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Moral psychology biases toward individual, not systemic, representations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 August 2023

Irein A. Thomas ,
Nick R. Kay  and
Kristin Laurin Open the ORCID record for Kristin Laurin [Opens in a new window]
Irein A. Thomas
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]; https://magiclab.psych.ubc.ca/
Nick R. Kay
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]; https://magiclab.psych.ubc.ca/
Kristin Laurin
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]; https://magiclab.psych.ubc.ca/
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Abstract

We expand Chater & Loewenstein's discussion of barriers to s-frames by highlighting moral psychological mechanisms. Systemic aspects of moralized social issues can be neglected because of (a) the individualistic frame through which we perceive moral transgressions; (b) the desire to punish elicited by moral emotions; and (c) the motivation to attribute agency and moral responsibility to transgressors.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e178
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

*

IAT and NRK contributed equally and share first authorship.

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