Glowacki understands peace as an ongoing state of harmonious interactions between social groups, with little or no violence, and where conflicts are expected to be resolved nonviolently (target article, sect. 1.1, para. 5). Two points he sets out to defend are: (1) peace, so understood, emerged approximately 100,000 years ago, and (2) the logic of peace is such that the “traits and the technologies that…enable peace are the same traits that are used to wage war” (target article, sect. 10, para. 5). In what follows I raise a few questions and concerns about Glowacki's understanding of peace and these two points.
Among prerequisites for peace Glowacki lists: The capacity to tolerate strangers, the motivation to interact with other social groups, the psychological and social structures necessary to develop, adhere to, and enforce norms regulating the intergroup behaviors of individuals (target article, sect. 3). He adds that regular intergroup cooperation, which “likely back dates to at least several hundred thousand years ago,” is insufficient; there must also be “high levels of interdependence” (target article, sect. 6.2, para 3). This last point seems questionable. Prima facie, intergroup peace is compatible with a wide range of degrees of interaction and interdependence. Why, for example, would not the strong desires of two groups not to be attacked by the other, to have their territories respected, and the like, at least sometimes motivate the implementation of group-enforcing norms capable of ensuring little or no intergroup violence – even if the degree of interaction and interdependence is not especially high (e.g., because that is how the groups want it)? Arguably, any adequate definition of peace should accommodate cases of this sort.
The requirement for peace at the heart of Glowacki's argument that peace emerged 100,000 years ago concerns group norms. Before that time societies “were likely to be small and unstratified, with few means to regulate and enforce norms against intergroup aggression” (target article, sect. 6.1, para. 4). Then around 100,000 years ago peace was facilitated by an increased emphasis on group identity, which was itself accelerated by a focus on material status symbols and symbolic behavior (target article, sect. 6.2, para. 1). While it is plausible that these developments led to more sophisticated forms of peacemaking, rather than maintaining that peace came into existence then, I believe a more accurate account would have it that peace's emergence was a longer and more gradual process, lacking any sharp boundary. Learned behavioral norms, after all, are as old as culture itself. And because our capacity to sanction within-group violations of norms (cheating, theft, etc.) is much older than 100,000 years, it is hard to see why that capacity would not also be applicable across group boundaries earlier too. That raids have sometimes been difficult to control does not indicate a general inability to do so, since advanced contemporary societies also often fail to prevent segments of their populations from undermining peace. Regarding Glowacki's claims about group identity, the phenomena he points to also seem like just one step in a longer process. For much longer than 100,000 years humans have conceptualized groups and subgroups at various levels of social organization, with an ability to distinguish members from nonmembers (in-group/out-group). Distinguishing hunters from nonhunters, skilled toolmakers from the unskilled, and so on, depends on such an ability which, once possessed, would almost certainly also apply to humans outside of one's broad social group (e.g., band). If status is tightly related to group identity, as Glowacki suggests, it should be noted that there can be status without status symbols, and status symbols with primary functions unrelated to status (having the best-crafted tools and weapons, the most desirable places of shelter, etc.), which suggests that status too would have been operative earlier.
Turning finally to Glowacki's remarks on the logic of peace and war, on how our capacity for peace enabled us to wage more sophisticated and brutal forms of war, this is true as far as it goes. Of course, if what was said above about this being a long and gradual process is correct, that will apply here as well. On the whole, Glowacki's point appears to be a special case of the truism that technology (knowledge, skills, etc.) can be used for both good and evil. While his use of the word “logic” suggests a necessary connection of some kind between the concepts of peace and war, all that can be inferred from what he says, I believe, is that, at times in our past, among the traits and technologies that enabled peace are some traits that could also be employed to wage war. This means that in principle there could be features of peacemaking that make war less likely, or even prevent it. Glowacki appears to accept this, as he ends his article by holding out the possibility that humans might learn to counteract their tendency to wage war by “engineering social systems that can withstand the challenges of defectors and the potential payoffs from violence” (target article, sect. 10, para. 6). That means that although it will be difficult, and success is far from certain, there is nothing in the logic of peace and war barring humans from discovering how to end war.
