What effect does the professional character of a legislature have on the power of its legislative leaders? Despite legislative scholars' desire to better understand both institutional professionalism and leadership power, few empirical studies have explored the relationship between these two important elements of American state legislatures. Moreover, of the research that has been conducted, little effort has been made to understand the impact of professionalism on leadership from a theoretical perspective. This article expands our understanding of legislative professionalism and leadership while testing three theoretical models of legislative organization. I examine the effect of professionalism and several control variables on the influence of state house leaders in 38 non-southern states in 1981 and 1995. Contrary to the fears of some analysts, I find that more professional state legislatures tend to have more powerful leaders. These results provide support for a partisan model of legislative organization.

How do people explain their behavior in socially unacceptable political situations? Exploring this question will give us insight into how the public responds to and frames collective decisions regarding controversial topics. We analyze accounts of the outcomes of racially sensitive statewide referenda in two states to understand the public responses to such political predicaments. Distinguishing four broad categories of these accounts—denials, justifications, excuses, and confessions—we find some clear-cut differences in their use between proponents and opponents of the ballot measures. These results have implications for political thought and dialogue regarding politically-sensitive issues and other heated policy issues. We also discuss how the different account dynamics in these two cases presaged subsequent political developments in these states, which might provide insights into why some such cases continue to be fiercely contested while others fade from public debate.

Does state political ideology change over time? Brace et al. (2004, 537) say no, based on their analysis of three longitudinal measures of state citizen ideology: Berry et al.‘s (1998) indicator that relies on election results and congressional roll call votes, and two indicators that Brace et al. construct from ideological self-placement items, one using GSS and ANES survey results, and the other employing surveys conducted by CBS/New York Times. The authors imply that the ideological stability they detect precludes the possibility that state citizen ideology influences state policy. However, this implication stems from Brace et al.‘s definition of meaningful ideological change as differences in the relative ideology of states over time rather than absolute changes in ideology within states. We contend that this argument is both logically and methodologically flawed. Brace et al. maintain that their CBS/New York Times and GSS/ANES indicators are valid measures of state citizen ideology, but that the Berry et al. indicator is not. To assess this claim, it is crucial to distinguish between ideological self-identification (or symbolic ideology) and policy mood (or operational ideology). We find that the Berry et al. measure is a valid indicator of policy mood, but that it is invalid as a measure of self-identification. In contrast, the CBS/New York Times and GSS/ANES measures are invalid as indicators of policy mood, and while they are valid indicators of self-identified ideology, they are highly unreliable. Although a measure of self-identified ideology can be useful for answering some research questions, we contend that an indicator of policy mood is more appropriate when studying the impact of public opinion on public policy, and we reiterate our confidence in using the Berry et al. (1998) measure for that purpose.

Interstate compacts hold tremendous promise for resolving tough public problems at the subnational level. They have also been promoted as one way that states can protect their sovereignty vis-à-vis the national government. But the rate at which states participate in such compacts varies widely. Thus, we ask: What explains a state's propensity to join national interstate compacts? Using time-series cross-sectional event count models of state compact participation from 1960–2000, we find that states join compacts to enhance their policymaking capacity and to substitute for policy action by the national government. We also find that the physical connection among states influences their preference for certain types of compacts. Isolated states show a preference for compacts that simply harmonize policies, while more proximate states are more likely to join compacts that effectively open their borders to other states. Contrary to the expectations of some observers, interstate compacts do not appear to be used strategicallyby states as a means to forestall federal preemption.

Term limits advocates argued that their reform would make state legislative campaigns more competitive and less expensive, and limited early studies suggested that it may have achieved those goals. But now, with evidence from more than a decade of experience with reform, we re-examine the effects of terms limits on electoral competitiveness and campaign spending in California Assembly elections. We find that while term limits initially suppressed campaign spending, they did not check its growth for long. Today, California's state legislative elections are as expensive in real dollars as they have ever been. In terms of electoral competitiveness, state legislative incumbents are in no more danger of losing their seats today than they were in the pre-term limits days of the late 1980s. Furthermore, open-seat races are not any more competitive under term limits than before them; however, we do find a modest, but significant, decline in incumbents' average winning margin since the imposition of term limits. But since term limits have made fewer incumbents eligible to run for office, this incumbency advantage helps fewer people than it once did. Yet, for the most part, rather than being supplanted by citizen-legislators, career politicians have simply adapted to the constraints imposed by term limits.

