We have previously argued thatbehavioral scientists have been testing and advocating individualistic (i-frame) solutions to policy problems that have systemic (s-frame) causes and require systemic solutions. Here, we consider the implications of adopting an s-frame approach for research. We argue that an s-frame approach will involve addressing different types of questions, which will, in turn, require a different toolbox of research methods.

Nudging is a policy tool that steers people’s behavior through noncoercive psychological pushes. This has consequences for people’s lives to varying degrees. For example, the nudge of a sticker of a fly in a urinal encourages peeing inside a urinal, while an organ donation default brings people to agree to donating their organs after their decease. Governments do not yet systematically examine which nudges have to be subjected to all safeguards of the rule of law—for example, parliamentary control, judicial review, or compliance with legal principles such as proportionality. This article argues that a legal doctrine is necessary to carry out this examination. Moreover, it contributes to the development of such a doctrine, using the approach of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of inspiration. The doctrine consists of a “de minimis” principle for nudges: Public institutions only need to ensure that a nudge complies with rule of law safeguards when the nudge has substantial consequences. In addition, the doctrine includes a criterion to determine which nudges have such substantial consequences. In particular, it is argued that a nudge should be subjected to at least some safeguards when it has a serious effect on people’s autonomy.

This study focuses on the development of a creative model of SDGs education that promotes behavior change in upper secondary schools using an approach that combines design thinking and behavioral science nudge methods. The SDGs education for high school students, which utilized design thinking, was used as a case study. Questionnaire surveys of high school students and teachers who participated in the project were conducted. Based on the survey results, a new education model was proposed that can effectively improve SDGs education at the high school level and support educators in this field.

Behavioural public policy (BPP) operates within one of four cultural models of public management, an illustration of an influential scheme set out by Christopher Hood. Even though BPP can be fatalist, individualist or egalitarian, so far it has been hierarchicalist. Hallsworth's manifesto is largely an expression of this hierarchicalist form of public management, with all its limitations and contradictions. As the manifesto pays relatively little attention to decentralist and egalitarian approaches, it misses a radical opportunity. Future work on BPP could incorporate entrepreneurial and egalitarian possibilities while recognising the difficulties of moving away from hierarchalism completely. Even though Hood cautions against a ‘public management for all seasons’, it remains a plausible path for the next generation of researchers and practitioners of BPP.

This article explains why hyper-engaging dark patterns should be considered unlawful in the European Union even though they are very common online, particularly on content-sharing platforms. A hyper-engaging dark pattern is a digital interface with an addictive design: it makes users spend more time interacting with the service by making use of big data analytics and one or more behavioural trait. Hyper-engaging dark patterns are a form of hypernudge. They exploit the dopamine cycle, reduce users’ autonomy and may have additional detrimental health effects. The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive should be interpreted as prohibiting them either as a form of undue influence or under the general test pursuant to Article 5. Both the Digital Services Act and the Artificial Intelligence Act can play a beneficial but merely complementary role in combatting the diffusion of hyper-engaging dark patterns.

Many philosophical accounts of manipulation are blind to the extent to which actual people fall short of the rational ideal, while prominent accounts in political science are under-inclusive. We offer necessary and sufficient conditions – Suitable Reason and Testimonial Honesty – distinguishing manipulative from non-manipulative influence; develop a ‘hypothetical disclosure test’ to measure the degree of manipulation; and provide further criteria to assess and compare the morality of manipulation across cases. We discuss multiple examples drawn from politics and from public policy with particular attention to recent debates about the ethics and politics of nudge.

Two preregistered web studies are presented that explore the impact of experience on the tendency to accept recommended defaults. In each of the 100 trials, participants (n = 180, n = 165) could accept a recommended default option or choose a less attractive prospect. The location of the options (left or right) was randomly determined before each trial. Both studies compared two conditions. Under Condition Dominant, the default option maximized participants’ payoff in all trials. Under Condition Protective, the default option protected the participants from rare losses and maximized expected return but decreased payoff in most trials. The results reveal a tendency to accept the default in Condition Dominant but the opposite tendency in Condition Protective. This pattern was predicted by assuming that in addition to promoting specific actions, the presentation of the default changes the set of feasible strategies, and choice between these strategies reflects reliance on small samples of past experiences.