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Glowacki understands peace as an ongoing state of harmonious interactions between social groups, with little or no violence, and where conflicts are expected to be resolved nonviolently (target article, sect. 1.1, para. 5). Two points he sets out to defend are: (1) peace, so understood, emerged approximately 100,000 years ago, and (2) the logic of peace is such that the “traits and the technologies that…enable peace are the same traits that are used to wage war” (target article, sect. 10, para. 5). In what follows I raise a few questions and concerns about Glowacki's understanding of peace and these two points.
Among prerequisites for peace Glowacki lists: The capacity to tolerate strangers, the motivation to interact with other social groups, the psychological and social structures necessary to develop, adhere to, and enforce norms regulating the intergroup behaviors of individuals (target article, sect. 3). He adds that regular intergroup cooperation, which “likely back dates to at least several hundred thousand years ago,” is insufficient; there must also be “high levels of interdependence” (target article, sect. 6.2, para 3). This last point seems questionable. Prima facie, intergroup peace is compatible with a wide range of degrees of interaction and interdependence. Why, for example, would not the strong desires of two groups not to be attacked by the other, to have their territories respected, and the like, at least sometimes motivate the implementation of group-enforcing norms capable of ensuring little or no intergroup violence – even if the degree of interaction and interdependence is not especially high (e.g., because that is how the groups want it)? Arguably, any adequate definition of peace should accommodate cases of this sort.
The requirement for peace at the heart of Glowacki's argument that peace emerged 100,000 years ago concerns group norms. Before that time societies “were likely to be small and unstratified, with few means to regulate and enforce norms against intergroup aggression” (target article, sect. 6.1, para. 4). Then around 100,000 years ago peace was facilitated by an increased emphasis on group identity, which was itself accelerated by a focus on material status symbols and symbolic behavior (target article, sect. 6.2, para. 1). While it is plausible that these developments led to more sophisticated forms of peacemaking, rather than maintaining that peace came into existence then, I believe a more accurate account would have it that peace's emergence was a longer and more gradual process, lacking any sharp boundary. Learned behavioral norms, after all, are as old as culture itself. And because our capacity to sanction within-group violations of norms (cheating, theft, etc.) is much older than 100,000 years, it is hard to see why that capacity would not also be applicable across group boundaries earlier too. That raids have sometimes been difficult to control does not indicate a general inability to do so, since advanced contemporary societies also often fail to prevent segments of their populations from undermining peace. Regarding Glowacki's claims about group identity, the phenomena he points to also seem like just one step in a longer process. For much longer than 100,000 years humans have conceptualized groups and subgroups at various levels of social organization, with an ability to distinguish members from nonmembers (in-group/out-group). Distinguishing hunters from nonhunters, skilled toolmakers from the unskilled, and so on, depends on such an ability which, once possessed, would almost certainly also apply to humans outside of one's broad social group (e.g., band). If status is tightly related to group identity, as Glowacki suggests, it should be noted that there can be status without status symbols, and status symbols with primary functions unrelated to status (having the best-crafted tools and weapons, the most desirable places of shelter, etc.), which suggests that status too would have been operative earlier.
Turning finally to Glowacki's remarks on the logic of peace and war, on how our capacity for peace enabled us to wage more sophisticated and brutal forms of war, this is true as far as it goes. Of course, if what was said above about this being a long and gradual process is correct, that will apply here as well. On the whole, Glowacki's point appears to be a special case of the truism that technology (knowledge, skills, etc.) can be used for both good and evil. While his use of the word “logic” suggests a necessary connection of some kind between the concepts of peace and war, all that can be inferred from what he says, I believe, is that, at times in our past, among the traits and technologies that enabled peace are some traits that could also be employed to wage war. This means that in principle there could be features of peacemaking that make war less likely, or even prevent it. Glowacki appears to accept this, as he ends his article by holding out the possibility that humans might learn to counteract their tendency to wage war by “engineering social systems that can withstand the challenges of defectors and the potential payoffs from violence” (target article, sect. 10, para. 6). That means that although it will be difficult, and success is far from certain, there is nothing in the logic of peace and war barring humans from discovering how to end war.
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This research received no specific grant from any funding agency, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
Competing interest
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