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Explaining the Comparatively Less Robust Human Rights Impact of the ECOWAS Court on Legislative and Judicial Decision-making, Process, and Action in Nigeria

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2024

Obiora Chinedu Okafor ,
Udoka Owie ,
Okechukwu Effoduh  and
Rahina Zarma
Obiora Chinedu Okafor*
Affiliation:
Edward B. Burling Chair in International Law and Institutions, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, United States Professor (part-time), Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada Former United Nations Independent Expert on Human Rights and International Solidarity
Udoka Owie
Affiliation:
Associate Professor of International Law at BAZE University, Abuja, Nigeria Former Senior Research Associate in the CARRISSA Program, Nathanson Centre on Transnational Human Rights, Crime and Security, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada (2018–23)
Okechukwu Effoduh
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor, Lincoln Alexander School of Law, Toronto Metropolitan University, Toronto, Canada
Rahina Zarma
Affiliation:
Former Research Associate in the CARRISSA Program Nathanson Centre on Transnational Human Rights, Crime and Security, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada (2020–21)
*
Corresponding author: Obiora Chinedu Okafor; Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This article outlines and tackles two inter-related puzzles regarding the comparatively much less robust human rights impact that the ECOWAS Court (in effect, West Africa’s international human rights court) has had on the generally more democratic legislative/judicial branch of decision-making and action in Nigeria vis-à-vis the generally more authoritarian executive branch within Nigeria, the country that is the source of most of the cases filed before the court. The article then discusses and analyzes the examples and extent of the court’s human rights impact on legislative/judicial branch decision-making and action in that key country. This is followed by the development of a set of analytical, multi-factorial, explanations for the two inter-connected puzzles that animate the enquiry in this article. In the end, the article argues that several factors have combined to produce the comparatively much less robust human rights impact that the ECOWAS Court has had on domestic legislative and judicial decision-making, process, and action in Nigeria, through restricting the extent to which the latter could mobilize more robustly the court’s human rights-relevant processes and rulings.

Résumé

Résumé

Cet article expose et aborde deux énigmes interdépendantes concernant l’impact comparativement beaucoup moins fort en matière de droits de la personne que la Cour de la CEDEAO (fonctionnellement, la cour internationale des droits de la personne de l’Afrique de l’Ouest) a eu sur la branche législative/judiciaire généralement plus démocratique de la prise de décision et de l’action au Nigeria par rapport à la branche exécutive généralement plus autoritaire au Nigeria, le pays qui est à l’origine de la plupart des affaires déposées devant la Cour. L’article examine et analyse ensuite les exemples et l’étendue de l’impact des droits de la personne de la Cour sur la prise de décision et l’action du pouvoir législatif/judiciaire dans ce pays clé. Il développe ensuite une série d’explications analytiques et multifactorielles pour les deux énigmes interconnectées qui animent l’enquête de cet article. En fin de compte, l’article soutient que plusieurs facteurs se sont combinés pour produire l’impact comparativement beaucoup moins fort de la Cour de la CEDEAO en matière de droits de la personne sur la prise de décision, le processus et l’action législative et judiciaire au Nigeria, en limitant la mesure dans laquelle ces derniers pouvaient mobiliser plus vigoureusement les processus et les décisions de la Cour en matière de droits de la personne.

Keywords

International courtsinternational human rights courtslegislative decision-makingregional courtsjudicial decision-makingcivil society actorsECOWASTribunaux internationauxtribunaux internationaux des droits de la personnetribunaux régionauxprise de décision judiciaireacteurs de la société civileCEDEAO
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international , First View , pp. 1 - 39
Copyright
© The Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international 2024

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Footnotes

The authors would like to thank Lilian Asiimwe, Kiana Blake, and John Mastrangelo for their excellent research assistance on the larger project of which it is a part. We are also grateful to the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Osgoode Hall Law School, and the Nathanson Centre on Transnational Human Rights, Crime and Security for generous funding that made the research for this article possible.

