Evidence shows that the willingness of individuals to avenge punishment inflicted upon them for transgressions they committed constitutes a significant obstacle toward upholding social norms and cooperation. The drivers of this behavior, however, are not well understood. We hypothesize that ulterior motive attribution—the tendency to assign ulterior motives to punishers for their actions—increases the likelihood of counter-punishment. We exogenously manipulate the ability to attribute ulterior motives to punishers by having the punisher be either an unaffected third party or a second party who, as the victim of a transgression, may be driven to punish by a desire to take revenge. We show that survey respondents consider second-party punishment to be substantially more likely to be driven by ulterior motives than an identical, payoff-equalizing punishment meted out by a third party. In line with our hypothesis, we find that second-party punishment is 66.3% more likely to trigger counter-punishment than third-party punishment in a lab experiment. The loss in earnings due to counter-punishment is 64.6% higher for second-party punishers than third-party punishers, all else equal.

We establish whether the efficacy of mutual monitoring in fostering cooperation is dependent on the degree of approval motivation within teams. Approval motivation is defined as the desire to produce positive perceptions in others and the incentive to acquire the approval of others as well as the desire to avoid disapproval, (Martin in J Personality Assess 48(5):508–519, 1984). Contrary to the theoretical predictions, the results from the experiment suggest that mutual monitoring was not effective in fostering cooperation in teams. Furthermore, the efficacy of mutual monitoring in fostering cooperation was not correlated with the degree of approval motivation within teams.

We study the robustness of Krupka and Weber's method (2013) for eliciting social norms. In two online experiments with more than 1200 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk, we find that participants’ response patterns are invariant to differences in the salience of the monetarily incentivized coordination aspect. We further demonstrate that asking participants for their personal first- and second-order beliefs without monetary incentives results in qualitatively identical responses in the case that beliefs and social norms are well aligned. Overall, Krupka and Weber's method produces remarkably robust response patterns.

Böckenholt and van der Heijden’s results regarding compliance with insurance regulations—that the enforcement activities of a regulatory agency were relatively unpredictive of compliance—are consistent with findings from other domains (e.g., tax adherence), where personal factors and informal social controls have been shown to play a more significant role. However, the specific form of informal social control investigated in Böckenholt and van der Heijden’s study (the perceived approval/disapproval of friends and family) is not the only kind of informal social control that has proven effective in spurring compliance. Descriptive social norms, which involve perceptions not of what others approve but of what others actually do, also influence compliance decisions powerfully. Yet, the role of descriptive social norms in rule adherence is often underappreciated by governed and governors alike. The consequences of this relative lack of recognition are discussed within the arena of compliance with pro-environmental regulations and requests.

Understanding and predicting human cooperative behaviour and belief dynamics remains a major challenge both from the scientific and practical perspectives. Because of the complexity and multiplicity of material, social and cognitive factors involved, both empirical and theoretical work tends to focus only on some snippets of the puzzle. Recently, a mathematical theory has been proposed that integrates material, social and cognitive aspects of behaviour and beliefs dynamics to explain how people make decisions in social dilemmas within heterogeneous groups. Here we apply this theory in two countries, China and Spain, through four long-term behavioural experiments utilising the Common Pool Resources game and the Collective Risk game. Our results show that material considerations carry the smallest weight in decision-making, while personal norms tend to be the most important factor. Empirical and normative expectations have intermediate weight in decision-making. Cognitive dissonance, social projection, logic constraints and cultural background play important roles in both decision-making and beliefs dynamics. At the individual level, we observe differences in the weights that people assign to factors involved in the decision-making and belief updating process. We identify different types of prosociality and rule-following associated with cultural differences, various channels for the effects of messaging, and culturally dependent interactions between sensitivity to messaging and conformity. Our results can put policy and information design on firmer ground, highlighting the need for interventions tailored to the situation at hand and to individual characteristics. Overall, this work demonstrates the theoretical and practical power of the theory in providing a more comprehensive understanding of human behaviour and beliefs.