In a nationwide survey Carey, Niemi, Powell, and Moncrief (2006) found that term-limited state legislators feel less constrained by their constituencies. I use direct measures of legislative activity to examine how this “Burkean shift” in attitudes is manifested in roll-call behavior. With a new dataset consisting of all competitive state legislative roll calls for the 1999–2000 sessions and a new measure of district constituency preferences, I examine three hypotheses: that term-limited legislators are less representative of their constituents, are more polarized, and participate less in roll-call voting. I find no evidence that term-limited legislators are any less representative, and no differences in levels of party polarization appear associated with the term limits reform. I find that the impact of term limits on roll-call voting is manifested in decreased legislative effort, but this effect only appears in the more demanding legislatures. The results are consistent with the sorting model in which elections are reasonably efficient at selecting leaders whose preferences align with those of their districts, but the prospect of re-election has little role in achieving representation of constituents' ideological preferences.

Writing this reply presents a challenge for us since the authors of the preceding article reinforce most of our substantive points published previously (Brace et al. 2004, 2006). In this new article, Berry et al. (2007) acknowledge that there is more cross-sectional than longitudinal variation in the Berry et al. (1998) measure of state citizen ideology and imply that researchers should take precautions not to confuse them. They admit that their measure is tapping something different from survey-based self-identification, and they also note the distinction between absolute and relative change in their ideology measure. Given our many points of agreement, this reply focuses on four key points made by Berry et al. in the preceding article on which we differ. First, we address the argument that focusing on intra-state attitude change ignores important attitude change affecting all states simultaneously. Second, we discuss Berry et al.‘s distinction between symbolic ideology and operational ideology. Third, we consider the validity and reliability of the various measures. Finally, we revisit our choice of statistical methods. Although we certainly do not conclude that Berry et al.‘s measure lacks clear utility or relevance, we believe it may serve a more limited purpose than the authors intended. We urge researchers to consider the conceptual, methodological, and epistemological concerns raised in our response before using any indicator of state public opinion.

Recent research has taught us much about the effects of campaign finance laws, but we know little about why states adopt the regulations that they do. I address this question by examining why states increased the stringency of their campaign finance laws from 1993 to 2002. As is the case with other policies regulating the conduct of elected officials, the popular perception exists that politicians resist stringent campaign finance out of a concern for their own electoral self-interest. As a result, I test whether campaign finance policymaking results from the selfish electoral incentives that politicians allegedly have on this issue or decisions on this issue are influenced by factors that influence other types of policies. I find evidence to support both views. Specifically, the initiative option, a liberal government, strong good government groups, legislative professionalism, and scandal increase the likelihood of a state increasing the stringency of their regulations, while states with expensive legislative elections are less willing to do so.

Recent studies (Brace and Hall 1990, 1995, 1997; Hall 1987, 1992; Hall and Brace 1989) have demonstrated that state supreme court judges' decisionmaking is influenced by the type of selection mechanism that put them into office. In particular, judges are found to respond to the interests of those who have placed them on the bench. We extend this line of inquiry further by testing the effect of rules governing the retention of these judges in merit systems. Do these judges respond to the subtle differences in constituency that these rules establish? We address this question with a larger dataset than that used in previous studies of decisionmaking (Brace and Hall 1995, 1997; Hall 1987, 1992), and we find overwhelming evidence of the effects of these retention rules. In fact, we also conclude that judicial decisions are more influenced by the actor charged with retaining them than the actor who placed them on the bench in the first place.

Interest groups have many tactics to choose from in pursuing their policy goals. While inside tactics have received considerable scholarly attention, outside tactics have been adopted increasingly by groups of all kinds. We explore one such lobbying tactic by examining the relationship between interest groups and journalists in the American states. Through a survey of statehouse reporters, we find that lobbyists are useful sources of information for these reporters, who even rank them above many more traditional sources of information. Our data also show that contact between interest groups and journalists varies systematically across the states. Specifically, interest groups in states with large or small numbers of interest groups have more contact with journalists than interest groups in states with an average number of groups. Furthermore, journalists in states where interest groups are relatively powerful claim to interact with those groups less than journalists in states where interest groups are less powerful.

As state judicial campaigns become progressively more expensive and political, judicial candidates have turned more frequently to lawyers and law firms for campaign contributions. Given that lawyers who contribute to judges' campaigns frequently appear before them in court, the potential for a conflict of interest arises. I ask whether judges are more likely to rule in favor of attorneys who provide financial support to their campaigns. Looking at cases decided in the Supreme Court of Georgia's 2003 term, I show that campaign contributions are indeed correlated with judges' decisions. Furthermore, I use a two-stage probit least squares estimator to show that these campaign contributions directly affect judicial decisionmaking.