References

1 For example, see Gathii, James T, ed, The Performance of Africa’s International Courts: Using Litigation for Political, Legal and Social Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020);CrossRefGoogle Scholar Karen J Alter et al, “A New International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice” (2013) 107 Am J Intl L 737.

2 For a few examples, see Gathii, supra note 1; Alter et al, supra note 1; Ebobrah, Solomon, “The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice: A Dual Mandate with Skewed Authority” in Alter, Karen J, Helfer, Laurence R & Madsen, Mikael R, eds, International Court Authority (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) 82 Google Scholar [Ebobrah, “ECOWAS Community Court of Justice”]; Solomon Ebobrah, “Critical Issues in the Human Rights Mandate of the ECOWAS Court of Justice” (2010) 54 J Afr L 1 at 54; Horace Adjolohoun, “The ECOWAS Court as a Human Rights Promoter? Assessing Five Years’ Impact of the Koraou Slavery Judgement” (2013) 31 Netherlands Q L Rev 368; Horace Adjolohoun, “Status of Human Rights Judgments of the ECOWAS Court: Implications on Human Rights and Democracy in the Region (7 August 2012),” cited in Alter et al, supra note 1, at 767, n 219; Obiora C Okafor & Okechukwu J Effoduh, “The ECOWAS Court as a (Promising) Resource for Pro-Poor Activist Forces: Sovereign Hurdles, Brainy Relays, and ‘Flipped Strategic Social Constructivism’” in Gathii, supra note 1, 106 at 106; Olabisi D Akinkugbe, “Towards and Analysis of the Mega-Political Jurisprudence of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice” in Gathii, supra note 1, 149; Maame E Addadzi‑Koom, “Of the Women’s Rights Jurisprudence of the ECOWAS Court: The Role of the Maputo Protocol and the Due Diligence Standard” (2020) 28 Fem Leg Stud 155; Kehinde Ibrahim, “The Puzzling Paradox Presented within the African Supranational Judicial Institutions: The ECOWAS Court of Justice” (2020) 28 African J Intl & Comparative L 86; Richard F Oppong, “The High Court of Ghana Declines to Enforce an ECOWAS Court Judgment” (2017) 25 African J Intl & Comparative L 127; Okechukwu Effoduh, “The ECOWAS Court, Activist Forces and the Pursuit of Socioeconomic and Environmental Justice in Nigeria” (LLM thesis, York University, 2017); Rahina Zarma, “Regional Economic Community Courts and the Advancement of Environmental Protection and Socio-Economic Justice in Africa: Three Case Studies” (PhD dissertation, York University, 2021).

3 The reasons for the choice of Nigeria as our case study are offered later in this introductory section.

4 For details on the sub-study that recently set this baseline, see Obiora C Okafor et al, “On the Modest Impact of West Africa’s International Human Rights Court on the Executive Branch of Government in Nigeria” (2022) 35 Harv Hum Rts J 501 [Okafor et al, “Modest Impact”]. For another related article, see Obiora C Okafor et al, “The ECOWAS Court and Civil Society Activists in Nigeria: An Anatomy and Analysis of a Robust and Mutually Beneficial Symbiosis” (2022) 14 African J Legal Studies 1.

