Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly being integrated into sentencing within the criminal justice system. This research examines the impact of AI on sentencing, addressing the challenges and opportunities for fairness and justice. The main problem explored is AI’s potential to perpetuate biases, undermining fair-trial principles. This study intends to assess AI’s influence on sentencing, identify legal and ethical challenges, and propose a framework for equitable AI use in judicial decisions. Key research questions include: (1) How does AI influence sentencing decisions? (2) What concerns arise from AI in sentencing? (3) What safeguards can mitigate those concerns and prejudices? Utilizing qualitative methodology, including doctrinal analysis and comparative studies, the research reveals AI’s potential to enhance sentencing efficiency but also to risk reinforcing biases. The study recommends robust regulatory frameworks, transparency in AI algorithms, and judicial oversight to ensure AI supports justice rather than impedes it, advocating for a balanced integration that prioritizes human rights and fairness.

Generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) has gained significant popularity in recent years. It is being integrated into a variety of sectors for its abilities in content creation, design, research, and many other functionalities. The capacity of GenAI to create new content—ranging from realistic images and videos to text and even computer code—has caught the attention of both the industry and the general public. The rise of publicly available platforms that offer these services has also made GenAI systems widely accessible, contributing to their mainstream appeal and dissemination. This article delves into the transformative potential and inherent challenges of incorporating GenAI into the domain of judicial decision-making. The article provides a critical examination of the legal and ethical implications that arise when GenAI is used in judicial rulings and their underlying rationale. While the adoption of this technology holds the promise of increased efficiency in the courtroom and expanded access to justice, it also introduces concerns regarding bias, interpretability, and accountability, thereby potentially undermining judicial discretion, the rule of law, and the safeguarding of rights. Around the world, judiciaries in different jurisdictions are taking different approaches to the use of GenAI in the courtroom. Through case studies of GenAI use by judges in jurisdictions including Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and India, this article maps out the challenges presented by integrating the technology in judicial determinations, and the risks of embracing it without proper guidelines for mitigating potential harms. Finally, this article develops a framework that promotes a more responsible and equitable use of GenAI in the judiciary, ensuring that the technology serves as a tool to protect rights, reduce risks, and ultimately, augment judicial reasoning and access to justice.

Attention to ideological polarization in the Circuit Courts of Appeals has surged in recent years. However, no valid cross-circuit cardinal measure of polarization has been established. The lack of a valid cross-circuit measure of polarization has limited scholar’s ability to evaluate broad trends in judicial polarization and address how ideological polarization influences judicial decision-making. To address this, I develop a new measure of ideological polarization for each of the Circuit Courts of Appeals between 1953 and 2022 using the polarization framework established by Esteban and Ray (1994). I then theorize that in order to uphold the norms of collegiality, more polarized courts are likely to take strategic actions to avoid breaking consensus. I show that polarized courts deliberate longer before releasing opinions, are less likely to give cases with a full hearing, and are less likely to publish justified and signed opinions. These results have implications for the efficiency, efficacy, and authority of the Circuit Courts of Appeals.

This article outlines and tackles two inter-related puzzles regarding the comparatively much less robust human rights impact that the ECOWAS Court (in effect, West Africa’s international human rights court) has had on the generally more democratic legislative/judicial branch of decision-making and action in Nigeria vis-à-vis the generally more authoritarian executive branch within Nigeria, the country that is the source of most of the cases filed before the court. The article then discusses and analyzes the examples and extent of the court’s human rights impact on legislative/judicial branch decision-making and action in that key country. This is followed by the development of a set of analytical, multi-factorial, explanations for the two inter-connected puzzles that animate the enquiry in this article. In the end, the article argues that several factors have combined to produce the comparatively much less robust human rights impact that the ECOWAS Court has had on domestic legislative and judicial decision-making, process, and action in Nigeria, through restricting the extent to which the latter could mobilize more robustly the court’s human rights-relevant processes and rulings.

Though once commonplace, presidents no longer nominate individuals with legislative experience to the U.S. Supreme Court. What difference does this shift make? Drawing on theories that connect judicial background characteristics to decision-making, I test whether legislative background impacts federal judicial review. Using nonparametric matching and almost 150 years of judicial review decisions, I find that, while such experience decreases the likelihood of striking down a law, the effect is small. By contrast, partisanship has a much stronger impact, with justices more likely to strike down laws when the enacting Congressional majority is a different party from their appointing president.

