We examine the international propagation of the financial crisis of 2008, and compare it with that of the crisis of 1931. Both crises featured a flight to liquidity and safety. We argue that the collateral squeeze in the United States, which became intense after the failure of Lehman Brothers, was an important propagator in 2008; in 1931 the acceptances granted by London banks to central European borrowers propagated the crisis to the UK. In both crises, central banks' reserve management actions contributed to the liquidity crisis. And in both crises, the behaviour of creditors towards debtors, and the valuation of assets by creditors, were very important. However, there was a key difference between the two crises in the range and nature of assets that were regarded as liquid and safe: central banks in 2008, with no gold standard constraint, could liquefy illiquid assets on a much greater scale.

In this article we re-evaluate the hypothesis that the development of the financial sector was an essential factor behind economic growth in nineteenth-century Germany. We apply a structural VAR framework to a new annual data set from 1870 to 1912 that was initially compiled by Walther Hoffmann (1965). With respect to the literature, the distinguishing characteristic of our analysis is the focus on different sectors in the economy and the interpretation of the findings in the context of a two-sector growth model. We find that all sectors were affected significantly by shocks from the banking system. Interestingly, this link is the strongest in sectors with small or non-tradable-goods-producing firms, such as construction, services, transportation and agriculture. In this regard, the growth patterns in nineteenth-century Germany are similar to those in today's emerging markets.

In 1720 Britain embarked on a project to convert a large part of the public debt into shares in the South Sea Company. Most narratives assume the Company stood to profit from an anticipated increase in the market price of its shares. Though some have noted that this assumption is incorrect, no one has yet tried to find an alternative explanation for the Company's motivation for entering into the project. In this article I argue that the Company had no need to profit directly from the conversion operation and instead saw it as an opportunity to establish dominance in the British banking industry.

Until 2008, Ireland's banks had a solid reputation. Its two long-established banks could trace their origins back to the beginnings of joint-stock banking in 1825. Few banks of consequence had failed in the interim. The last such failure, the focus of this article, was that of the Munster Bank in 1885. That event tells us much about the history of Irish banking before recent events.

Sovereign debts differ from other financial instruments because repayment ultimately depends on the issuers' willingness to pay. In turn, willingness to pay may be influenced by political, diplomatic or economic considerations. Based on an original database of Romanian bonds traded in Paris, this article shows that international diplomacy played an important role in the Romanian debt valuation.