Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-89wxm Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-05T23:28:26.227Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The evolution of peace (and war) is driven by an elementary social interaction mechanism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 January 2024

Ilan Fischer Open the ORCID record for Ilan Fischer [Opens in a new window] ,
Shacked Avrashi Open the ORCID record for Shacked Avrashi [Opens in a new window]  and
Lior Savranevski
Ilan Fischer*
Affiliation:
School of Psychological Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
Shacked Avrashi
Affiliation:
School of Psychological Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
Lior Savranevski
Affiliation:
School of Psychological Sciences, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
*
*Corresponding author.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Here we revise Glowacki's model by proposing a simple and empirically tested mechanism that is applicable to a comprehensive set of social interactions. This parsimonious mechanism accounts for the choice of both cooperative and peaceful alternatives and explains when each choice benefits the interacting parties. It is proposed that this mechanism is key to the evolution of both peace and conflict.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 47 , 2024 , e7
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Axelrod, R. M. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. Basic Books.Google Scholar
Axelrod, R. M., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science (New York, N.Y.), 211(4489), 1390–1396. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7466396CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Fischer, I. (2009). Friend or foe: Subjective expected relative similarity as a determinant of cooperation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 138(3), 341–350. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0016073CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Fischer, I. (2012). Similarity or reciprocity? On the determinants of cooperation in similarity-sensitive games. Psychological Inquiry, 23(1), 48–54. https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2012.658004CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Fischer, I., Frid, A., Goerg, S. J., Levin, S. A., Rubenstein, D. I., & Selten, R. (2013). Fusing enacted and expected mimicry generates a winning strategy that promotes the evolution of cooperation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 110, 10229–10233. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1308221110CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Fischer, I., Levin, S. A., Rubenstein, D. I., Avrashi, S., Givon, L., & Oz, T. (2022). Interacting with others while reacting to the environment. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 45(E106), 27–28. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X21001291CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Fischer, I., Rubenstein, D. I., & Levin, S. A. (2022). Vaccination-hesitancy and global warming: Distinct social challenges with similar behavioural solutions. Royal Society Open Science, 9(6). https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.211515CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Flood, M. M. (1958). Some experimental games. Management Science, 5(1), 5–26. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.5.1.5Google Scholar
Fraser, N. M., & Kilgour, D. M. (1986). Non-strict ordinal 2 × 2 games: A comprehensive computer-assisted analysis of the 726 possibilities. Theory and Decision, 20(2), 99–121. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00135087/METRICSCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Johnson, D. D. P., Stopka, P., & Bell, J. (2002). Individual variation evades the prisoner's dilemma. BMC Evolutionary Biology, 2(1), 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2148-2-15/FIGURES/2CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kilgour, D. M., & Fraser, N. M. (1988). A taxonomy of all ordinal 2 × 2 games. Theory and Decision, 24(2), 99–117. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00132457/METRICSCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Northcott, R., & Alexandrova, A. (2015). Prisoner's dilemma doesn't explain much. In Peterson, M. (Ed.), The prisoner's dilemma. Classic philosophical arguments (pp. 64–84). Cambridge University Press. https://philpapers.org/rec/NORPDDCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rapoport, A., & Chammah, A. M. (1965). Prisoner's dilemma: A study in conflict and cooperation. University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rapoport, A., & Guyer, M. (1966). A taxonomy of 2×2 games. General Systems, 11, 203–214.Google Scholar