5 Okafor et al, “Modest Impact,” supra note 4.

6 While underlining the trite fact that the minimum requirement for a democracy to exist extends beyond the mere periodic conduct of elections (which does happen in Nigeria), some key indicators that show that Nigeria has, at best, been a quasi-democracy during almost all of the period under study are discussed later on in this article, including elsewhere in this introductory section. However, some of these indicators include credible reports that almost every one of the presidential polls conducted in Nigeria during the period under study was rigged in favour of the then ruling party (see, for example, European Union Election Observation Mission — Nigeria — Final Report – 2019 [on file with author], and Hakeem Onapajo & Dele Babalola, “Nigeria’s 2019 General Elections: A Shattered Hope? (2020) 109:4 The Round Table 363); the rampant harassment, arrest, and detention of journalists for publishing reports about illegal or unethical government conduct (see e.g. Abdullahi Jimoh, “Under Nigeria’s Tinubu, Journalists Are as Unsafe as Ever,” Mail and Guardian, 4 June 2024, online: <mg.co.za/africa/2024-06-04-under-nigerias-tinubu-journalists-are-as-unsafe-as-ever/>, reporting that the Buhari government alone arrested and detained at least 189 journalists during its term between 2011 and 2019); routine disobedience of court orders (see e.g. “Major Court Orders Buhari Administration Disobeyed in Eight Years” (19 May 2023), online: International Centre for Investigative Reporting <www.icirnigeria.org/major-court-orders-buhari-administration-disobeyed-in-his-eight-years/>, reporting a record of brazen and near-routine disobedience of such orders); and the unconstitutional and illegal suspension and “forcing-out” of a sitting chief justice of Nigeria (see e.g. Onnoghen case, infra note 12). See also Aderonke Majekodunmi & Felix O Awosika, “Godfatherism and Political Conflicts in Nigeria: The Fourth Republic in Perspective” (2013) 2 Intl L J Management & Social Science Research 70; Adeniyi S Basiru, “Democracy Deficit and the Deepening Crisis of Corruption in Post-Authoritarian Nigeria: Navigating the Nexus” (2018) 14 Taiwan Journal of Democracy 121 at 140 (referring to the continuation of authoritarianism in Nigeria and much of the African continent within, and as result of a context in, which the head of state is widely regarded and treated [far too deferentially and often unconstitutionally] as “the father of the nation”).

7 See Okafor, Obiora C, The African Human Rights System, Activist Forces and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar [Okafor, African Human Rights System]; Obiora C Okafor, “Modest Harvests: On the Significant (but Limited) Impact of Human Rights NGOs on Legislative and Executive Behaviour in Nigeria” (2004) 48 J Afr L 23 at 48.

8 Okafor, African Human Rights System, supra note 7.

9 For example, see Benjamin O Eneasato & Banko H Okibe, “Trajectory Democracy, Rule of Law and National Development in Nigeria: An Overview of the Muhammadu Buhari Administration (2015–2019)” (2020) 6 International Digital Organization for Scientific Research J Current Issues in Arts & the Humanities 15.

10 See Alexandra Huneeus, “Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court’s Struggle to Enforce Human Rights” (2011) 44 Cornell Intl LJ 493.

11 See Okafor, African Human Rights System, supra note 7.

12 For example, see the jurisprudential resistance posed by the Court of Appeal of Nigeria to the government’s praxis of removing judges unconstitutionally, as represented by its declaration that the removal of the then sitting chief justice of Nigeria through the obtaining of an ex parte order from the Code of Conduct Tribunal was unconstitutional. See Justice Walter Samuel Nkanu Onnoghen v Federal Republic of Nigeria, Judgment No CA/A/44C/2019 (10 May 2019), (2019) LPELR-47689 (CA) [Onnoghen]. Following the executive branch’s illegal suspension from office of the chief justice, purportedly in compliance with this ex parte order and successful pressure on him to resign or face prosecution, the National Judicial Council (which is vested with the authority to regulate the judiciary and discipline judges, at least in the first instance, and which was bypassed by the executive branch’s apparent cloak and dagger tactics in resorting to securing such an ex parte order), the removal was widely (though not uniformly) condemned by the Nigerian bar as illegal and illegitimate. See Olabisi Akinkugbe, “The Politics of Regulating and Disciplining Judges in Nigeria” in Richard Devlin & Sheila Wildeman, eds, Disciplining Judges: Contemporary Challenges and Controversies (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2021) 254 at 254. The decision of the Court of Appeal in the Onnoghen case settled the question beyond all reasonable doubt.

