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Imitation: Neither instinct nor gadget, but a cultural starting point?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 September 2019
Abstract
Heyes asks whether cultural learning mechanisms are cognitive instincts or cognitive gadgets. I argue that imitation does not fall into either category. Instead, its acquisition is promoted by its value in social interactions, which is evident across phylogeny and ontogeny and does not depend on the role of imitation in cultural learning.
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019
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Précis of Cognitive Gadgets: The Cultural Evolution of Thinking
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