Governments around the world have increasingly adopted behavioural public policies, in which behavioural insights units (often designated as ‘Nudge units’) play an increasingly important role. Such units are typically assigned with implementing behavioural insights in various social policy fields. However, research on the contextual specificities of Nudge units is still scarce. This article addresses that gap by providing an in-depth qualitative study of MineduLAB, a Nudge unit active within the Peruvian Ministry of Education. Informed by an interpretive approach, our analysis shows that the behavioural insights that MineduLAB makes use of and develops, are enacted by a unique local interplay of three different dimensions: a political-financial, an epistemic community, and a sector-specific (here: educational) dimension. Moreover, our analysis of a Nudge unit in the Global South showcases both similarities (e.g. focus on behavioural evidence and experimentation) as well as differences (e.g. the challenge of corruption; the deployment of other vocabulary with regards to behavioural insights) with the predominantly Western Nudge units that are more commonly researched. Consequently, we argue that for a profound academic evaluation of behavioural public policy and the role of Nudge units herein, it is crucial to pay close attention to their contextuality and geographical diversity.

Nudging is a policy tool that steers people’s behavior through noncoercive psychological pushes. This has consequences for people’s lives to varying degrees. For example, the nudge of a sticker of a fly in a urinal encourages peeing inside a urinal, while an organ donation default brings people to agree to donating their organs after their decease. Governments do not yet systematically examine which nudges have to be subjected to all safeguards of the rule of law—for example, parliamentary control, judicial review, or compliance with legal principles such as proportionality. This article argues that a legal doctrine is necessary to carry out this examination. Moreover, it contributes to the development of such a doctrine, using the approach of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of inspiration. The doctrine consists of a “de minimis” principle for nudges: Public institutions only need to ensure that a nudge complies with rule of law safeguards when the nudge has substantial consequences. In addition, the doctrine includes a criterion to determine which nudges have such substantial consequences. In particular, it is argued that a nudge should be subjected to at least some safeguards when it has a serious effect on people’s autonomy.

Transparency is intimately linked to debates about the ethics, political legitimacy and effectiveness of nudging. This paper provides an overview of empirical studies investigating how changes in the transparency of a nudge affect people's choices and evaluations of the nudge. I conclude that the present literature provides generally consistent evidence supporting that the effectiveness of a nudge does not decrease when choosers are given good opportunity to detect and understand the influence it might have on their choices. However, several conceptual and methodological issues are identified, significantly limiting the scope of the conclusions that can be drawn. The limitations are discussed and organized into six themes, with recommendations provided for how future research may address them.

Financial policymakers increasingly rely on behavioural insights to protect the interests of consumers. However, little is known about how citizens feel about interventions designed to nudge their financial behaviour. Most literature on the acceptability of behavioural interventions focuses on the health domain. To address this gap, we present the results of an experiment on the acceptability of seven financial behavioural interventions (N = 684, members of a panel of the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets). We investigate the role of the agent implementing the intervention (policymaker versus financial company) and perceived effectiveness in relation to the acceptability of these interventions. The acceptability of behavioural interventions in financial decision-making appears to be lower than the acceptability levels found in previous studies. We find no effect of the agent on acceptability. Perceived effectiveness is strongly correlated with acceptability, but only perceived effectiveness in influencing one's own decisions has a consistently positive relationship with acceptability. Perceived effectiveness in influencing others' decisions has either no, a positive, or a negative relationship with acceptability. These results highlight that acceptability appears to be at least partly domain-specific and show that we have only just begun understanding the acceptability of behavioural interventions and its drivers.

Although customer support is critical to the wider uptake of nudging strategies to promote fruits and vegetables (FV) in institutional food service (FS) settings, empirical research is sparse and typically based on small convenience samples. An online survey was conducted to assess support, perceived effectiveness and intrusiveness of nine nudge types drawn from Münscher et al.'s Taxonomy of Choice Architecture. We focused on the setting of campus FSs across Canada. A national sample of post-secondary students regularly using campus FSs was used (N 1057). Support for changing the range of options (B3) was the highest, closely followed by changing option-related effort (B2) and changing option-related consequences (B4). Facilitating commitment (C2), changing default (B1) and providing a social reference point (A3) received lowest support. Furthermore, we extracted three clusters of respondents based on perceived effectiveness and intrusiveness of nudge types. Characterised by a relatively low level of perceived effectiveness and moderately high level of intrusiveness, Cluster 1 (61⋅7 % of the sample) reported the lowest support for nudges. Cluster 2 (26⋅6 %), characterised by intermediate effectiveness and low intrusiveness of nudging, reported a high level of support for nudges. Lastly, Cluster 3 (11⋅7 %), characterised by high perceived effectiveness of as well as high perceived intrusiveness, reported the highest level of support for nudges. Findings confirm overall support for FV nudging, with significant differences across nudge types. Differences in customers’ acceptance and perception across nudge types offer campus FS operators initial priors in selecting nudges to promote FV.

