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The logic of challenging research into bias and social disparity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 May 2022

Regina Rini*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, York University, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada. [email protected]

Abstract

There are two problems with the logic of Cesario's argument for abandoning existing research on social bias. First, laboratory findings of decisional bias have social significance even if Cesario is right that the research strips away real-world context. Second, the argument makes overly skeptical demands of a research program seeking complex causal linkages between micro- and macro-scale phenomena.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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