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Distinguishing self-involving from self-serving choices in framing effects

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2022

M. J. Crockett Open the ORCID record for M. J. Crockett [Opens in a new window]  and
L. A. Paul
M. J. Crockett
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511, [email protected], www.crockettlab.org
L. A. Paul
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511, [email protected], www.crockettlab.org Department of Philosophy, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511, [email protected], www.lapaul.org
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Abstract

We distinguish two types of cases that have potential to generate quasi-cyclical preferences: self-involving choices where an agent oscillates between first- and third-person perspectives that conflict regarding their life-changing implications, and self-serving choices where frame-based reasoning can be “first-personally rational” yet “third-personally irrational.” We argue that the distinction between these types of cases deserves more attention in Bermúdez's account.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e224
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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