Behavioural science has made significant contributions to public policy over the last decade from tax compliance to pensions and energy use. However, behavioural insights (BI) have not yet been able to claim significant policy shifts in the area of crime, despite increasing interest and experimentation. This paper offers a critical reflection on the state of BI and crime from the perspective of those who have been at the forefront of this work since the inception of the world's first behavioural science team in government. We outline how existing theories of crime have already laid foundations for the successful application of BI but identify opportunities to build on these with tools from behavioural science. We conclude by examining how continued cross-pollination of ideas between BI and disciplines such as applied criminology points to promising directions for future research.

People do not save enough for retirement and this can have serious repercussions on their well-being. We tested an intervention in a large field study (N = 20,507) with the goal of nudging a population of freelance workers to save more for the future. First, we changed the default from the earlier contribution rate of 10% to a contribution rate of 20%, but left people free to choose how much they wanted to contribute. Second, those who reduced their contribution were reminded that they would receive a lower pension as a result. Third, we informed people about how much tax they would save as a result of their contribution. This nudging intervention proved to be a cost-effective, yet powerful way to remind people about the long-term implications of their savings decisions. It was also successful at counteracting the temptation to keep as much money as possible for present consumption while losing out on the long run. Overall, we were able to increase cash flow to the fund by more than eight million Euros (in addition to the roughly 50 million collected in the previous year), with an almost seven-fold increase in the number of people who chose to contribute more than the minimum.

In “Nudging, Bullshitting, and the Meta-Nudge”, the author responds to William Simkulet’s claim that nudging is bullshitting (according to Harry Frankfurt’s analysis of bullshit and bullshitting), and therefore nudging during the process of informed consent renders consent invalid. The author argues that nudging is not necessarily bullshitting and then explains that although this issue is philosophically interesting, practically speaking, even if nudging is bullshitting, it does not follow that nudging necessarily renders informed consent invalid. This is obviously true in those situations in which nudging during the process of informed consent is unavoidable. The author concludes with a discussion of the meta-nudge and suggests that physicians can use the meta-nudge to eliminate or decrease the power of inappropriate, problematic, or undesirable nudges.

According to the Free Will Explanation of a traditional view of hell, human freedom explains why some human persons are in hell. Human freedom also explains its punishment and finality: persons in hell have freely developed moral vices that are their own punishment and that make repentance psychologically impossible. So, even though God continues to desire reconciliation with persons in hell, damned persons do not want reconciliation with God. But this moral vice explanation of hell's finality is implausible. I argue that God can and would make direct or indirect alterations in their character to give them new motivational reasons that re-enable their freedom to repent. Subsequently, I argue that it is probable that each damned person will be saved eventually, because there is a potential infinity of opportunities for free repentance. Thus, if the Free Will Explanation's descriptions of hell and divine love are correct, it is highly probable that each person in hell escapes to heaven.

This article reports on a survey study comparing the general public's attitude towards nudging to its attitude towards the traditional tools of government: information, subsidies, taxes and mandates. The study was based on responses from a representative sample of the adult Swedish population. In separate evaluations, the respondents rated how positively or negatively they perceived a set of specific policy tools, traditional and behavioral, across different policy goals. Overall, information and subsidies were more positively perceived than the other types of policy tools, nudging included. Respondents’ attitudes towards the policy tools were partly explained by individualistic ideological views, whether they agreed with the intended policy goals, and certain socio-demographic variables. Implications for future research and public policy are discussed.

This essay focuses on conceptual engineers who aim to improve other people's patterns of inference and attention by shaping their concepts. Such conceptual engineers sometimes engage in a form of epistemic paternalism that I call paternalistic cognitive engineering: instead of explicitly persuading, informing and educating others, the engineers non-consultatively rely on assumptions about the target agents’ cognitive systems to improve their belief forming. The target agents could reasonably regard such benevolent exercises of control as violating their sovereignty over their own belief formation. This is a pro tanto reason against such engineering. In addition to the relevant projects of conceptual engineering, paternalistic cognitive engineering plausibly includes certain kinds of nudging and evidence suppression. I distinguish the sovereignty-based concern from other ethical worries about conceptual engineering and discuss how one might justify the relevant conceptual engineering projects despite the sovereignty-based reason against them.