Technocracy is becoming increasingly relevant in Western democracies and particularly in Italy, a country characterised by four technocratic governments in three decades. Despite the growing number of dedicated studies, there is a persistent gap in the existing literature concerning the discursive dimension of technocracy – namely, how technocrats frame the historical context, legitimise their policy agendas and, more broadly, the establishment of their governments. This study aims to fill this gap by analysing the speeches given by four Italian technocratic Prime Ministers to the parliament when asking for the vote of confidence. Methodologically, we perform first the content analysis to map the themes addressed in the speeches, their quantitative relevance and variation over time. Then, we turn to critical discourse analysis to understand the specific argumentative strategies that legitimise policy action in five key and interrelated dimensions: context, legitimation, the state, European Union and political economy. The analysis seeks to answer three research questions: What are the main discursive strategies of legitimation used by technocrats? Do they change significantly between governments and over time? Do partisan policy options and worldviews emerge clearly, or do they remain under the surface? The paper aims to contribute to the theoretical conceptualisation and empirical analysis of technocracy by highlighting the subjective, performative and overall political dimensions of the phenomenon.

This article examines kidnappings for ransom by the ’Ndrangheta in Italy from the more measured perspective that the passage of time allows. To investigate the importance and characteristics of this phenomenon, we analyse a new database compiled from various sources. We put forward an explanation of the way that the kidnapping era ended that derives both from statistical analysis of the 654 instances surveyed and from a case study (the abduction of Cesare Casella). Within this analysis, we award significant weight to the changing political context and to two particular factors: the crime's politicisation under new electoral pressure, and the behaviour of law enforcement agencies. The two factors often regarded as the principal explanations for the end of kidnapping, legislation on the freezing of assets and the appeal of the drugs trade, are treated here as simply aspects of the overall picture. The disappearance of this criminal practice seems to have followed a hiatus in relationships and a reciprocal show of strength. Although the repertoire of state threats, notably military action and prison sentences, was substantial, the political value of victims’ lives and the weakness of the government were powerful weapons for the final cohort of kidnappers.

In recent years, the relationship between Italy and the European Union (EU) has worsened due to the emergence of an increasingly negative attitude towards the question of European integration. The growth in citizens' disaffection with, and hostility towards, the political elites is part of a more general trend witnessed throughout the EU. From this point of view, an understanding of whether, and in what way, the role of Prime Minister (PM) has been affected by this change of perspective, especially following the various crises affecting the EU in the last 10 years, would be worthwhile we believe. This article examines the political positions of all PM during the so-called Second Republic (1994–now), by means of a longitudinal content analysis. This analysis reveals that after 2008, and for the first time in the history of the Italy–EU relationship, PMs' speeches have included sharp criticism of the EU. In particular, two PMs (Renzi and Conte) have clearly rejected those conditionality mechanisms implied by the EU. The results of this study confirm the start of a phase of strong conflict/politicization in regard to the EU and its institutional functioning.

This article contributes to the broader literature concerning the study of the relationship between political elites and the EU, by focusing for the first time not simply on party leaders but on one of the most important institutional roles in the Italian political system (the Presidenza del Consiglio).

Ministers can have an incentive to adopt policies through secondary legislation that deviates from the general compromise reached via the primary legislation. We suggest that when secondary legislation is at stake, in some countries coalition partners can rely upon the ex-ante legal scrutiny of courts as an extra-cabinet control mechanism. We focus on the interaction between governments and the Council of State, the highest administrative court and the most important consultative body of the government in Italy. Our findings support the general hypothesis that the Council's activism as an advisor is generated by the demand for control mechanisms on the secondary legislation. Such a demand is affected by specific political conditions, i.e. the level of government heterogeneity and government alternation. The findings on the Italian case can be a starting point for research on the different levels of involvement of administrative courts in the executive politics that characterize European Democracies.

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the result of the referendum on constitutional reform held in Italy on 4 December 2016. The votes against (59.1%) won by a significant margin, with an unexpectedly high turnout at the polls and more than 33 million citizens voting. Using as a point of departure the polls carried out prior to and following the referendum, in which Italians said they were essentially in favour of the reform proposed by the prime minister, the essay focuses on the mistakes made by Matteo Renzi that discouraged Italians from voting Yes. These touch on all aspects of the referendum: 1) the parliamentary process, 2) its combination with electoral law, 3) institutional communication, and 4) his political analysis and strategic approach. The final section evaluates the effects of the referendum result on the Italian political system, emphasising the setback to reformism and the strengthening of the anti-system parties that support leaving the Euro (in particular the Movimento 5 Stelle).

Matteo Renzi’s eruption on to the Italian political scene is now overcoming the inertia of the Italian political system, with a highly personalised leadership style which is challenging the Democratic Party’s (Partito Democratico, PD) organisational model. Renzi’s great innovation on the Italian left is the enforcement of a post-ideological leadership which is able to attract wide support due to a vigorous style of communication and skill in the use of traditional and new media. This article analyses the rise of this new charismatic leadership and the way in which it challenged the traditional organisational model of the PD, and aims to identify the main elements that define it at national and party level.

This article examines the launch of the Tribuna elettorale and Tribuna politica programmes on Italian television (1960–1961), seen in the context of the country's broadcasting history and the changes in the political spectrum and governing alliances at that time. The changing face of political communications and leader–viewer relations may be the most interesting side to the Tribune, but also the most heavily studied. This article chooses instead to reconstruct the steps and reasons that led prime minister Fanfani in the autumn of 1960 to force through his decision to give all political parties airspace for political propaganda. The article argues that the Tribune programmes were only partly innovatory, a kind of ‘revolution that never was’. They were a first step towards democratising the public broadcasting corporation, but maintained firm links with the past and above all sought to legitimiste ‘government television’, as well as delaying structural reform of the medium in the face of mounting pressure on many sides. For the Christian Democrat (DC) and the RAI management, the Tribune programmes were a clever compromise solution, giving in terms of pluralism of information what they were not prepared to concede in terms of pluralism of management.