This study empirically examines gender inequality in tolerance for women's opinions and identifies how the provision of normative gender-egalitarian message can mitigate this inequality by conducting online randomized experiments in Japan. In this experiment, I asked the participants to evaluate the agreement score for 10 anonymous statements and implemented two types of random interventions: disclosing the gender of the statement poster and providing normative statement for gender equality. The results of both cross-sectional and panel data analyses showed that people significantly reduced the agreement score for women's opinions compared with men's and non-gender disclosure opinions. Meanwhile, the negative impact of female gender disclosure was neutralized when participants were provided with a normative message.

Based on social norms theory, we examine the impact of local gambling culture, an unexpected result of government-permitted lotteries, on enterprise bribery. We propose that local gambling cultures can promote active enterprise involvement in bribery activities by reinforcing the speculative psychology of enterprise decision-makers. In addition, we argue that local gambling culture is less likely to lead female (returnee) chairpersons to develop speculative psychology than male (nonreturnee) chairpersons. This, in turn, allows female (returnee) chairpersons to undermine the positive impact of local gambling culture on involvement in enterprise bribery. Based on 11 years of empirical data obtained from privately listed Chinese companies (including 2,637 listed companies with 15,036 firm-year data points), we obtain empirical evidence to support most of these views. This study is the first to explore the relationship between local gambling culture and enterprise bribery, and important insights are provided for shareholders and policy-makers to better curb enterprise bribery.

Counter-serious and organised crime (SOC) strategies often include an awareness-raising element. Such messaging aims to build support for counter-SOC efforts, and intolerance for organised criminal activity. However, a growing body of research suggests that raising awareness to ‘social bads’ like SOC may risk backfiring by encouraging pessimistic attitudes about whether they can be controlled and could even nudge people to agree with populist narratives which argue that political outsiders represent the only hope for tackling systemic problems. A nationally representative survey experiment in Albania was conducted to test, for the first time, the impact of messages about SOC. Typical of counter-SOC messaging in practice, the first message emphasised the harms SOC causes. The second was more positive, highlighting high levels of social disapproval of SOC, a theme that social norms research suggests may be effective. We find that the first message backfires by reducing confidence in law enforcement and encouraging support for populist ideas. The second message is unexpectedly found to also encourage support for a populist sentiment, while having no positive impact on attitudes about law enforcement. This suggests that even positive messaging about ‘social bads’ can risk triggering unwanted responses.

We study why suffering a negative economic shock, i.e., a significant loss, may trigger a change in other-regarding behavior. We conjecture that people trade off concern for money with a conditional preference to follow social norms and that suffering a shock makes extrinsic motivation more salient, leading to more norm violation. This hypothesis is grounded on the premise that preferences are norm-dependent. We study this question experimentally: after administering losses on the earnings from a real-effort task, we analyze choices in prosocial and antisocial settings. To derive our predictions, we elicit social norms for each context analyzed in the experiments. We find evidence that shock increases deviations from norms.

Production and utilization of crop residues as mulch and effective weed management are two central elements in the successful implementation of Conservation Agriculture (CA) systems in southern Africa. Yet, the challenges of crop residue availability for mulch or the difficulties in managing weed proliferation in CA systems are bigger than a micro-level focus on weeds and crop residues themselves. The bottlenecks are symptoms of broader systemic complications that cannot be resolved without appreciating the interactions between the current scientific understanding of CA and its application in smallholder systems, private incentives, social norms, institutions, and government policy. In this paper, we elucidate a series of areas that represent some unquestioned answers about chemical weed control and unanswered questions about how to maintain groundcover demanding more research along the natural and social sciences continuum. In some communities, traditional rules that allow free-range grazing of livestock after harvesting present a barrier in surface crop residue management. On the other hand, many of the communities either burn, remove, or incorporate the residues into the soil thus hindering the near-permanent soil cover required in CA systems. The lack of soil cover also means that weed management through soil mulch is unachievable. Herbicides are often a successful stopgap solution to weed control, but they are costly, and most farmers do not use them as recommended, which reduces efficacy. Besides, the use of herbicides can cause environmental hazards and may affect human health. Here, we suggest further assessment of the manipulation of crop competition, the use of vigorously growing cover crops, exploration of allelopathy, and use of microorganisms in managing weeds and reducing seed production to deplete the soil weed seed bank. We also suggest in situ production of plant biomass, use of unpalatable species for mulch generation and change of grazing by-laws towards a holistic management of pastures to reduce the competition for crop residues. However, these depend on the socio-economic status dynamics at farmer and community level.