Boosts and nudges are two separate types of behavioral public policies, distinguished by the mechanisms through which they operate. We investigated whether this theoretical distinction translates into different effects when instances of these policy types are implemented in the context of energy consumption. In a long-term field randomized controlled trial, we competitively tested boosts against nudges. We found that boosts outperform nudges throughout a seven-month period in a student dormitory setting – both in terms of accumulated energy savings, as well as in keeping consumption consistently low during the experimental period. Furthermore, we explored the processes behind the boosts and nudges through a number of mechanistic markers and showed that the tested interventions indeed are instances of the respective types.

The effectiveness and uptake of financial incentives can differ substantially between reward- and deposit-based incentives. Therefore, it is unclear to whom and how different incentives should be assigned. In this study, the effect of different modes of assigning reward- and deposit-based financial incentives on effort is explored in a two-session experiment. First, students’ (n = 228, recruited online) discounting, loss aversion and willingness to pay a deposit were elicited. Second, an incentivized real-effort task was completed (n = 171, 25% drop-out). Two modes of assigning reward- or deposit-based financial incentives were compared: random assignment and ‘nudged’ assignment – assignment based on respondent characteristics allowing opting out. Our results show that respondents receiving nudged assignment earned more and persisted longer on the real-effort task than respondents randomly assigned to incentives. We find no differences in effectiveness between reward-based or deposit-based incentives. Overall, 39% of respondents in the nudged assignment mode followed-up the advice to take deposit-based incentives. The effect of deposit-based incentives was larger for the respondents who followed-up the advice than for respondents that randomly received deposit-based incentives. Overall, these findings suggest that nudged assignment may increase incentives’ effect on effort. Future work should extend this approach to other contexts (e.g., behaviour change).

Nudges are widely employed tools within organizations, but they are often criticized for harming autonomy and for being ineffective. We assess these two criticisms simultaneously: can nudges be both autonomy-preserving and effective in changing behavior? We developed three nudges – an opinion leader nudge, a rule-of-thumb and self-nudges – to reduce a particularly sticky behavior: email use. In a survey experiment of 4,112 healthcare employees, we tested their effect on perceived autonomy and subjective effectiveness. We also tested traditional policy instruments for comparison. Next, to assess objective effectiveness, we conducted a quasi-field experiment in a large healthcare organization with an estimate of 1,189 active email users. We found that each nudge in isolation, but especially when combined, was perceived to be both autonomy-preserving and effective, and more so than traditional policy instruments like an access limit or a monetary reward. We also found some evidence that the combination of all nudges decreased actual email use. This paper advances the literature by showing how innovations in nudge design improve nudges’ ability to be autonomy-preserving and effective.

Nudges – light-touch interventions aimed to help people achieve socially desirable outcomes – can take place without individuals being aware of them. It would seem to be ethically superior to tell individuals that they are being nudged, encouraging them to be aware of the reasons for the official interest in their behaviours. Aided by internal reflection, individuals may make informed choices whether to go along with officially-preferred options or not. In general, this paper adopts this line of argument, justifying self-awareness from the liberal belief in autonomy of the person. However, awareness and/or reflection are not always necessarily ethically superior to passivity, as in cases where manipulation is also present with information provision, when there is framing of deliberative exercises, and where there is harm done to others due to reflectively-driven actions. Most of the time self-awareness is to be preferred, but not always.

We study the impact of changing the existing terminology to describe the rules governing Social Security retirement benefits. We provided respondents from a nationally representative online panel with information pertinent to the decision of when to claim Social Security retirement benefits. The content of the information treatments was identical for all respondents, but some were randomly given an alternative set of terms to refer to the key claiming ages (the experimental treatment group), while others were given the current terms (the control group). Despite the minimal nature of the change, there were significant differences in outcomes. Those in the treatment group spent less time reading the information, but their understanding of the Social Security program improved more than the control group. In addition, the treatment delayed retirement claiming intentions by an average of about two and a half months and increased the recommended claiming age to vignette characters by a similar magnitude. The effects were particularly strong for those with low levels of financial literacy. The relative gains in knowledge persisted several months after the treatment.

Attitudes of public groups towards behavioral policy interventions (or nudges) can be important for both the policy makers who design and deploy nudges, and to researchers who try to understand when and why some nudges are supported while others are not. Until now, research on public attitudes towards nudges has focused on either state- or country-level comparisons, or on correlations with individual-level traits, and has neglected to study how different social groups (such as minorities) might view nudges. Using a large and representative sample, we tested the attitudes of two distinct minority groups in Israel (Israeli Arabs and Ultra-Orthodox Jews), and discovered that nudges that operated against a minority group’s held social norms, promoting a more general societal goal not aligned with the group’s norms, were often less supported by minorities. Contrary to expectations, these differences could not be explained by differences in trust in the government applying these nudges. We discuss implications for public policy and for the research and applications of behavioral interventions.

