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Motivational constructs: Real, causally powerful, not psychologically constructed

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2025

Andrea Scarantino Open the ORCID record for Andrea Scarantino [Opens in a new window]
Andrea Scarantino*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA [email protected] https://sites.google.com/site/andreascarantinoswebsite/
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

Murayama and Jach criticize the use of high-level motivational constructs in psychology, urging psychologists to “unpack” the black box. These constructs are alleged to be “psychological constructions” with no causal powers of their own. I argue that this view is mistaken, and that high-level motivational constructs are causal even when unpacked in terms of underlying computational, algorithmic, and implementational processes.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 48 , 2025 , e42
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press

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