13 For example, see Kemi Busari “Onnoghen: Nigeria Now under Dictatorship: Saraki,” Premium Times (26 January 2019), online: <www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/308108-onnoghen-nigeria-now-under-dictatorship-saraki.html>.

14 For example, see Kemi Busari “Buhari Can’t Be Impeached, Lawmaker Warns Saraki, Other Colleagues,” Premium Times (5 June 2018), online: <www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/271260-buhari-cant-be-impeached-lawmaker-warns-saraki-other-colleagues.html>.

15 See Okafor, African Human Rights System, supra note 7. See also Busari, supra note 14.

16 See Busari, supra note 14.

17 See Okafor, African Human Rights System, supra note 7 at 91–154.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid. at 59–61.

20 See e.g., more recently, Duffy, Helen, Strategic Human Rights Litigation: Understanding and Maximizing Impact (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018) at 91–102 CrossRefGoogle Scholar (examining the different ways in which litigation can, and does, contribute to change, whether legal, political, institutional, social, or cultural); Par Engstrom, “Introduction: Rethinking the Impact of the Inter-American Human Rights System” in Engstrom, Par, ed, The Inter-American Human Rights System: Impact beyond Compliance (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019)CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 1 (emphasizing the need to look beyond the rule of compliance); César Rodriguez-Garavito, “Beyond Enforcement: Assessing and Enhancing Judicial Impact” in Langford, Malcolm, Rodriguez-Garavito, César & Rossi, Julieta, eds, Social Rights Judgements and the Politics of Compliance: Making It Stick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 75 CrossRefGoogle Scholar (describing four ways that the relationship between the enforcement and impact of (international) judicial decisions presents itself in the specific economic/social rights sub-area).

21 Okafor, African Human Rights System, supra note 7 at 284–85.

22 See Alter, Karen, The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics and Rights (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014)Google Scholar at 19; James T Gathii, “Variation in the Use of Subregional Integration Courts between Business and Human Rights Actors: The Case of the East African Court of Justice” (2016) 79 Law & Contemp Probs 37 at 38; Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” (1998) 52 Intl Org 887 at 895.

23 See Okafor, African Human Rights System,” supra note 7 at 91–154.

24 See e.g. Jerry Ugokwe v Federal Republic of Nigeria, Judgment No ECW/CCJ/JUD/03/05 (7 October 2005) at para 32 [Ugokwe].

25 See Interviewees JDA1LEG. Our approved ethics protocol prevents us from identifying the names of those interviewed, the exact committees to which they belong, or who they serve as legislative aides/staff.

26 Again, our approved ethics protocol prevents us from identifying the names of those interviewed, the exact committees to which they belong, or who they serve as legislative aides/staff.

27 See Interviewees JDA1JUD.

28 Ibid.

29 See the “Nigeria-at-a-Glance,” online: World Bank, <www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria#:~:text=A%20key%20regional%20player%20in,of%20youth%20in%20the%20world>.

30 Ibid; Prinesha Naidoo, “Nigeria Tops South Africa as the Continent’s Biggest Economy,” Bloomberg News (3 March 2020), online: <www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-03/nigeria-now-tops-south-africa-as-the-continent-s-biggest-economy>.

31 See Interviewee 16 (a judge from the Community Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS Court]); Interviewee 20 (an ECOWAS Court official).

32 These figures are based on a review of the data published by the ECOWAS Court on its website as of 8 September 2020 and subsequent information gathered by the authors. See “Community Court of Justice,” online: <www.courtecowas.org/>.

33 See Afolabi v Federal Republic of Nigeria, Judgment No ECW/CCJ/JUD/01/04 (27 April 2004).

34 See Alter et al, supra note 1 at 749–53.

35 See Ugokwe, supra note 24.

36 See Interviewee 20. See also Alter et al, supra note 1 at 759.

37 See Interviewee 20.

38 See Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, section 52(1).

39 See Interviewee 20; Alter et al, supra note 1 at 759.

40 It should be emphasized here that, in the Nigerian system at least, legislative decision-making, process, and action is not confined to the legislature per se. For example, many federal government bills are initiated and prepared by the Federal Ministry of Justice.