Very small but cumulated decreases in food intake may be sufficient to erase obesity over a period of years. We examine the effect of slight changes in the accessibility of different foods in a pay-by-weight-of-food salad bar in a cafeteria serving adults for the lunch period. Making a food slightly more difficult to reach (by varying its proximity by about 10 inches) or changing the serving utensil (spoon or tongs) modestly but reliably reduces intake, in the range of 8–16%. Given this effect, it is possible that making calorie-dense foods less accessible and low-calorie foods more accessible over an extended period of time would result in significant weight loss.

Traditionally, information has been assumed to never harm consumers, a notion recently challenged. Salience nudges have been argued to evoke negative emotions, therefore acting as “emotional taxes”. I design a hypothetical restaurant meal experiment to analyze the emotional and short-term consumer welfare impact of a calorie salience nudge (calorie menu labeling) – a policy implemented nationwide in the U.S. in 2018. I find that a calorie salience nudge may act as an emotional tax, but only for some – there is considerable heterogeneity in the emotional response to the nudge. In particular, the nudge emotionally taxes people with low eating self-control, while it emotionally subsidizes those with higher levels of eating self-control. It therefore emotionally taxes the “right” people. However, people with lower levels of self-control may experience fewer benefits from the nudge – the nudge causes them to adjust their high calorie meal consumption by less than do those with higher self-control. It is therefore unsurprising that consumers with lower self-control attach a lower (a negative) value to the calorie salience nudge. Overall, the calorie salience nudge positively affects consumer welfare, although heterogeneity over consumers is substantial – the consumer value ranges from positive to negative. I find no distributional effects over income from the calorie salience nudge.

“Very small but cumulated decreases in food intake may be sufficient to have significant effects, even erasing obesity over a period of years” (Rozin et al., 2011). In two studies, one a lab study and the other a real-world study, we examine the effect of manipulating the position of different foods on a restaurant menu. Items placed at the beginning or the end of the list of their category options were up to twice as popular as when they were placed in the center of the list. Given this effect, placing healthier menu items at the top or bottom of item lists and less healthy ones in their center (e.g., sugared drinks vs. calorie-free drinks) should result in some increase in favor of healthier food choices.

In “Nudging, Bullshitting, and the Meta-Nudge”, the author responds to William Simkulet’s claim that nudging is bullshitting (according to Harry Frankfurt’s analysis of bullshit and bullshitting), and therefore nudging during the process of informed consent renders consent invalid. The author argues that nudging is not necessarily bullshitting and then explains that although this issue is philosophically interesting, practically speaking, even if nudging is bullshitting, it does not follow that nudging necessarily renders informed consent invalid. This is obviously true in those situations in which nudging during the process of informed consent is unavoidable. The author concludes with a discussion of the meta-nudge and suggests that physicians can use the meta-nudge to eliminate or decrease the power of inappropriate, problematic, or undesirable nudges.

Communicating evidence that a policy is effective can increase public support although the effects are small. In the context of policies to increase healthier eating in out-of-home restaurants, we investigate two ways of presenting evidence for a policy's effectiveness: (i) visualising and (ii) re-expressing evidence into a more interpretable form. We conducted an online experiment in which participants were randomly allocated to one of five groups. We used a 2 (text only vs visualisation) × 2 (no re-expression vs re-expression) design with one control group. Participants (n = 4500) representative of the English population were recruited. The primary outcome was perceived effectiveness and the secondary outcome was public support. Evidence of effectiveness increased perceptions of effectiveness (d = 0.14, p < 0.001). There was no evidence that visualising, or re-expressing, changed perceptions of effectiveness (respectively, d = 0.02, p = 0.605; d = −0.02, p = 0.507). Policy support increased with evidence but this was not statistically significant after Bonferroni adjustment (d = 0.08, p = 0.034, α = 0.006). In conclusion, communicating evidence of policy effectiveness increased perceptions that the policy was effective. Neither visualising nor re-expressing evidence increased perceived effectiveness of policies more than merely stating in text that the policy was effective.