According to the United Nations World Population Prospects, Africa is expected to account for more than half of the population growth in the world in the next three decades. And by the turn of the 22nd century, the populations of the poorest 33 African countries will have likely tripled. These demographic developments present challenges and opportunities for sustained growth and economic development in Africa. On the one hand, for example, they make it harder for cities to grow harmoniously, and for governments to fight poverty and inequality, while expanding health and education services. On the other hand, the potential for a demographic transition opens the door to the possibility of reaping the fruits of a demographic dividend, which was so important in the take-off of Europe towards modern growth.

The headline demographics of sub-Saharan Africa appear to be reason for concern. Looking back, since Independence in the 1960s, the region has been the major exception to the global demographic trend of rising height: In some countries, average height has even been declining [eLife (2016)]. Looking forward, between now and 2050, the population is set to grow more rapidly than that of any other region. But the demographic transition that is typically of most concern to African governments is not about the size or stature of overall population, it is urbanization. Politicians fear the consequences of a restive urban youth: an Arab Spring repeated south of the Sahara. Many would like to slow the pace of urbanization.

The stylized facts of Africa's urban transition highlight the limitations of traditional economic models of urbanization. Recent research has provided evidence that demographic rather than economic processes provide a more compelling explanation for observed trends in the region. In particular, mortality decline appears to be both a necessary and sufficient condition for urbanization to occur and a key driver of urban growth more broadly. The accumulation of survey data over the past few decades and the development of new geospatial datasets that incorporate satellite imagery are facilitating new, more spatially nuanced insights into the dynamics of urban population change in the region. This offers opportunity to develop better policies for managing urban change than those adopted in the past, which placed a misguided emphasis on manipulating migration incentives with little evidence of positive benefits.

The majority of the urban population of Sub-Saharan Africa lives in slums where access to basic services, such as water, sanitation, or electricity is low. There is a growing body of evidence showing that access to these basic services has significant effect on the well-being of the poor. As the progress to universal access is still very slow, this essay contributes to the understanding of the persistence of the situation by reviewing the recent empirical evidence on both supply and demand issues related to the provision of basic infrastructure in urban areas of developing countries.

This paper reviews the scant economic literature on the transformations of farming households under the influence of land pressure, market development or technical change. Theoretical as well as empirical contributions are summarized with a special attention to the African context.

Over the next 35 years, the total population of sub-Saharan Africa is projected to increase by 118%, with a greater rise of of 156% of people in the prime working ages. To cope with population growth and exploit the slowly unfolding, favorable change in age structure, countries face a triple challenge. Agricultural productivity has to improve. Prospects are good, though climate change remains a threat. Manufacturing jobs need to be created on a far larger scale than hitherto. Success is uncertain because much depends on foreign investors and the actions of competing low-wage countries in Asia. The third challenge concerns the non-agricultural informal sector, which, even under optimistic assumptions about manufacturing, will continue to provide livelihoods for a large segment of the population. Entrepreneurship needs to be encouraged so that an increasing proportion of family enterprises evolve into larger businesses. There is no blueprint to achieve this evolution and much will depend on the hard work and ingenuity of individuals.

We assess Africa's prospects for enjoying a demographic dividend. While fertility rates and dependency ratios in Africa remain high, they have started to decline. According to UN projections, they will fall further in the coming decades such that by the mid-21st century, the ratio of the working age to dependent population will be greater than in Asia, Europe, and Northern America. This projection suggests Africa has considerable potential to enjoy a demographic dividend. Whether and when it actually materializes, and also its magnitude, hinges on policies and institutions in key realms that include macroeconomic management, human capital, trade, governance, and labor and capital markets. Given strong complementarities among these areas, coordinated policies will likely be most effective in generating the momentum needed to pull Africa's economies out of a development trap.

In mid-2016, the population of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was almost 1 billion people. By 2050, the population of the region will probably reach 2.1 billion people [Population Reference Bureau (2016)]. In 2100, SSA's population could be almost 4 billion people [United Nations (2015)]. This rapid demographic increase would translate into a possible quadrupling of the current SSA population by the end of the century (unless fertility would decline sharply in the near future). Nonetheless, the region has embarked on its demographic transition, i.e., the shift from high to low crude birth rates and crude death rates, albeit this process has occurred in SSA at a slower pace than in the rest of the developing world. In particular, the decline of fertility has been slower in SSA than in the other regions of the world. The rapid population growth and the occurrence of a demographic transition in the region have generated discussions on the prospects for SSA to open a demographic window of opportunity and capture a first demographic dividend. However, two crucial dimensions, which have so far been rather neglected, need more attention. First, one will need to define with more accuracy the sub-populations of the working-age adults and their young and older dependents, therefore refining the calculation of the dependency ratio. In particular, one will need to assess the population of the young dependents as well as the population of adults who are actually working. Second, it will be also necessary to examine the conditions required to trigger a faster and significant fertility decline in the region. This is most important because the relationship between the active adults and their dependents is predicated by the fertility decline, which will bring the changes to the age structure.

In this paper, we document the economic implications of changing demographic conditions in Africa. To construct support ratios, we use National Transfer Accounts (NTA) estimates of per capita labor income and consumption by age, as well as population estimates and projections provided by the UN Population Division for 16 African countries. First, we find that, on average, support ratios are rising in Africa. But compared with the support ratios in Asia and Latin America, the magnitude of those in Africa is lower because the percentage of effective workers in the total population is also low. Second, we find that human capital spending is high in countries with low fertility rates, which suggests a quantity–quality trade-off. NTA estimates also show that to capitalize on the demographic dividend, countries have to create economic opportunities for young adults. In addition, investment in human and physical capital is important to generate the second demographic dividend.

I examine recent changes in African mortality and discuss their potential economic and demographic effects. Growth in life expectancy sharply departed from its trend after 1990, and then experienced a sharp acceleration after 2005. This latter acceleration was due overwhelmingly to improvements in HIV and malaria. Economists differ in their estimates of how large the structural effect of health on income is, with many estimates being relatively small. Taking seriously the delays built into many plausible causal channels would lead one to expect that any economic effects of these mortality changes, if they are detectable at all, will not appear for several decades. By contrast, the effect of declining mortality, especially from malaria, should soon be visible in data on population age structure in some countries.

Measuring direct and indirect effects of extending health insurance coverage in developing countries is a key issue for health system development and for attaining universal health coverage. This paper investigates the role played by health insurance in the relationship between parental morbidity and child work decisions. We use a propensity score matching technique combined with hurdle models, using data from Rwanda. The results show that parental health shocks have a substantial influence on child work when households do not have health insurance. Depending on the gender of the sick parent, there is a substitution effect not only between the parent and the child on the labor market, but also between the time the child spends on different work activities. Altogether, results reveal that health insurance protects children against child work in the presence of parental health shocks.

Malaria afflicts mankind since thousands of years and still imposes serious health impediments and considerable mortality on the affected populations. Empirical investigations of the role of malaria for economic development at the country level deliver mixed findings, however. We study the role of long-term malaria exposure on development today using disaggregate within-country variation for the whole of Africa with 1 × 1 degree cells as units of observation. Local development is measured by light density at night. Based on insights from epidemiology, which documents that genetic and acquired immunities reduce Malaria risk for adults in holoendemic areas, the effect is hypothesized to be nonlinear, with a peak for intermediate rather than high exposure to the pathogen. The empirical findings support this hypothesis. The results also suggest the existence of a significant moderating effect of genetic immunities measured by the prevalence of the sickle cell trait in the population.