41 See e.g. Interviewee 17. See also Femi Falana, “Twenty Years of ECOWAS Court of Justice: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects” (paper presented at the International Conference hosted by the ECOWAS Court of Justice at Lome, Togo on the Theme: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects, 22–24 October 2021) [on file with authors].

42 SERAP v Federal Republic of Nigeria, Judgment No ECW/CCJ/JUD/07/10 (30 November 2010) [SERAP].

43 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 217 (entered into force 21 October 1986).

44 SERAP, supra note 42 at para 28.

45 SERAP v President, Judgment No ECW/CCJ/APP/08/09 (10 December 2010) [SERAP Niger Delta case].

46 Ibid.

47 See Dayo Akpata, “From the Office of the Attorney General of the Federation and Ministry of Justice on the 2015/2016 Legal Year of the Community Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States” (22 October 2015) [on file with authors]. This speech is also cited in Effoduh, supra note 2 at 83, n 83 (and accompanying text).

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid at 2.

50 See, respectively, SERAP v Federal Republic of Nigeria, Judgment No ECW/CCJ/JUD/18/12 (14 December 2012); SERAP, supra note 42.

51 National Biosafety Management Agency Act (2015), online: <nbma.gov.ng/nbma-act/>.

52 Ibid. This Act relates primarily to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 29 January 2000, 2226 UNTS 208 (entered into force 11 September 2003) (which was ratified by Nigeria in 2003).

53 AJ Mohammed, “Presentation of the Federal Republic of Nigeria: National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan 2016 – 2020,” Hestories (December 2015), online: <www.hestories.info/federal-republic-of-nigeria-national-biodiversity-strategy-and.html>. This speech was also cited in Effoduh, supra note 2, at 85, n 289 (and accompanying text).

54 Ibid.

55 See Incorporated Trustees of Laws and Rights Awareness Initiatives v Nigeria, Judgment No ECW/CCJ/JUD/16/20 (10 July 2020) [Cybercrime Act case]. See also Innocent Odoh, “ECOWAS Court Orders Nigeria to Amend Its Law on Cybercrime,” Business Day (11 July 2020), online: <https://businessday.ng/security/article/ecowas-court-orders-nigeria-to-amend-its-law-on-cybercrime/>. The plaintiffs had sued in 2018, but the ruling was issued in 2020.

56 Cybercrime (Prohibition and Prevention, etc) Act, 2015, online: <www.nfiu.gov.ng/images/Downloads/downloads/cybercrime.pdf> [Cybercrime Act].

57 Cybercrime Act, supra note 56 at 3.

58 Ibid at 6.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid at 3–4.

61 Ibid at 42.

62 Earlier work recognizing the ways in which such judicial/legal wars or even battles in Nigeria, and other parts of the African continent, often constitute only one part of broader political struggles include James T Gathii, “Mission Creep or a Search for Relevance: The East African Court of Justice’s Human Rights Strategy” (2019) 24 Duke J Comp & Intl L 249 at 296; James T Gathii, “Introduction: The Performance of Africa’s International Courts” in Gathii, supra note 1, 1; Okafor, African Human Rights System, supra note 7.

63 See Solomon Okedara v Attorney General of the Federation (Federal High Court of Nigeria), Suit No FHC/L/CS/937/2017 (7 December 2017) [unreported] [Okedara].

64 “Okedara v. Attorney General,” online: Global Freedom of Expression, Columbia University <globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/okedara-v-attorney-general/>.

65 See Okedara, supra note 63 at 34–35 [emphasis added].

66 Ibid at 37.

67 See Solomon Okedara v Attorney General of the Federation (Court of Appeal of Nigeria), Suit No CA/L/174/18 (28 February 2019) [unreported].

