This article explores how the political ideal of data interacts with the legal entitlement of autonomy in the care of pregnant people guided by feminist theory and critical approaches to data. Using Scandinavian legislation and administrative practice, it analyses how the presence or absence of data, namely scientific evidence, interacts with pregnant people’s legal autonomy in healthcare. Data –particularly scientific evidence - is shown as something that is not neutral but open to interpretation and misappropriation. First, administrative complaints illustrate that not only a lack of scientific studies on pregnant people but also patriarchal attitudes have implications for care. Second, Scandinavian legislation authorizes the involuntary detention of pregnant drug users despite an absence of evidence supporting such drastic actions. Third, complaints bodies are found to frame injury to pregnant bodies as a natural consequence of birth, despite clear evidence as to the duties of healthcare professionals in preventing harm. A relational approach that sees the pregnant body and fetus as integrated though quintessentially unequal is needed. Evidence is not the only answer; an approach that recognizes the dignity of pregnant people must be central. This requires eliminating coercion, recognizing the pregnant patient as the decision maker in healthcare choices and prizing the birthing patient’s voice as a valuable data source.

The story of national judges’ participation in the process of dialogue with the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) pursuant to Article 267 TFEU is a well-known one. There have been many scholarly efforts to explain and theorize the—lack of—participation of national courts in the mechanism. Indeed, various constitutional, institutional, procedural, cultural, political, and individual factors are pointed out to explain this engagement. Yet, it may come as a surprise that still much remains unknown. The available empirical data concerning the potential causes of the national judges’—non—participation is limited to a number of EU member states and is mostly confined to lower courts judges. It is the aim of this Article to partly fill the void in the literature and to provide novel empirical data gained in the course of semi-structured interviews among judges and court référendaires of three Belgian highest courts. The interviews provide insight into the possible factors driving concerned national judges when deciding (not) to refer preliminary questions, including the role and significance of the obligation to refer which is to be found in Article 267 TFEU and the Cilfit-criteria.

This Article examines scenario analysis, a disruptive argumentation technique used by the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) in recent high-profile cases, such as the so-called climate protection case (Klimaschutz) and other decisions on the fundamental right to intergenerational justice (Grundrecht auf Generationengerechitgkeit). After explaining the basic argumentative steps involved in scenario analysis, for example designing scenarios, identifying stakeholders, relating scenarios to strategies, determining the main driving forces, estimating scenario probabilities, the Article sketches a normative model for rational scenario design. The normative model is used as a lens for evaluating the arguments developed by the GFCC in the climate protection case. Such evaluation also builds on game-theoretic insights and points out some weaknesses in the Court’s argument. Finally, the Article observes that, as scenario analysis is used to assess the future impact of legislative decisions, it has the effect of imposing greater constraints on legislatures.

As modern constitutions bind democratic legislation to entrenched norms, they are in tension with the democratic idea that laws should be open to revision by new majorities. Against a widespread view, constitutional norms cannot be considered to be “more democratic” than ordinary laws due to specific qualities of the constitution-making process. Rather, the higher-level law of constitutions can fulfil a specific function as it may provide standards that ensure that laws made by the majority can be justified to everyone. On that basis, I evaluate for different types of constitutional norms whether there are good reasons for constraining legislation. In particular, entrenching cultural traditions and economic policy is more problematic than guarantees of the democratic process and rights ensuring respect for individuals. In sum, a two-tiered law-making system has important values, but people engaging in constitution-making and constitutional interpretation should be wary that the constitutional form is not abused.

Nudging is a policy tool that steers people’s behavior through noncoercive psychological pushes. This has consequences for people’s lives to varying degrees. For example, the nudge of a sticker of a fly in a urinal encourages peeing inside a urinal, while an organ donation default brings people to agree to donating their organs after their decease. Governments do not yet systematically examine which nudges have to be subjected to all safeguards of the rule of law—for example, parliamentary control, judicial review, or compliance with legal principles such as proportionality. This article argues that a legal doctrine is necessary to carry out this examination. Moreover, it contributes to the development of such a doctrine, using the approach of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of inspiration. The doctrine consists of a “de minimis” principle for nudges: Public institutions only need to ensure that a nudge complies with rule of law safeguards when the nudge has substantial consequences. In addition, the doctrine includes a criterion to determine which nudges have such substantial consequences. In particular, it is argued that a nudge should be subjected to at least some safeguards when it has a serious effect on people’s autonomy.

The odious debt doctrine was envisaged by the Russian jurist Alexander Sack as an exception to the passing rule of a debt in case of state and government succession. An analysis of the practice indicates that this exception was often accompanied by some equitable solution. Although the 1983 Vienna Convention did not acknowledge the doctrine, the equitable distribution of assets and liabilities as a method of settling disputes may allow an application of the doctrine in disguise. This equitable method of settling could come into play if the doctrine found application beyond the strict boundaries of state succession. Such a step would imply the formalization of the doctrine in national legislation, with the result that a loan agreement tainted with odiousness would be illegal and unenforceable. Nevertheless, in common law countries, the laws of which usually govern financial transactions, a claim for recovering what transferred under an illegal contract could be denied based on public policy considerations. This denial of restitution would refrain these countries, traditionally sensitive to creditors’ rights, from acknowledging the doctrine in their legal systems. To overcome this impasse, the formalization of the doctrine should include an equitable approach based on the benefit for the population. This equitable approach would reflect the practice of state and government succession on which the doctrine is usually grounded.