Gender role ideology, i.e. beliefs about how genders should behave, is shaped by social learning. Accordingly, if perceptions about the beliefs of others are inaccurate this may impact trajectories of cultural change. Consistent with this premise, recent studies report evidence of a tendency to overestimate peer support for inequitable gender norms, especially among men, and that correcting apparent ‘norm misperception’ promotes transitions to relatively egalitarian beliefs. However, supporting evidence largely relies on self-report measures vulnerable to social desirability bias. Consequently, observed patterns may reflect researcher measurement error rather than participant misperception. Addressing this shortcoming, we examine men's gender role ideology using both conventional self-reported and a novel wife-reported measure of men's beliefs in an urbanising community in Tanzania. We confirm that participants overestimate peer support for gender inequity. However, the latter measure, which we argue more accurately captures men's true beliefs, implies that this tendency is relatively modest in magnitude and scope. Overestimation was most pronounced among men holding relatively inequitable beliefs, consistent with misperception of peer beliefs reinforcing inequitable norms. Furthermore, older and poorly educated men overestimated peer support for gender inequity the most, suggesting that outdated and limited social information contribute to norm misperception in this context.

According to one influential tradition, to assert that p is to express a belief that p. Yet how do assertions provide strong evidence for belief? Philosophers have recently drawn on evolutionary biology to help explain the stability of assertive communication. Mitchell Green suggests that assertions are akin to biological handicaps. Peter Graham argues against the handicap view and instead claims that the norms of assertion are deterrents. Contra Graham, I argue that both mechanisms may play a role in assertive communication, although assertions as deterrents will often fail to provide strong evidence for belief.

It is now abundantly clear that social norms channel behaviour and impact economic development. This insight leads to the question: How do social norms evolve? In a companion paper (Voigt (2023). Journal of Institutional Economics, 20), I survey studies showing that geographical conditions can have direct and long-lasting effects on social norms. This paper goes one step further: It surveys studies that show how different geographical conditions affect both religious beliefs as well as traditions of family organization and how these, in turn, affect social norms.

It is now abundantly clear that social norms channel behaviour and impact economic development. This insight leads to the question: How do social norms evolve? This survey examines research that relies on geography to explain the development of social norms. It turns out that many social norms are either directly or indirectly determined by geography broadly conceived and can, hence, be considered largely time invariant. Given that successful economic development presupposes the congruence between formal institutions and social norms, this insight is highly relevant for all policy interventions designed to foster economic development. In a companion paper, the role of religion and family organization as potential mediators between geography and social norms assumes centre stage.

Liberal political institutions have been an enormous boon for humanity. The free market aspect of liberalism has led to an explosion of innovation, ranging from new kinds of technology and novel forms of entertainment to advances in science and medicine. The emphasis on individual rights at the core of liberalism has increased our ability to explore new ways of living and to construct an identity of our own choosing. But liberal political institutions around the world are facing two crises: low fertility and declining social trust. In particular, liberalism’s focus on individual liberty rather than group cohesion can increase economic productivity by encouraging the free movement of people and capital, but this movement is associated with declines in social cohesion and fertility. In this essay, we highlight some challenges to the long-term evolutionary stability of liberalism. In other words, we raise the question: Can liberalism last?

Compliance with hygiene and other safety measures in the workplace was an important component of society's strategy for reducing infections at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular before vaccinations were widely available. We report the results of a field trial of well-established behavioural interventions (social norms, pledging and messenger effects) we implemented to improve compliance with such measures in an occupational setting. We use daily reports of own and other's behaviour to assess the effects of these interventions and supplement these subjective (self-reported) measures with objective data on hand sanitiser usage. The behavioural interventions tested have statistically significant but quantitatively moderate effects on subjective compliance measures and minimal effects on hand sanitiser usage. All effects of our interventions are short-term in nature and dissipate shortly after implementation. Our findings thus provide at most weak support for the notion that typical behavioural interventions can help support compliance with infection prevention measures in the workplace.