The role of judges in implementing climate policies has become a crucial component of the existing governance framework regulating climate change action. Litigation focusing on more ambitious climate action is trending globally. Individuals, local authorities and NGOs are bringing lawsuits against national governments, holding them accountable to their legal obligations and engendering policy change. Due to the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers, the justiciability of climate policy is questioned. Disagreements exist between advocates of an activist judicial role and those in favour of legislative and executive discretion. The main question is to what extent the judiciary can oblige other government branches to take urgent preventative action, particularly to implement or adjust climate policies. Their role in implementing climate policies is analysed from a comparative perspective, considering theoretical debates on the doctrine of the separation of powers in different legal systems and relevant case-law. The chapter connects international and domestic issues and highlights recommendations to foster effective implementation of more ambitious climate policies.

This chapter presents how scientists currently use the increasing number of individuals who live to an age above 90 years (i.e. long-lived individuals) to investigate biological determinants of longevity. It will provide an overview of the most extensive studies of exceptionally long-lived individuals and long-living families that have been established since the early 1970s. The focus of the chapter will be on the metabolic phenotypes and the genetic determinants that characterize them. It will discuss the delayed occurrence of age-related disease in long-lived individuals and their offspring as well as their favourable immune-metabolic profile, that is, improved glycaemic control, lipid and thyroid metabolism and immunity. Moreover, it will provide an overview of studies focused on unravelling the genetic component of longevity, which is assumed to be partly responsible for the observed immune-metabolic profile. The findings from these studies indicate that longevity is most likely determined by many different rare protective genetic variants that still need to be identified, for example using whole genome/exome sequencing approaches. Last, but not least, the chapter will discuss some of the implications of the presented findings for medical research on ageing and age-related diseases.

This chapter discusses the immunities of individuals in relation to criminal prosecution for international crimes. It introduces the main two types of immunity: functional immunity and personal immunity. It discusses diplomatic immunity as a particular illustration. The chapter then discusses limits on functional immunity, with the Pinochet decision and other precedents. It then discusses the harder situation of personal immunity, as explained by the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant Decision. It reviews various ways that states have relinquished immunity, including through Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or through ratification of the ICC Statute. The chapter surveys the many issues about whether Security Council referrals to the ICC, coupled with a duty to cooperate fully, have the same effect of removing immunity. The chapter then discusses the legal position advanced by the Sierra Leone Special Court in the Taylor case, and endorsed by the ICC Appeals Chamber in the Al Bashir case, that there are no immunities before international courts, by virtue of their special nature. The chapter canvasses criticism of the theory as well arguments in favour of it.

The ICC launched in 2002 to judge cases against individuals accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. It is unique among international institutions in this book in that it imposes its obligations upon individual persons rather than governments. This chapter shows the powers and limits on the authority of the ICC to punish people for large-scale atrocities. The practical power of the ICC is shaped by both the difficulty of apprehending people and the active work of those who wish to remain insulated from accountability.

This chapter provides a basic introduction to virology, dealing with the history of viruses, taxonomy, virus replication stages (attachment, entry, uncoating, transcription, translation, assembly and release). It also deals with the immune response to viruses, including innate immune response, adaptive immunity, cell-mediated response, antibody-mediated response, viral pathogenesis, viral tropisms, viral spread, viral persistence, viral virulence and host factors.

This chapter examines section 117 of the Australian Constitution, which prohibits States from discriminating against residents in other States. Section 117 is a peculiar provision. It is not a limitation on power that invalidates offending laws: it confers an immunity on some individuals (namely, those who are Australians resident in a State, but not those who are non-Australians resident in a State or anyone resident in a territory or overseas) from offending laws. The basic methodology for determining whether section 117 applies involves a comparison of the position of the plaintiff in two scenarios. The first scenario is the actual situation of a plaintiff. The second scenario is the hypothetical situation of the plaintiff being a resident in the State alleged to have discriminated against the plaintiff. If the treatment of the plaintiff in both scenarios by the State would be the same, then there is no discrimination and section 117 does not apply. If the treatment of the plaintiff in both scenarios would be different, then there is discrimination on the ground of State residency and section 117 renders the plaintiff immune from the offending law.

The 1928 epidemic came a decade after the 1918–19 influenza pandemic. Using the rich epidemiological, biological, and historical evidence available from the 1918–19 pandemic, this chapter examines the relationship between these two episodes. What happened along the Mackenzie River in 1928 offers unique insight into the global reverberations of the appearance of a novel influenza virus ten years previously. This chapter also explores the effects of colonial power relations on the course of the epidemic and the ways in which this epidemic reinforced particular interpretations of ‘race’ and ‘racial’ difference in northern North America.

