This final chapter shows how further enquiry into artefacts’ metaphysics forces us to return to artefacts’ physics. At the same time, this further enquiry is in turn shown to fall outside the interests of a metaphysician and to be the task of a natural philosopher. For this reason, the chapter looks at artefacts as objects of inquiry and distinguishes between perspective of the natural scientist, the maker, and the user on the one hand, and the perspective of the metaphysician on the other. This discussion allows us to wrap up the results, to reassess the relationship between the Physics and the Metaphysics, and to evaluate the respective contributions of these works to Aristotle’s ontology of artefacts.

We need theories that help us join the struggle for alternative futures. Cultural-historical approaches frame agency as something people do rather than something they have or sense. Building on this, I conceptualise agency in terms of the direction and reach of actions. Direction concerns movement from distinctive subject positionings towards desired endpoints. Reach concerns the extent of this movement. Direction and reach can be both outward (transforming the world) and inward (transforming the self). This acknowledges individuals’ contributions to changing their own lives and those of others without evacuating actions from the activities in which they are embedded. Motive, mediation, and motion are key to this. I illustrate these ideas in relation to existing research on young people’s environmental activism, a Latino boy in foster care, and a mother struggling to care for her infant child, as well as examples from prior research and other chapters in this volume.

African buffalo herd size varies across their distribution range from as few as 5–10 in the rainforests of West and Central Africa to as many as 2000 individuals in the floodplains of eastern and southern Africa. The home range size of African buffalo also varies greatly, with those of savanna buffalo herds generally ranging between 50 and 350 km2. The larger home ranges are generally observed in areas where resources are spatially segregated, and where herds are forced to undertake seasonal movements. In contrast, forest buffalo exhibit smaller home ranges (<10 km2) due to a less pronounced seasonality of the environment, and a more homogeneous spatial arrangement of resources. African buffalo are ruminants, essentially feeding on grass and roughage. This species is capable of subsisting on pastures too coarse and too tall for most other herbivores. The African buffalo occupies an important niche, opening up habitats that are preferred by short-grass grazers. Although the African buffalo primarily is a grazer, savanna buffalo can partially switch their diet to browse when grasses become tall and lignified. The ability of the African buffalo to cope with contrasting environmental conditions throughout most sub-Saharan ecosystems, by modulating a large array of biological traits, highlights a high degree of behavioural plasticity.

Actions are not merely what we do but essentially connected with intentionality, particularly beliefs and intentions, and thereby with the will. Some actions are basic; others we do by doing something basically – “at will.” Act-types are the kind of thing we can exemplify repeatedly or multiple agents can exemplify simultaneously, say speaking. Act-tokens are individual actions tied to a particular agent, time, and mode of performance. Ethics must address both: types as contents of intentions and primary indicators of obligations, and tokens as morally significant in ways that, like their underlying motives, are not fixed by their type. This chapter also clarifies control of action, direct and indirect. It is not just basic acts that are under direct voluntary control; most of the salient manners of our actions are. Moral obligation and moral responsibility for action extend to those as well as to the acts they color – or discolor.

Chapter 6 discusses the daily activities of older hippies. By exploring what they currently do for fun and comparing it with their past leisure activities, this chapter explores patterns of continuity and change in practice and meaning. It also suggests that the hippies diverse leisure repertoires and ethics of play significantly contribute to their wellbeing in later life.

The final chapter discusses whether or not hippies age differently or better than other older adults.It suggests two complementary perspectives: The perceptions of the researched individuals that emphasize healthy lifestyle, engagement, and social support; and the researcher’s viewpoint, which stresses identity work, generativity, play, spirituality, and psychological sense of community. Discussing the two overarching themes of ideology and adaptability, the chapter also presents a take-home message about commitment and its contribution to wellbeing in old age. Overall, it suggests that we and others may benefit if we make our later years meaningful, satisfying, and hippie to an extent.

The implementation of undergraduate research in music is occurring at many institutions as an expansion and renaming of a wide variety of creative activities that heretofore have not been labeled as research. A rapidly increasing number of examples exist around the world, and these can serve as models for future projects and programs. What is needed now is the implementation, adaptation, improvement, and assessment of these models so that all music students have such opportunities. Many other disciplines have a long history of such activity.

