survenue durant la campagne fédérale canadienne de 2015. Les résultats montrent que la période de tempête médiatique a influencé les attitudes citoyennes à l’égard de certains cadres liés à la question et que l'effet a persisté jusqu’à la fin de la campagne. Ils révèlent par ailleurs que certaines opinions politiques en viennent à constituer des éléments déterminants de l'intention de vote et du choix de vote final. Ces éléments de preuve montrent que les citoyens sont réceptifs aux tempêtes médiatiques et constituent un exemple concret de la manière dont la logique de marché médiatique devient parfois prépondérante dans les rapports de force qui caractérisent la sphère publique.

We perform a survey experiment on the issue of immigration. People are presented with a situation where public opinion is at odds with the election promise. In our control group, no information is given about public opinion. In the treatment groups, respondents are told that 55 per cent or 80 per cent of the people are against the project. When respondents are informed about the election promise but are not told about public opinion, 64 per cent say that the party should fulfill its promise. That percentage drops to 51 per cent when people are informed that a slight majority (55 per cent) are opposed to the project and to 42 per cent when they are told that a strong majority (80 per cent) are opposed. Citizens thus believe that politicians should pay attention not only to the majority view but also to the size of that majority.

Contact tracing applications have been deployed at a fast pace around the world to stop the spread of COVID-19 and may be key to containing future pandemics. This study aims to explain public opinion toward cell phone contact tracing using a survey experiment. We build upon a theory in evolutionary psychology—disease avoidance—to predict how media coverage of the pandemic affects public support for containment measures. We report three key findings. First, exposure to a news item that shows people ignoring social distancing rules causes an increase in support for cell phone contact tracing. Second, pre-treatment covariates such as anxiety and a belief that other people are not following the rules rank among the strongest predictors of support for COVID-19 apps. And third, while a majority of respondents approve of the reliance on cell phone contact tracing, concerns for rights and freedoms remain a salient preoccupation.

Canada has often been seen as immune from the powerful backlash against globalization and immigration that has driven political shifts elsewhere. This article challenges this belief, at least in part, by tracing the evolution of public attitudes toward immigration and analyzing the factors that have shaped the trajectory for over three decades. Drawing on nearly forty years of Environics Focus Canada surveys, combined with annual data on macro-economics and immigration flows, findings here suggest that Canadians’ tolerance toward immigration responds to immigration flows and is heavily influenced by macro-economic conditions.

Cultural theory (CT) has been widely used to explain variations in risk perception but has rarely been tested in Canada. This contribution represents the most thorough attempt to adapt CT to the Canadian context. Study results suggest that respondents’ commitment to egalitarianism was strongly correlated with risks from technology, while respondents’ commitment to hierarchism was strongly correlated with risks from criminal or unsafe behaviours. Respondents’ commitment to individualism was also correlated with risks from criminal and unsafe behaviours but differed from hierarchism in that individualism was not correlated with risk perceptions from prostitution and marijuana use. Respondents’ commitments to fatalism were strongly correlated with risk perception of vaccines. These conclusions are reinforced by results from a survey question that tests the extent to which such cultural predispositions map onto the myths of nature hypothesized by CT and by a survey experiment that tests how cultural commitments predict perceived risks from a controversial pipeline.

Public opinion on later-life sexuality affects older people’s sexual health, behaviour, and satisfaction. In this study, we explored public opinion on later-life sexuality by participants’ responding to an open-ended question rather than rank their level of agreement or disagreement with different statements about older people’s sexuality. Responses from 135 men and women reflecting on how sexuality changes in older age were thematically analysed. Five themes emerged, varying from positive to negative perceptions of later-life sexuality. Older people’s sexuality was described as declining, non-existent, conservative, narrow, tedious, and boring, but also as encompassing more emotions and feelings; being better and more “complete”. This study provides qualitative data and an opportunity to gain insights on valuable opinions on what young and middle-aged people think about later-life sexuality. Assessing what people think about later-life sexuality is the first stage in instilling more liberating views about the diversity of sexual expressions in old age.

This article suggests a reconceptualization of the way in which social and legal sciences traditionally represented the relation between the judicial system and public opinion. Our analysis is based on Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory and on empirical examples taken from case laws and qualitative interviews demonstrating the heuristic potential of the polycontexturalisation of public opinion. In social and legal sciences, research has mainly focused on the public’s opinion of the judicial system. But the notion of polycontexturality here suggests a new approach which consists of analyzing the structures involved in the selection and judicial shaping of legally relevant public opinions. The goal then is no longer to understand what public opinion thinks of the judiciary but rather to understand what the judiciary believes public opinion thinks of it.