Institutional designers of judiciaries often want to provide the appearance of impartiality. As a result, many collegial courts issue per curiam rulings in which judges’ votes are not public. An extensive scholarship, however, provides evidence that ideology and mechanisms of retention affect judicial decision-making. Do per curiam rulings actively mitigate or provide cover for ideological and career-oriented judicial decision-making? I argue that – when serving as the rapporteur (opinion-writer) – a judge on a civil law per curiam court can steer their panel towards the outcome their appointer prefers. When their appointing government turns over, nonetheless, a judge is not compelled to change their decision-making to be in line with their new government, as per curiam rulings protect them from retaliation. An analysis of decisions at the Court of Justice of the European Union provides evidence for this account.

Several legal scholars have recently argued that U.S. tort law’s physical-emotional distinction commits tort to the objectionable position of mind-body dualism, but they have not considered the distinction’s role as an aid to judicial cognition and decision-making. Drawing primarily on the law of negligent infliction of emotional distress, this essay argues that tort’s physical-emotional distinction is not a relic of mind-body dualism but a heuristic that judges have used to structure and simplify the difficult but unavoidable task of drawing lines between legally cognizable and non-cognizable harm. The analysis has at least three normative implications: (1) users of tort’s physical-emotional distinction should clarify that they neither endorse dualism nor depreciate emotional harm; (2) because judicial expertise may not extend to the task of drawing lines between legally cognizable and non-cognizable harm, judicial performance in this area may be more adequate than critics suggest; and (3) although it may not be possible to determine the optimal way of drawing lines between legally cognizable and non-cognizable emotional harm, moral-philosophical tools such as Rawlsian and Scanlonian contractualism may be able to identify partial or pro tanto considerations for choosing among different ways of doing so.

Orders are judicial decisions designed to shore up fair and timely resolution of disputes. As written, detailed, and factual documents, they are reliable markers of procedural steps and a unique source of information about the inner working of an institution. This article examines all published orders of the European Court of Justice, drawing lessons from their use. The analysis demonstrates that the pursuit of efficiency and uniform application blurs the lines between the administration and judging. First, it centralises the institution, expanding the duties of the Registry and amplifying the role of the Cabinet of the President of the Court. Second, it bureaucratises the interpretation and the uniform application of European Union law. These processes are common in judicial institutions with no power over their dockets. But the particular European response, authored by the Court, also suggests its reluctance to forfeit the interpretive monopoly.

The “hungry judge” effect, as presented by a famous study, is a common point of reference to underline human bias in judicial decision-making. This is particularly pronounced in the literature on “artificial intelligence” (AI) in law. Here, the effect is invoked to counter concerns about bias in automated decision-aids and to motivate their use. However, the validity of the “hungry judge” effect is doubtful. In our context, this is problematic for, at least, two reasons. First, shaky evidence leads to a misconstruction of the problem that may warrant an AI intervention. Second, painting the justice system worse than it actually is becomes a dangerous argumentative strategy, as it undermines institutional trust. Against this background, this article revisits the original “hungry judge” study and argues that it cannot be relied on as an argument in the AI discourse or beyond. The case of “hungry judges” demonstrates the lure of narratives, the dangers of “problem gerrymandering,” and, ultimately, the need for a careful reception of social science.

France relies on unionized judges to assess labor cases in court. The economic literature advocates that judges pertaining to the more belligerent unions alter judicial equilibrium, foster lower settlements, avoid trials, and intensify a professional judge's interventions. This paper intends to test whether such speculations are accurate. The empirical evidence provided here suggests that such fears are not grounded. Using a database on French employment courts, between 2012 and 2016, we show that judges from the most adversarial trade unions foster conciliation and reduce the number of dropped legal cases. The lack of statistically significant impact of unions on the judicial institution's dysfunctions is evident: the labor judiciary's alleged polarization does not drive the rate of appeals and the number of professional judges' intervention. Finally, the judicial malfunctions appear to be driven by institutional distortions and local socio-economic conditions.