Epistemology is in many ways important for Spinoza’s philosophy. It underlies his metaphysics, as well as his ethics and his political theory, and it also connected in many interesting ways with his psychological views on the mental life of human subjects. It is against this background that the present chapter discusses several key concepts and doctrines that Spinoza establishes in his epistemology, such as his views on truth and adequacy, the definition of idea and the denial of the notion of innate ideas, the famous distinction of the three kinds or rather “genera” of knowledge, the cognitive psychology underlying the discussion of the process of the imagination, humanity’s capacity for rationality, and finally the idea of our being blessed by intuitive knowledge. Moreover, regarding Spinoza’s denial of skepticism as the basic motivation driving his epistemology, the chapter also shows how his epistemological views develop over time. Altogether, it is argued that Spinoza manages to establish an epistemology that is both quite consistent on its own terms and successful in providing a stable foundation for his metaphysical, ethical and political views.

Spinoza’s philosophy of mind has been subject to widely divergent interpretations. What explains this lack of consensus? The principal reason is that Spinoza’s notion of an attribute and its relation to his substance monism is poorly understood. This chapter begins by setting out some interpretative difficulties regarding Spinoza’s notion of an attribute in general. It will then explain Spinoza’s conception of the attributes of thought and extension in particular. Next, it will explain how Spinoza argues for the structural similarity of the mental and physical realms from his claim that the mind and the body are one and the same thing conceived under different attributes. This will require developing a new interpretation of Spinoza’s notion of attribute. This interpretation will both explain why his philosophy of mind has been subject to such contradictory interpretations as well as solve a host of interpretative difficulties that have long vexed commentators. The chapter will conclude by explaining how Spinoza’s denial of mind-body causal explanation is compatible with his assertion of mind-body identity.

Spinoza developed a method of biblical interpretation which has guided most scholars ever since. It requires an understanding of the scriptural languages, a comparison of different discussions of the same topic (not assuming that Scripture, as the word of God, must be consistent), and an account of the authorship, date, circumstances, and transmission of each book. Renaissance humanists like Erasmus had anticipated some of his method, but Spinoza was more systematic and bolder: not only did Moses not write the Pentateuch, many of the traditional assumptions about the authorship of biblical books were mistaken. A late editor, working on now lost mss. of earlier histories, had compiled them. Spinoza writes mainly about the Hebrew Bible, but also draws challenging conclusions about the New Testament: the apostles didn’t write with prophetic authority; James was right (against Paul) to emphasize works over faith. He also suggests that the apostles probably wrote in Aramaic, so that the Greek text is a translation of a lost original. Like Erasmus, he emphasizes the moral teachings of Scripture and avoids philosophical speculations, of which the doctrine of original sin is probably the most important example. His advocacy of theological minimalism furthered the cause of religious liberty.

This essay explores the metaphysical foundations of Spinoza's psychology. A particular focus is Spinoza's conatus principle according to which each thing strives not only to persevere in existence but also to increase its power of acting. This striving is, for Spinoza, the actual essence of each thing, and it forms the basis of the three fundamental affects desire, joy, and sadness--which are central to Spinoza's accounts of weakness of the will, self-deception, the imitation of the affects, egoism, altruism, and teleology. Throughout, the essay emphasizes the ways in which Spinoza's psychology manifests his naturalism, his view that everything –including human beings and their various affects or emotions – is governed by the same laws that are found throughout nature.

Although international commercial arbitration is not subject to as much criticism as investor-State arbitration, it is nonetheless facing challenges going forward. These challenges are several, and only some can be addressed in this chapter. Some relate to concerns that have been with international arbitration for a long time. These include costs, delay and excessive formality, as well as arbitrator neutrality. Others – arbitration ethics, diversity, and transparency – are not new, but are taking on greater urgency. Still others simply represent new developments more or less extrinsic to international arbitration but with which international arbitration must cope. Among these changes to the broader international arbitration landscape are the data protection movement and the rise of both settlement agreements and international commercial courts.

The empiricist legacy of John Locke developed in various directions in the British Romantic period, especially informing the movement known as theological utilitarianism, which taught ethics based on prudence and sought evidences for a benevolent, Christian God as designer of the world. This approach was challenged, however, above all by the idealism of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who drew on Platonic and recent German sources. Further, newly translated Hindu texts influenced both metaphysical speculation and practical recommendations of a life of moderation and self-denial, including in the work of several female novelists in the period.

The question whether private international law has a useful role to play in process of arbitration is framed too broadly to produce a concise and useful answer. It is also complicated by the inveterate tension between the doctrinal view, on the one hand, that lex facit arbitrum,1 the law makes the arbitration, and the pragmatic view on the other, that arbitration is a private matter whose very purpose is to keep the process of dispute resolution as far away from the courts, legal procedure and legal doctrine, as possible. It is further complicated by a perception, held by many if confessed by fewer, that private international lawyers do not really understand arbitration, and are forever trying to force it into a mould created and devised by them for proceedings before courts and judgments given by courts.

British Romanticism’s engagement with Islam was shaped by an age of conflict, tumult, and intellectual ferment. Following the French Revolution, British Romantic writers gained knowledge of Islam through processes of cultural osmosis. Despite the growing presence of Muslims visiting and even living in Britain, Islam remained the stereotypical “Other.” At the same time, as republican and irreligious, the broader milieu in which these Romantic writers operated manifested its radicalism in the form of the distribution and dissemination of subversive manuscripts, with Islam providing an effective vehicle. While they often subscribed to notions about Britain’s intellectual and moral superiority vis-à-vis the Muslim world, these writers deployed Islam to reinforce a wider cause, in some cases arguing for a radical revision of contemporary orthodoxies, even when a positive depiction risked social approbation and possible punishment in a Britain where prejudice against Islam endured.

This essay explores the established Churches in Britain during the Romantic period, with a focus on England and Scotland. It considers the impact of the churchmanship that was evolving during this period, reveals tensions between the Church and nonconformists, provides examples of everyday belief and practice, and seeks to show why it was believed that a close alliance between Church and state remained necessary.

This chapter explores the relationship between religion and “the novel” by focusing on a cross-section of religious questions having to do with belonging (domestic, national, global) and identity. It begins with a consideration the Evangelical Hannah More’s Coelebs in Search of a Wife (1809), moves to a cluster of novels that contemplated domestic religious differences in the form of Catholics and Jews, and concludes with a shift outside the geographical boundaries of the United Kingdom and Ireland to examine early novelistic responses to overseas missionary movements, which raised challenging questions about empire, race, and religious community.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“IBRD” or “World Bank”) was established by the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held at Bretton Woods in 1944.1 It was tasked with facilitating the investment of capital in economies destroyed or disrupted by World War II and channeling capital to countries in need of reconstruction and development.