68 Ibid at 28 (emphasis added).

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 See the Incorporated Trustees of Paradigm Initiative for Information Technology Development, the EIE Project Ltd/GTE and the Incorporated Trustees of Media Rights Agenda v Attorney General of the Federation, the National Assembly of Nigeria and the Inspector General of Police, Suit No FHC/L/CS/692/16 (20 January 2017) [unreported].

72 See Incorporated Trustees of Paradigm Initiative for Information Technology Development, the EIE Project Ltd/GTE and the Incorporated Trustees of Media Rights Agenda v Attorney General of the Federation, the National Assembly of Nigeria and the Inspector General of Police, Suit No CA/L/556/2017 (1 June 2018) [unreported].

73 See the Incorporated Trustees of Paradigm Initiative for Informational Technology Development & 2 Ors v A.G Fed & 2 Ors, Appeal No SC/1251/18 (Supreme Court of Nigeria). See also Paradigm Initiative “Legal Battle over Cybercrimes Act Moves to the Supreme Court,” Paradigmhq (2 August 2018), online: <https://paradigmhq.org/legal-battle-over-cybercrimes-act-moves-to-the-supreme-court/>; Ugo Onwuaso, “Battle over Cybercrimes Goes to Supreme Court,” The Guardian (3 August 2018), online: <guardian.ng/business-services/battle-over-cybercrimes-goes-to-supreme-court/>.

74 See Kemi Busari, “Nigeria’s Cybercrime Act Needs Review: Senate Committee,” Premium Times (31 October 2017), online: <www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/247851-nigerias-cybercrime-act-needs-review-senate-committee.html?tztc=1>.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 See Margaret Mwantok & Paul Adunwoke, “FG Promises to Amend Cybercrime Act,” The Guardian (12 June 2019), online: <guardian.ng/news/nigeria/fg-promises-to-amend-cybercrime-act/> [emphasis added].

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

82 See Interviewee 111T [emphasis added].

83 Cybercrime Act, supra note 56.

84 “Coalition Lauds Cybercrimes Act Amendment and Urges FG to Further Safeguard Freedom of Expression,” Paradigm Initiative (19 March 2024), online: <paradigmhq.org/press-release-coalition-lauds-cybercrimes-act-amendment-and-urges-fg-to-further-safeguard-freedom-of-expression/>.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

87 See Interviewees JDA1LEG.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid.

90 Cap E12, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (2004).

91 Nigerian Television Authority Live, “National Assembly House of Reps Plenary,” Youtube (6 July 2017), 01:47.05, online: <www.youtube.com/watch?v=xUH5pOq8Gw0>.

92 Ibid.

93 This was in a participant’s observation of a discussion between the said legislator with a senior leader of his political party in the National Assembly on 16 March 2021.

94 See Okafor et al, “Modest Impact,” supra note 4.

95 See Mwantok & Adunwoke, supra note 79.

96 The Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project’s (SERAP) long-standing environmental rights campaign has enjoyed huge publicity in the media, which is too numerous to document here. For an allegorical example, see “How to End Niger Delta Crisis: SERAP,” PM News (12 June 2016), online: <www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2016/06/12/how-to-end-niger-delta-crisis-serap/>.

97 See Alter et al, supra note 1 at 765.

98 We borrow the key terms used here from Okafor, African Human Rights System, supra note 7 at 94–95.

99 This is an admissibility rule that the court has largely maintained since its ruling in Ugokwe, supra note 24.

100 See Huneeus, supra note 10 at 511.

101 See Interviewee 19 [emphasis added].

102 LEDAP & Anor v Federal Ministry of Education & Anor, Suit No FHC/ABJ/CS/978/15 (1 March 2017), online: <https://www.nigerialii.org/ng/judgment/high-court/2017/2.html> [LEDAP].

