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Definitional devils and detail: On identifying motivation as an animating dynamic
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 January 2025
Abstract
Murayama and Jach critically evaluate the idea that motivation is a dynamic that determines behavior and propose alternatively that it might be an emergent property that people construe through perceived regularities in experience and action. The critique has value but fails to appreciate the progress that has been made in moving beyond the idea of which the authors are critical.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
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Target article
A critique of motivation constructs to explain higher-order behavior: We should unpack the black box
Related commentaries (25)
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Author response
Response to the critiques (and encouragements) on our critique of motivation constructs