Governments are important players in many parts of the economy, and at present perhaps the most visible is the balance they set between taxing and spending. Tax and spending polices are in part designed to redistribute resources between individuals, but they can also be used to redistribute resources over time. Governments can also use tax and spending policies to sustain or restrain economic activity, and in most countries a case can be made for using active fiscal policy in periods of clear economic distress, or in periods when it would be useful to restrain imbalances that can lead to financial crises. As a result it is difficult to gauge the appropriate stance of policy. Short-run problems have to be balanced against longer-term needs, and mistakes are common. In the UK, for instance, in the six years up until 2008 the balance of policy was perhaps too loose, whilst over the next five years it is probably too tight, even though deficits are projected to be higher than they were before 2009.

GDP growth in the OECD group of economies moderated in the first quarter of 2011, reflecting a contraction in output in Japan related to the earthquake in March 2011 and a slowdown in the US economy. This was partly offset by an acceleration of growth in the Euro Area, to some extent attributable to a weather related rebound in Northern Europe, but also a strong rise in business investment in Germany and France. Moderate growth at the OECD level persisted into the second quarter. Supply-chain disruptions continued to affect Japan; the high oil price eroded real wages, exacerbating the effect of high unemployment on consumption in the US; the deepening sovereign debt crisis in Europe raised uncertainty, leading to a rise in precautionary savings even in countries not restrained by severe fiscal austerity programmes. Outside the OECD, China and India continue to drive world growth, although rising inflation points to more moderate prospects in the second half of the year. We forecast global GDP growth of about 4½ per cent per annum in both 2011 and 2012, compared to 5 per cent growth recorded in 2010. The key assumptions underlying this forecast are discussed in Appendix A, with our forecasts for key macro variables in 40 major economies detailed in Appendix B.

The rate of growth of the US economy moderated in the first quarter of 2011, and remained lacklustre in the second quarter of the year, as the high oil price eroded real wages and weighed on consumer spending. In 2011 as a whole, we expect GDP to expand by 2½ per cent, with an acceleration to nearly 3 per cent expected in 2012.

The forecasts for the world and the UK economy reported in this Review are produced using NIESR's global econometric model, NiGEM. The NiGEM model has been in use at the National Institute for forecasting and policy analysis since 1987, and is also used by a group of about 50 model subscribers, mainly in the policy community. Most countries in the OECD are modelled separately, and there are also separate models of China, India, Russia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Brazil, South Africa, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria. The rest of the world is modelled through regional blocks so that the model is global in scope. All models contain the determinants of domestic demand, export and import volumes, prices, current accounts and net assets. Output is tied down in the long run by factor inputs and technical progress interacting through production functions, but is driven by demand in the short to medium term. Economies are linked through trade, competitiveness and financial markets and are fully simultaneous. Further details on the NiGEM model are available on http://nimodel.niesr.ac.uk/.

This note examines the impact of rising bond yields in certain Euro Area countries on debt sustainability. It concludes that without the financial assistance of the bailout packages, government debt in Greece would clearly have been unsustainable, while Ireland and Portugal would have been extremely vulnerable. We also examine the case of vulnerable countries which have not received bailouts — Italy, Spain and Belgium. We conclude that while they can absorb some temporary rise, as has been seen in recent weeks, a significant further sustained rise — more than 100–200 basis points — would call their solvency into question in the absence of financial assistance.

The persistent weakness of UK economic growth figures has dominated recent economic commentary. This debate continued with the release of the Office for National Statistics‘ (ONS) preliminary estimate of GDP growth for the second quarter of this year. The ONS estimates that the economy enjoyed only a modest expansion in the second quarter: 0.2 per cent per quarter. This implies the level of output is little changed from the third quarter of 2010. ‘One-off effects’ are partly responsible for the weak growth in the second quarter. We expect GDP growth to accelerate in the third quarter of this year (see figure 1), but this increase is likely to be flattered by the events of the second quarter.