103 Compulsory, Free, Universal Basic Education Act, 2004, online: <education.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Compendium-Of-Education-Sector-Laws-In-Nigeria-Third-Edition-Vol.1.pdf>.

104 For the avoidance of doubt, the non-justiciability of the socio-economic rights under the Nigerian Constitution was previously challenged in case in Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Limited and 2 Others, Suit No FHC/B/CS/153/05 (14 November 2005), where the applicants claimed that by virtue of Articles 4 (right to life), 16 (right to health) and 24 (right to a generally satisfactory environment) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, 1983, Cap A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 [African Charter Act], they have the right to respect for their lives and dignity of their persons and to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health as well as right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development. The Federal High Court in Benin City granted the reliefs claimed by the applicants based on these provisions in addition to the right to life and human dignity as guaranteed by section 33 and 34 of the Nigerian Constitution respectively.

105 See SERAP v President of Nigeria & Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC), Judgment No ECW/CCJ/JUD/07/10 (30 November 2010).

106 African Charter Act, supra note 104.

107 See LEDAP, supra note 102, Factum of the Plaintiff, 23 March 2015 [on file with authors; emphasis added].

108 See Okafor, African Human Rights System, supra note 7 at 59–61.

109 For example, see “Now That Free Education Is Justiciable,” Vanguard (9 March 2017), online: <www.vanguardngr.com/2017/03/now-free-education-justiciable/>.

110 A host of media reports in Nigeria have since focused on the realization of the right to education. For example, see Joseph Onyekwere, “Court Declares Free Compulsory Education Enforceable Right,” The Guardian (2 March 2017), online: <guardian.ng/news/court-declares-free-compulsory-education-enforceable-right/>; Tope Alabi, “Court Declares Free Basic Education an Enforceable Right,” Information Nigeria (3 March 2017), online: <www.informationng.com/2017/03/court-declares-free-basic-education-enforceable-right.html>.

111 See Interviewees 17 and 19 (former judges of the ECOWAS Court).

112 Colonel Mohammed Sambo Dasuki (rtd) v Federal Republic of Nigeria, Judgment No ECW/CCJ/JUD/23/16 (4 October 2016) [Dasuki case].

113 See “Review: Dasuki’s Long Road to Freedom,” Premium Times (26 December 2019), online: <www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/369962-review-sambo-dasukis-long-road-to-freedom.html>.

114 See Colonel Sambo Dasuki v Director-General State Security, Suit No CA/A/806/2018 (13 June 2019), LPELR-48113 (CA), per Justices Tinuade Akomolafe-Wilson, Peter O. Ige, and Emmanuel A. Agim [Dasuki]. See also Soonest Nathaniel, “Appeal Court Orders Dasuki Release from DSS Custody,” Channels TV (14 July 2019), online: <www.channelstv.com/2019/07/14/appeal-court-orders-dasuki-release-from-dss-custody/>.

115 See Dasuki, supra note 114 at 36 [emphasis added].

116 See Dasuki, supra note 114.

117 See Interviewees JDA2JUD.

118 See Dasuki, supra note 114 at paras 28, 29.

119 See Okafor et al, “Modest Impact,” supra note 4.

120 Ibid.

121 Huneeus’s work, of course, does provide some general insight into this question, albeit from the angle of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights’ domestic influence, and we draw on some of these in this section of the article. See Huneeus, supra note 10.

122 For example, see Interviewees 1, 4, 5, 8, 10, 12 14, 21, 23 24–27, 40X, 64X.

123 See Omotese Eva (Legal Adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria) and Yusuf Danmadami (Senior Legal Officer of the ECOWAS Court), presentations to the Webinar of the International Law Association (Nigeria Branch), reprinted in “COVID-19: Highly Skilled International Lawyers Are Crucial to Effective Pandemic Responses,” Law and Society Magazine (22 August 2020), online: <lawandsocietymagazine.com/covid-19-highly-skilled-international-lawyers-are-crucial-to-effective-pandemic-responses-says-prof-obiora-okafor/>.