IOM wields power over individuals and is capable of violating their rights, for instance when it contributes to migrant detention operations or when it engages in migrant returns that are ‘voluntary under compulsion’. This chapter assesses IOM’s legal human rights accountability in three steps. First, IOM’s human rights obligations are identified. While there has been much debate about their proper source, there is today little doubt that organizations such as IOM as have at least a core bundle of human rights obligations. The second step is to identify and analyze the mechanisms that may potentially hold IOM to account for violations of its human rights obligations. I identify the Office of the Inspector General and domestic courts as the only two IOM human rights accountability mechanisms, and analyze their rules on access, participation, neutrality, and outcomes using doctrinal legal methodology. Third, I assess the sufficiency of these two accountability mechanisms, in light of the right to an effective remedy and procedural justice research. The chapter concludes with an overall assessment of IOM’s human rights accountability, and some thoughts on potential avenues for reform.

Chapter 2 defines efficiency. The efficiency criterion here is cost-benefit analysis, where cost is institution cost (including information and transaction costs) and benefit is what is called “allocative efficiency” in the literature. My efficiency criterion builds on 60 years of law-and-economics research in property law, but I believe that this is the first time that efficiency has been formulated in this way. Chapter 2 positions efficiency as a first-order value, while welfare is a second-order value that includes efficiency and other first-order values such as distribution of wealth. In addition, Chapter 2 introduces the concepts of ex ante viewpoint and the property rule versus the liability rule, both of which will be drawn on in later chapters.

The chapter examines the nature and the main characteristics of arbitral institutions and describes the main features of institutional arbitration. It then illustrates several categories of institutions, distinguishing them on the basis of various criteria. The chapter further describes the functions performed by arbitral institutions with respect to the specific cases submitted to them, their contribution to the making of arbitration law and their role in promoting the knowledge and culture of arbitration. The chapter further examines the notion of "mandatory institutional rules", i.e. rules that institutions do not accept derogations from, and illustrates the conditions for institutions' liability vis à vis the parties and the scope of their immunity in relation to acts and omissions in the performance of their functions under the rules The author concludes that, despite the importance of the functions carried out by institutions, their role does not entail any involvement in adjudicating disputes. The impact of institutions’ decisions on the outcome of cases is indirect, limited to procedural issues or limited to recommendations to arbitrators.

The multi-faceted role of arbitrators is complex and protean. While there is consensus on the fact that the nature of the international arbitrator’s role entails according the arbitrator wide-ranging powers and that the arbitrator also undertakes a panoply of obligations, the scope of these powers and duties is not always well defined.Views about the nature and scope of these powers and duties might diverge depending on whether arbitrators are seen as service providers, justice purveyors, or both. Following a brief overview of this core question, the contribution proceeds to identify the sources of an arbitrator’s powers. Next, the most important duties of international arbitrators, including those pertaining to ethical obligations, the need to ensure due process, the necessity to apply the proper law, the duty to provide a reasoned award, and several others are explored. This contribution also highlights the most important rights of international arbitrators, such as the right to receive good faith cooperation from the parties, as well as the rights to remuneration and immunity, amongst others. Finally, we make some observations on ways in which the rights and duties entailed by the complex mandate of arbitrators can be reconciled in the event of conflict.

This chapter deals with Germany’s position on State jurisdiction and immunities. The first part, Jurisdiction of the State, addresses Germany releasing an Iranian citizen in a prisoner swap, as well as Germany considering further US sanctions on Nord Stream 2, a pipeline project delivering gas from Russia to Germany, an encroachment on its sovereignty as it understands them to be extraterritorial in nature. The second part, State immunity, deals with the Federal Constitutional Court classifying Greek debt restructuring measures as acta iure imperii. While the chapter agrees with the decision, it criticizes the Federal Constitutional Court for missing the opportunity to advance the discussion of a contentious matter of public international law. Another article assesses Germany’s (non)participation in US court proceedings for alleged colonial genocide and enslavement of the Ovaherero and Nama in what was formerly known as South West Africa and is now Namibia. The chapter argues that Germany is not answerable and that Namibia’s position in its negotiations with the German government over a political declaration concerning atrocities committed during colonial rule was weakened.

The chapter provides an analysis of the concept of rights. It clarifies the precise object of inquiry of the book. A particular focus is repesented by claim rights or subjective rights. Mayor elements of the analysis of subjective rights are recalled, including historical contributions from Natural Law thinkers, comments by legal positivists, the Hohfeldian framework and the rules and principles approach. The question as to whether it is conceptually impossible to regard social rights as proper rights is addressed. Central elements of a concept of rights are discussed, including the addressees of rights, the holders of rights and the problem of group rights. The relation of legal and moral rights is a further object of inquiry, as are the basic contents of human rights, the copossibility and limitations of rights, the nature of obligations, the peremptory nature of rights and questions of the interpretation of rights.