Brexit has cast a long shadow over the UK economy, with its impact masked by the COVID-19 pandemic and the crisis in Ukraine. Disentangling those effects is not straightforward, but that is the aim of the papers contained in this Special Issue. This Special Issue draws upon excellent contributions from some leading academic and policy-oriented researchers, all expert in the macroeconomic impacts of Brexit.

That Brexit disrupted the UK economy is widely agreed. Studies refer to its impact on exports and imports and on food prices. Less work has been done with respect to the impact on the labour market. This article concentrates on the relationship between vacancies and unemployment, which serves as an indicator of labour market tightness. Post-Brexit, the number of vacancies relative to the number of people unemployed increased dramatically. Analysis is based upon difference-in-difference methods. It suggests that by mid 2022 the UK’s V/U ratio might have been some 25% higher than it would have been without Brexit.

Since early 2021, food prices in Britain have increased by 30%. Using monthly microdata, researchers have found that frictions in the UK’s new trade relationship with the European Union (EU) play an important part in this inflation. The trade relationship is evolving, with further changes expected in 2024. This article establishes a framework for identifying trade-related inflation in close to real time. Using programming techniques, we collect daily prices of over 100,000 supermarket items, covering 80% of the UK grocery market. We identify 1,200 products from 12 countries with a protected designation of origin (PDO). This allows us to link price changes to individual EU economies. Addressing the predominance of EU PDOs, we employ a large language model to discern product origins from additional web-scraped data, thus broadening our analysis to cover over 67,000 products. Since August 2023, we find that prices for EU-originating food products have increased at a rate of 50% higher than domestically sourced products. This study presents a unique methodological approach to dissecting food sector inflation, which is well-positioned to be used in a policy setting, allowing us to assess the possible impact of impending nontariff barriers at the GB-EU border in 2024.

The United Kingdom has experienced significantly lower growth rates of business investment and labour productivity following its decision to leave the European Union, although this lacklustre performance was affected by the economic shocks caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in addition to Brexit. This article aims to quantify the impact of Brexit on business investment and labour productivity in the United Kingdom using the National Institute of Economic and Social Research’s Global Macroeconometric Model. We model Brexit as a decline in trade with the European Union and associated reduction in terms of trade, a decrease in productivity and a permanent increase in uncertainty. Our estimates suggest that these shocks have led to an approximately 12–13% decline in UK business investment in 2023, which gradually declines to 7–8% by 2035 as businesses adjust to the terms of trade and productivity shocks. This corresponds to a real gross domestic product (GDP) loss of 2–3% (about £850 per capita) in 2023 and 5–6% (about £2,300 per capita) by 2035. Additionally, we find that Brexit has reduced labour productivity by around 2–2.5% as of 2023, with a projected reduction of 5–6% by 2035.

In this article, we use a three-country macroeconomic model of trade, in which we allow for the presence of labour market frictions and heterogeneous firms, to analyse the effects of Brexit on UK productivity. We find that, under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, UK GDP would have been expected to fall by approximately 7.5% in 2021, that is, as soon as the United Kingdom exited the European Union. Our model suggests that UK GDP would then recover, rising back to a long-run level around 4% below where it would have been had Brexit not happened. This fall in GDP is driven by the negative productivity effects of the implied increase in the costs of trading between the United Kingdom and European Union. Specifically, the increase in trading costs will lead to fewer, higher-productivity, UK firms exporting and reduced competition from EU firms in the UK domestic market allows more ‘low productivity’ firms to remain in the market.

The end of free movement and the introduction of the post-Brexit migration system represent the most important changes to the UK migration system in half a century. Coinciding with the aftereffects of the pandemic, the result has been very large changes both to the numbers of those coming for work and study, and to their composition, both in terms of countries of origin and in the sectors and occupations of new migrants. It has also resulted in a political backlash, resulting in significant further changes to the system announced in December 2023. I discuss the evidence to date of the impact of recent migration trends on the UK economy and labour market, distinguishing between different sectors.