Fertility decline in human history is a complex enigma. Different triggers have been proposed, among others the increased demand for human capital resulting in parents making a quantity–quality (QQ) trade-off. This is the first study that examines the existence of a QQ trade-off and the possible gender bias by analyzing fertility intentions rather than fertility outcomes. We rely on the unified growth theory to understand the QQ trade-off conceptually and a discrete choice experiment conducted among 426 respondents in Ethiopia to analyze fertility intentions empirically. We confirm the existence of a QQ trade-off only when the number of children is less than six and find that intentions are gendered in two ways: (i) boys are preferred over girls, and (ii) men are willing to trade-off more education in return for more children. Results imply that a focus on both stimulating intentions for education, especially girls' education, and on family size intentions is important to accelerate the demographic transition.

Evolutionary demographers often invoke tradeoffs between reproduction and survival to explain reductions in fertility during demographic transitions. The evidence for such tradeoffs in humans has been mixed, partly because tradeoffs may be masked by individual differences in quality or access to resources. Unmasking tradeoffs despite such phenotypic correlations requires sophisticated statistical analyses that account for endogeneity among variables and individual differences in access to resources. Here we tested for costs of reproduction using N = 13,663 birth records from the maternity hospital in Basel, Switzerland, 1896–1939, a period characterised by rapid fertility declines. We predicted that higher parity is associated with worse maternal and offspring condition at the time of birth, adjusting for age and a variety of covariates. We used Bayesian multivariate, multilevel models to simultaneously analyse multiple related outcomes while accounting for endogeneity, appropriately modelling non-linear effects, dealing with hierarchical data structures, and effectively imputing missing data. Despite all these efforts, we found virtually no evidence for costs of reproduction. Instead, women with better access to resources had fewer children. Barring limitations of the data, these results are consistent with demographic transitions reflecting women's investment in their own embodied capital and/or the adoption of maladaptive low-fertility norms by elites.

This paper reviews recent demographic and familial changes in the Middle East and North African countries (MENA), which parallel the developments associated with the second demographic transition that has transformed population profiles and family life in the more developed OECD countries. The emerging needs for family-oriented policies are analysed in relation to these changes. And the current levels of social protection in the MENA region are assessed along with the recent measures initiated in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The paper offers evidence of the demographic transition underway in the region, as many countries are experiencing declining fertility rates combined with an increase in life expectancy, which creates a rising old age dependency ratio. This in turn adds an additional burden of elderly dependents on the working age population and on the state’s capacity to care for elderly dependents, which generates an increasing need to expand social protection in the MENA region.

The paper explains long-term changes in birth, death rates, and in attitude to personal consumption by evolution of preferences by means of cultural transmission. When communities are culturally isolated, they are focused on population growth, which results in large fertility and welfare transfers to children, limited adult consumption, and lack of old-age support. With increasing cultural contact across communities, successful cultural traits induce their hosts to increase their social visibility by limiting fertility and increasing longevity via higher individual consumption. Empirical analysis confirms that social visibility, as measured by the number of language versions of Wikipedia biographical pages, is associated with fewer children and longer lifespan. The presence of notable individuals precedes reduced aggregate birth rates.

Advanced economies undergo three transitions during their development: (1) transition from a rural to an urban economy, (2) transition from low-income growth to high-income growth, (3) transition from high fertility and mortality rates to low modern levels. The timings of these transitions are correlated in the historical development of most advanced economies. I consider a nonlinear model of endogenous long-run economic and demographic change, in which child quantity-quality substitution is driven by declining child mortality. Because the model captures the interactions between all three transitions, it is able to explain three additional empirical patterns: a declining urban-rural wage gap, a declining rural-urban family size ratio, and most surprisingly, that early urbanization slows development. This third prediction distinguishes the model from other theories of long-run growth, and I document evidence for it in cross-country data.

Numerous evolutionary mechanisms have been proposed for the origins, spread and maintenance of low fertility. Such scholarship has focused on explaining the adoption of fertility-reducing behaviour, especially the use of contraceptive methods. However, this work has yet to engage fully with the dynamics of contraceptive behaviour at the individual level. Here we highlight the importance of considering not just adoption but also discontinuation for understanding contraceptive dynamics and their impact on fertility. We start by introducing contemporary evolutionary approaches to understanding fertility regulation behaviours, discussing the potential for integrating behavioural ecology and cultural evolution frameworks. Second, we draw on family planning studies to highlight the importance of contraceptive discontinuation owing to side-effects for understanding fertility rates and suggest evolutionary hypotheses for explaining patterns of variation in discontinuation rates. Third, we sketch a framework for considering how individual flexibility in contraceptive behaviour might impact the evolution of contraceptive strategies and the demographic transition. We argue that integrating public health and evolutionary approaches to reproductive behaviour might advance both fields by providing (a) a predictive framework for comparing the effectiveness of various public health strategies and (b) a more realistic picture of behaviour by considering contraceptive dynamics at the individual level more explicitly when modelling the cultural evolution of low fertility.