TBT-S utilizes multiple intervention strategies to apply TBT-S principles. These strategies have been developed and adapted over a 10-year period through iteratively integrating client and Support feedback with research findings in the treatment development process to increase accuracy and acceptability. The interventions are (1) neurobiological psychoeducation, (2)experiential learning addressing AN neurobiology and traits for problem-solving activities for clients and Supports, (4) client and Support skills training, (5) meal coaching, and (6) The TBT-S Behavioral Agreement.

In the nineteenth century, visual culture became noted for spectacles such as panoramas, which sought to create an experience that offered more than simply viewing an engraving or a framed painting. The panorama placed the spectator at the centre of a circle, surrounded by a huge painting on a curved surface. This chapter focuses on the Arctic panorama Summer and Winter Views of the Polar Regions (1850) that opened in London in 1850. The chapter explains how a radically transformed Arctic was presented to a metropolitan audience, which anticipated education, entertainment, and an aesthetic experience at Leicester Square, London. Summer and Winter Views was based on the drawings of a recently returned officer, William Henry Browne, and made claims of authenticity in a competitive market. By closely reading the sources available for the panorama, including sketches, contemporary reviews, and prints, it argues that this affordable and persuasive spectacle of ‘savage horrors’ transformed the Arctic into a supernatural space of well-executed, yet sensationalistic, Gothic icescapes, masculine endeavour, and exotic meteorological effects.

The colobine monkey genus Semnopithecus includes gray, Nilgiri, and purple-faced langurs. Gray langurs (traditionally, S. entellus) have among the most extensive geographical ranges of all nonhuman primates, from Sri Lanka to the Himalayas, and are historically the most frequently studied colobine. Gray langurs have become key models in studies of sexual selection, niche partitioning, socioecology, optimal foraging theory, and movement ecology. Nilgiri langurs (S. johnii) are found in the Western Ghats of southern India; in addition to foundational descriptive studies, research on Nilgiri langurs has included inspired work on nutritional ecology and behavioral rhythms. Purple-faced langurs (S. vetulus) are found in varied Sri Lankan habitats and are perhaps the least-studied members of the genus; notwithstanding, they have been the subject of influential, interdisciplinary studies of locomotion, as well as one of the few detailed studies of predation on a colobine. All Semnopithecus appear to be characterized by considerable phenotypic plasticity, including a fluid leaf and/or fruit-centered diet with considerable site-specific differentiation in supplemental food categories, and variable social arrangements including single-male and/or multi-male, multi-female groups. There remain many opportunities to further advance our knowledge of this genus from novel biological, psychological, and anthropological perspectives.

I present an overview of On the Soul, Aristotle’s investigation into how psuchē (soul) explains biological phenomena in a unified way. This principle serves as a final, formal, and efficient cause of living activities. Soul needs specific consideration because it is a unique sort of form. It is responsible not just for giving living things their capacities, but also for when and how they exercise these capacities. Soul orders the ways in which living things grow, reproduce, move, and cognize the world. It accounts for all the more specific capacities and activities of the living thing. Studying soul thus gives Aristotle the opportunity to make some of his most subtle distinctions about kinds of capacity and activity. Aristotle’s discussion of soul as cause also prepares the way for considering how it works together with body, as Aristotle does in the Parva Naturalia and biological works. I then present synopses of the chapters in this guide and discuss how they relate to one another.

Aristotle maintains that defining nous requires first defining its activity, which requires first having considered its objects, intelligible beings. This chapter is about the nature of these objects: what about them makes them intelligible? My principal proposals will be that what makes them intelligible is that they are separate or unmixed, and that because, insofar as they are intelligible, they are, in their essence, activity. I am not unaware that this makes it sound as though Aristotle takes intelligibility to consist in some kind of nous. But he himself virtually says as much, when he claims that nous is the form of its objects (lit. εἶδος εἰδῶν); besides it is a result he is committed to by the doctrines that nous is intelligible and that there is something that intelligible objects all are in common; for the alternative, as he himself says, is to suppose that nous “will have something mixed-in, which makes it intelligible just like the rest.” The challenge, then, is not to steer clear of this result, but to make sense of it. My proposal will be that the key lies in realizing that and why Aristotle thinks intelligibility is a creature of nous.