The relations between different countries and continents have always been important politically and scientifically. This applies in particular to relations between Turkey and Europe. Through centuries, the Ottoman Empire was seen as the main enemy of ‘Christian Europe’. In this paper, three topics are discussed: (1) European, and in particular Austrian and German, attitudes towards Turkey's membership in the European Union. It is argued that the dominantly negative attitudes in this regard do not indicate a generally negative attitude towards Turkey. (2) Some of the reasons for the negative view of Turkish EU-membership in many EU countries are discussed. (3) In conclusion, three issues are taken up: the relevance of Turkish EU-membership; the reasons and persistence of national and ethnic stereotypes; the relevance of the time factor in international relations.

There is generally a negative image of the Turk – as arch-enemy – in Balkan countries. Yet this image refers less to real Turks than to different ethno-linguistic and religious neighbour groups, who are seen as more ‘Asiatic’ and less ‘European’ than oneself. Real Turks and the Turkish tradition – especially among Muslims – are rather admired. These images are constructions of high culture, albeit with sometimes dire consequences for all and sundry in times of conflict.

Presented here is an overview of migration flows and demographic structures of Turks in Europe over the past 50 years. Large-scale labour migration from Turkey to Europe occurred between 1961 and 1974. After that, it gave way to family migration, which today has more or less ended. Recently, there is slightly more emigration than immigration from the European point of view. Thus, stable migrant stocks developed in the receiving countries, especially Germany, Austria, France, and the Netherlands. The migrant stocks lag in many respects behind developments in the receiving countries, yet nonetheless they slowly but surely adapt to these. Despite their low status and feelings of exclusion, most Turkish immigrants are content with their lot and do not plan to leave their new homes in Europe.

In 2005 the European Union (EU) began formally to negotiate Turkey's application to become a full member. Today, the EU is a very different organization, Turkey has also experienced major changes, and the Arab Spring has dramatically impacted the Middle East. In sum, there is a changed context for the evolving relationship between Turkey and the EU. This article explains that context and concludes that, for the foreseeable future, Turkey is unlikely to become a full EU member, although close ties with respect to economic matters and immigration will persist.

Turkey and Europe are closely interlinked through migration, trade and investment flows. In the year 2000, the interrelationships entered a new phase. Return migration of Turkish migrants to Turkey set in, of often well-educated second-generation migrants, triggered by the fast economic growth and shortages of skilled labour in Turkey. At the same time continued family migration to Europe and Turkish business start-ups in Europe promote trade between Turkey and Europe due to preference and network channels. While economic growth in Turkey is dynamic, it is also volatile, depending on foreign capital. The major challenge for stable and sustainable economic growth is, however, the low labour force participation rate of women and the slow progress in the educational attainment level of its workforce.

Turkish migrants constitute the largest migrant community as well as the largest migrant entrepreneurial group in many European countries. Recent studies state that today 1 in 10 Turkish families is self-employed and the number of Turkish entrepreneurs operating all over EU member states has exceeded 100,000. Projections suggest that 190,000 Turkish entrepreneurs will be living in the EU member states in 2020 while employing over 1 million people. An increasing involvement of second-generation migrants in entrepreneurial activities, as well as the new orientations from traditional to non-traditional sectors and transnational activities, has led to a transformation from ‘Migrant Entrepreneurship’ towards the ‘New European Entrepreneurship’.

In spite of the fact that negotiations have been going on for years, the chances that Turkey will eventually become a full member of the European Union are slim. At present, a political majority among the EU-member states headed by Germany seems to oppose Turkey entering the EU. In the Netherlands, however, most political parties are still in favour of Turkey's membership. That difference coincides with the difference in the position of Turkish immigrants in German and Dutch societies.

This article aims to open a theoretical space to address the variation of migrant settlement and transnationalism in time and space beyond the national scale and ethnic lens. On the basis of the emergent homeland ties and Hometown Associations of Syriac migrants from Mardin (Turkey) in Europe it approaches migrant dynamics through the lens of the repositioning struggles Mardin has undergone within the context of neo-liberal development agendas.

Return migration has been one of the rather neglected aspects of migration until recently, although a considerable number of international migrants as well as inter-regional migrants return to their place of origin. Nevertheless, since the beginning of the 1990s, the interest for issues related to return migration has grown considerably. In the context of Turkish return migration there still is a lack of information about the motives for returning, the new social status, the levels of satisfaction and reintegration as well as the employment and income of emigrants who have returned home. This paper aims at shedding light on this neglected aspect of Turkish migration in the context of Europe as well as on the history of Turkey as a country of immigration.

What are the reasons for the rapid economic growth of regions and their later decline? Why does the development of a certain region create under-development in another region within a national or global sphere? A central paradigm for explaining such phenomena is core–periphery relations, and the case study presented in this paper is the port city of Thessaloniki and its regressive and peripheral status within the regional (Macedonia and the Southern Balkans), national (State of Greece), and international (the capitalist world- system) spheres during two main political periods: (i) the final decades of the Ottoman regime in Macedonia (1870–1912); (ii) the first quarter of a century in which Thessaloniki integrated with Greece (1912–1936).

Core–periphery analysis is vital to an understanding of the European Union (EU) and regional development. The European Economic Community (EEC), which would eventually become the EU, was formed in 1957 in order to promote progressive economic integration. Recognizing that there were depressed regions within both peripheral and core nation-states, the EC adopted a programme with the goal of bringing those regions into convergence. Its programme is essentially a liberal centre–periphery model similar to the one proposed by Friedman. Many of the nation-states within the EC also have their own regional policies and programmes regarding intervention within their own spatial boundaries. To present an approach for comparison this article will focus on two examples of regional policy: Britain's attitude toward regional development in the North and the German programme for integrating East Germany.

When the debate on globalization started in the early 1990s, the dominant assumption was that globalization was a shocking new phenomenon. Moreover, this new development was seen as an attempt to undermine the sovereignty and economic functions of the nation state, hence undermining the fundamental basis of the welfare state. According to this perspective, the welfare state was expected to collapse as a result of economic constraints. Some influential publications promoted the idea that countries would find themselves captured in a global trap. At least in the field of social sciences, this thesis was interpreted differently: the weakening of the nation state by globalization was considered a myth that served as an excuse for cutting government budgets. Since then, the social sciences have developed an approach to globalization as a long-term trend within the capitalistic framework, driven by economic and political developments and dependent on pre-existing social conditions.