In the coming decades, the countries of the South will be facing the aging of the population faster than the countries of the North. This will have long-term economic consequences for the South but also for the North through the changing of international capital flows. To study the latter, we build a simple two-region two-period overlapping generations (OLG) model, assuming fully integrated financial markets. This allows us to determine the analytical expression of the world interest rate dynamics at general equilibrium and the resulting capital flows accruing to each of the two regions (the North and the South). From there, we analyze how a reduction in either fertility or mortality alters the magnitude of the international capital flows. Contradictory effects are evidenced. To clear-up any ambiguity and to study the South's demographic transition, which involves a succession of shocks, we propose numerical simulations. Even if the results stress that the institutional context and technological catching-up may matter, they suggest in a rather general way that the declines in both fertility and mortality tend to reduce the relative capital needs of the Southern economies and consequently their capital inflows. This, in turn, would be beneficial to the North's productive capacity, which should then hold more capital.

Understanding the causes of the Industrial Revolution, namely the process of transition from a Malthusian equilibrium to modern economic growth, has been the subject of passionate debate. This paper contributes to insights into the process of industrialization and the demographic transition that followed. We present a model that proposes a mechanism behind the claim that landed elites had strong incentives to block education reforms. By applying the theory of interest groups to landownership, landowners could delay education. However, they could not prevent its introduction indefinitely since gains for the landed elites derived from education would at some moment surpass the costs associated with them. We also sustain that improvements in agricultural productivity prior to the Industrial Revolution may have induced a positive impact on the landowners’ decision to educate the population, which led to an earlier introduction of education reforms. The conclusions fit the patterns of the late boom of industrialization and demographic transition and help explain why some countries (e.g., Britain and The Netherlands) had accelerated education reforms and a faster process of industrialization than most continental countries. A theoretical model is presented, and numerical simulations are exhibited to illustrate our claims.

A challenge that faces many advanced economies is how to finance age-related spending programs as the population ages. In this paper, we investigate two policy options–pension cuts and tax hikes–to mitigate fiscal pressure arising in the special context of Australia, whose population is ageing fast while growing substantially in size due to immigration. Using a computable overlapping generations model, we find that while both policy reforms can achieve a similar fiscal goal, they lead to different distributional and welfare effects across income groups over time. Future generations prefer pension cuts, whereas current generations prefer tax hikes to finance government spending commitments. Moreover, within the tax hike option, taxing income or consumption results in opposing macroeconomic and welfare effects. Indeed, our opposing intra- and inter-temporal welfare outcomes highlight some political complexity when devising a more sustainable tax-transfer system.

In mid-2016, the population of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was almost 1 billion people. By 2050, the population of the region will probably reach 2.1 billion people [Population Reference Bureau (2016)]. In 2100, SSA's population could be almost 4 billion people [United Nations (2015)]. This rapid demographic increase would translate into a possible quadrupling of the current SSA population by the end of the century (unless fertility would decline sharply in the near future). Nonetheless, the region has embarked on its demographic transition, i.e., the shift from high to low crude birth rates and crude death rates, albeit this process has occurred in SSA at a slower pace than in the rest of the developing world. In particular, the decline of fertility has been slower in SSA than in the other regions of the world. The rapid population growth and the occurrence of a demographic transition in the region have generated discussions on the prospects for SSA to open a demographic window of opportunity and capture a first demographic dividend. However, two crucial dimensions, which have so far been rather neglected, need more attention. First, one will need to define with more accuracy the sub-populations of the working-age adults and their young and older dependents, therefore refining the calculation of the dependency ratio. In particular, one will need to assess the population of the young dependents as well as the population of adults who are actually working. Second, it will be also necessary to examine the conditions required to trigger a faster and significant fertility decline in the region. This is most important because the relationship between the active adults and their dependents is predicated by the fertility decline, which will bring the changes to the age structure.

In this paper, we document the economic implications of changing demographic conditions in Africa. To construct support ratios, we use National Transfer Accounts (NTA) estimates of per capita labor income and consumption by age, as well as population estimates and projections provided by the UN Population Division for 16 African countries. First, we find that, on average, support ratios are rising in Africa. But compared with the support ratios in Asia and Latin America, the magnitude of those in Africa is lower because the percentage of effective workers in the total population is also low. Second, we find that human capital spending is high in countries with low fertility rates, which suggests a quantity–quality trade-off. NTA estimates also show that to capitalize on the demographic dividend, countries have to create economic opportunities for young adults. In addition, investment in human and physical capital is important to generate the second demographic dividend.

Since the seminal work of Becker, the dynamics of endogenous fertility has been based on the trade-off faced by parents between the quantity and the quality of their children. However, in developing countries, where child labor is an indispensable source of household income, parents actually incur a negative cost by having an extra child, so that the trade-off disappears. The purpose of this paper is to restore the Beckerian quantity–quality trade-off when intergenerational transfers are upstream, in order to keep fertility endogenous. We do that by adding a negative “sibship size effect” on human capital formation to the standard Becker model. With a simple specification, we obtain multiplicity of steady states or, more fundamentally, the possibility of a jump from a state with high fertility and low income to a state with low fertility and high income, triggered by a continuous increase in the productivity of human capital formation.

Before Gary Becker, fertility choice was widely considered to be outside the realm of economic analysis. Apart from intellectual tradition, one reason for this was that the data on fertility did not immediately suggest an economic mechanism. In industrialized countries, fertility had declined strongly over time, even though family incomes were rising. Similarly, in many studies using cross-sectional data the relationship between family income and fertility had been shown to be either flat or declining. To many observers, these observations suggested that the “taste” for children had waned over time and that high income families placed less value on childbearing than the poor.