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Unification at the cost of realism and precision

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 May 2020

Rachael L. Brown ,
Carl Brusse Open the ORCID record for Carl Brusse [Opens in a new window] ,
Bryce Huebner  and
Ross Pain Open the ORCID record for Ross Pain [Opens in a new window]
Rachael L. Brown
Affiliation:
School of Philosophy, the Australian National University, Canberra, 0200ACT, Australia. [email protected] [email protected] http://rachaelbrown.net
Carl Brusse
Affiliation:
School of Philosophy, the Australian National University, Canberra, 0200ACT, Australia. [email protected] [email protected] http://rachaelbrown.net Department of Philosophy and Charles Perkins Centre, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW2006, Australia. [email protected]
Bryce Huebner
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, DC20009. [email protected] brycehuebner.weebly.com
Ross Pain
Affiliation:
School of Philosophy, the Australian National University, Canberra, 0200ACT, Australia. [email protected] [email protected] http://rachaelbrown.net
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Abstract

Veissière et al. must sacrifice explanatory realism and precision in order to develop a unified formal model. Drawing on examples from cognitive archeology, we argue that this makes it difficult for them to derive the kinds of testable predictions that would allow them to resolve debates over the nature of human social cognition and cultural acquisition.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e95
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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