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid.

126 Ibid.

127 Ibid.

128 Ibid.

129 See Interviewees JDA1JUD.

130 For example, see Interviewees 2, 10, 14, 24, 26, 27, JDA1LEG, JDA1JUD, JDA2JUD.

131 See Interviewee 64X.

132 See Interviewee 19.

133 See Cybercrime Act, supra note 56.

134 A discussion of the generally low level of awareness of the ECOWAS Court is offered later in this article.

135 See Cybercrime Act, supra note 56 at 19, para 67.

136 See Media Rights Agenda & Ors v Nigeria, Communication No 105/93 & Others (31 October 1998).

137 See Request for an Advisory Opinion by the Pan African Lawyers Union on the Compatibility of Vagrancy Laws with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Other Human Rights Instruments Applicable in Africa, Case No 001/2018 (4 December 2020) at 40, para 153 [emphasis added].

138 See Huneeus, supra note 10 at 511.

139 Ibid.

140 Ibid at 513.

141 Ibid.

142 See Ugokwe, supra note 24.

143 See the example discussed in section 1 of this article.

144 For example, see Eneasato & Okibe, supra note 9; Majekodunmi & Awosika, supra note 6; Basiru, supra note 6.

145 See, for example, the saga of the illegal removal from office of the then Chief Justice Walter Onnoghen, discussed in section 1 of this article.

146 See Senator Iroegbu & Ernest Chinwo, “DSS Operatives Invade Judges’ Homes on Abuja, Rivers and Gombe,” Thisday Live (8 October 2016), online: <www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/10/08/dss-operatives-invade-judges-homes-in-abuja-rivers-gombe/>.

147 See Onnoghen, supra note 12. See also Felix Omohomhion, “Appeal Court Upturns Onnoghen’s Suspension, Says It’s Illegal,” Businessday (10 May 2019), online: <businessday.ng/lead-story/article/appeal-court-upturns-onnoghens-suspension-says-its-illegal/>.

148 Ibid.

149 For instance, see the now famous anti-ruling party dissent of Nweze JSC in the application to reverse the Supreme Court of Nigeria’s judgment in the Imo State Governorship Electoral case. See Halima Yahaya, “Our Ruling on Imo Governorship Will Haunt Nigeria for Long Time: Supreme Court Justice,” Premium Times (4 March 2020), online: <www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/380133-our-ruling-on-imo-governorship-will-haunt-nigeria-for-long-time-supreme-court-justice.html>.

150 Ibid.

151 Ebobrah alludes to this tendency in his work. See Ebobrah, “ECOWAS Community Court of Justice,” supra note 2 at 91–95.

152 See Huneeus, supra note 10 at 514.

153 See Ebobrah, “ECOWAS Community Court of Justice,” supra note 2 at 91–95.

154 Holman Bros (Nig) Ltd v Kigo Brothers (Nig) Ltd, (1980) 8–11 SC 44, LOR (05/09/1980) SC at para “P,” online: Lawyers Online Report <cases.lawyersonline.ng/holman-bros-nig-ltd-v-kigo-nig-ltd/> [emphasis added].

155 See Attorney-General of Bendel State v Attorney-General of the Federation, (1981) 10 SC 115 at 187–88.

156 Ibid, Obaseki JSC (the full judgment is available at “Attorney-General of Bendel State v. Attorney-General of the Federation & 22 Ors (SC. 17/1981),” online: NigeriaLII, Supreme Court Judgments <nigerialii.org/ng/judgment/supreme-court/1981/4>.

157 See Okafor, African Human Rights System, supra note 7 at 110–14.

158 See Abacha v Fawehinmi, (2000) 13 NWLR (Part 660) 228.

159 See Okafor, African Human Rights System, supra note 7 at 113.