The rise in global oil prices observed since September 2010 results in part from the social and political instability in the Middle East and North African regions, and in part from longer-term trends reasserting themselves. The unrest sweeping Tunisia earlier this year spread over many surrounding nations, including some major oil producers, such as Algeria and, most significantly, Libya. The Middle East currently supplies about a third of world oil and possesses over half of the world's proven reserves. Clearly, instability in the region automatically raises worries of supply disruptions and possible oil shortage, stimulating speculation and driving world oil prices to new peaks. Speculators have a tendency to overshoot the impact of a supply shock, and in any case supply-driven spikes should remain temporary, fading away as political stability returns.

Restoring sustainable public finances in the aftermath of the Great Recession is a key challenge in most EU countries. In order to learn from history, our paper examines consolidation episodes in the EU since 1970. We shed light on the factors that favour the start of a consolidation episode and determine its success. Compared to the existing literature, we add a number of new dimensions in the analysis. First, we explore a broader set of potential ingredients of the ‘recipe for success‘, including the quality and strength of fiscal governance and the implementation of structural reforms. Secondly, we check whether the ‘recipe for success’ changed over time. Our analysis broadly confirms received wisdom concerning the conditions triggering a consolidation episode and the role of the composition of adjustment for success, with some qualifications related to the role played by government wages. In addition it provides evidence that well-designed fiscal governance as well as structural reforms improve the odds of both starting a consolidation episode and achieving a lasting fiscal correction. We also show that, over time, successful and unsuccessful consolidation episodes have become more similar in terms of adjustment composition.

The lack of fiscal discipline is a natural and pervasive implication of the perceived separation between the benefits from public spending and the taxes that individuals and interest groups receive and pay, respectively. The implication is that budget preparation, decision and execution must be constrained. The challenge is that the policymakers who need to be constrained are those who must decide the constraints. Two broad classes of solutions are possible: institutions that shape the budgetary process and quantitative rules that set limits. The mounting experience with both institutions and rules is disappointing, for reasons that are often complementary. Examining the reasons for this state of affairs, this article argues that institutions and rules ought to be combined and associated with advisory fiscal councils.

Macroeconomic theory clearly suggests that at the zero lower bound, fiscal contraction will reduce output and slow any recovery. Yet in 2010 the focus of fiscal policy in many countries switched from supporting activity to reducing debt, despite the fact that the recovery from recession often appeared weak. While high levels of public debt can explain this switch in some countries, it does not provide a satisfactory account in others. In addition, the possibility of using balanced budget fiscal expansion or tax switches that bring forward spending remain largely unexplored. This paper suggests that policy has been influenced by an opposition to countercyclical fiscal policy which has ideological roots.

This paper considers the origins and characteristics of the current economic crisis in Ireland. In particular, it examines how fiscal policy contributed to the crisis rather than preventing it. The paper gives details of the major fiscal tightening that is under way. By 2014 the authorities will have implemented a package of ex ante cuts equivalent to one-fifth of GDP. The costs of this package, together with the more permanent effects of the recession on potential output, are discussed and the legacy effects of the crisis for government indebtedness are analysed.

This paper explains how the collapse of growth after 2008, in combination with soaring public and external deficits, led to the escalation of Greek debt, while the government's delay in responding to the crisis increased the cost of borrowing and necessitated the bail-out agreement with the IMF and the European Union. One year later, Greece is struggling to harness fiscal deficits amidst a deep recession and rising social tension. Debt sustainability has not yet been ensured and another tranche of loans has been negotiated under new terms and conditions, including higher taxes and extensive privatisations of public companies and property. The paper discusses the main failures of the bail-out agreement and why the lack of growth so far has undermined efforts at stabilisation. As an alternative, the paper suggests that with a modest return to growth, combined with fast-track privatisations, the prospects of debt sustainability improve substantially. In light of the recent debate on the European Stability Mechanism, the paper suggests that the bail-out facility should avoid the debt seniority condition, so that Greece could return to normal market borrowing after 2013 without raising new fears of ‘haircuts’ on private sector obligations.