This note examines two modeling alterations of Barabas and Jerit's (2004) analysis of the influence of redistricting principles on minority representation in congressional districts. The size of states and the fact that some states cannot have majority-minority or minority-influence districts is taken into account in these new analyses. Overall, even with these two important alterations, Barabas and Jerit's findings are largely replicated. However, two of their most prominently reported findings—that a compactness requirement for redistricting is associated with both fewer majority-minority and minority-influence districts—are not corroborated.

Political scientists are increasingly turning to direct democracy, as practiced in the American states, to investigate a broad range of questions dealing with median voter preferences and policy responsiveness, minority interests, theories of representation, policy implementation, political knowledge and behavior, citizen engagement, mobilization and turnout, voter competence, activities of interest groups and political parties, campaign finance, media effects, and agenda-setting. In this review article, we examine recent research on the instrumental effects of ballot measures on policy outcomes as well as the educative (and spillover) effects of the process of direct democracy on candidate contests. Throughout the article we suggest avenues for possible future research.

This article analyzes existing scholarship on the diffusion of public policies among the American states, focusing on recent developments in this line of research and suggesting several potential avenues for future work. The analysis is organized around three fundamental questions. First, why does policy diffusion occur? Answering this question will require scholars to devote more attention to concepts such as imitation, emulation, and competition. Second, which political forces facilitate or impede policy diffusion? Answering this question will require scholars to devote more attention to the causal mechanisms at work when states adopt policies like those of other states. Third, what is being diffused? Answering this question will require scholars to think more carefully about the content of public policy, both as an outcome to be explained and as a factor that itself affects the diffusion process.

The lively debate between Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (2007, hereafter Berry et al.) and Brace, Arceneaux, Johnson, and Ulbig (2004, hereafter Brace et al.) about the measurement of state public opinion is instructive for scholars of many aspects of state politics and policy. Researchers in need of such a measure now have a variety of choices, but as this debate illustrates, these measures are not simply interchangeable nor can they be used without a good deal of theoretical and methodological thought. Each measure is linked to a different component of state public opinion and each has its limitations. In addition, state policies, and changes in state policies, may have different causal links to these measures depending on policy type, kind of policy change, or environmental factors.

our initial article challenged three of Brace et al.'s (2004) claims: (1) state citizen ideology is stable over time; (2) the Berry et al. (1998) measure of state citizen ideology is invalid; and (3) assessing the effect of state citizen ideology on state policy requires analysts to first parse out national or across-the-board changes in ideology. By stating that “the authors of the preceding article reinforce most of our substantive points,” Brace et al. (2007, 000) leave the impression that we agree with these claims. We do not. In fact, we see no evidence in this exchange to support any of these claims or to rebut our criticisms of them. To substantiate their first claim Brace et al. (2004) report that residuals from fixed-effects regression models of two measures of state ideological self-identification display few significant time trends. In this issue, we show that the results of the residual analysis are almost certainly artifacts of low statistical power and high measurement error and, hence, cannot support their claim. Brace et al. defend their second claim by showing that Berry et al.'s measure of citizen ideology both produces far more statistically significant time trends than do the two measures of ideological self-identification and is weakly correlated with these two measures. In response, we once again point to the artifactual nature of their regression residual results and note that Brace et al. (2001) report incorrect correlations. These empirical criticisms are independent of the distinction we draw between policy mood and self-identification; were we to abandon this distinction completely, which we recommend against on theoretical grounds, these criticisms of Brace et al. (2004) would still apply. We reject Brace et al.'s third claim that changes in state citizen ideology associated with national trends cannot meaningfully influence state public policyon logical grounds, noting that across-the-board changes in state ideology may very well produce changes in state public policy.

State politics scholars often confront data situations where the explanatory variables in a model are highly related to each other. Such multicollinearity (“MC”) makes it difficult to identify the independent effect that each of these variables has on the outcome of interest. In an effort to circumvent MC, researchers sometimes drop collinear variables from the regression model. Using simulated data, we demonstrate the implications that MC has for statistical estimation and the potential for introducing bias that the omitting-variables approach generates. We also discuss MC in the context of multiplicative interaction models, using research on the influence of the initiative on policy responsiveness as an applied example. We conclude with advice for researchers faced with MC in their datasets.

Researchers are often interested in the effects of state policies and institutions on individual behavior or other outcomes in sub-state-level observational units, such as election results in state legislative districts. In this article, we examine the issue of clustered data in state and local politics research and the analytical problems it can cause. Standard estimation methods applied in most regression models do not properly account for the clustering of observations within states, leading analysts to overstate the statistical significance of coefficient estimates, especially of state-level factors. We discuss the theory behind two approaches for dealing with clustering—clustered standard errors and multilevel modeling—and argue that calculating clustered standard errors is a more straightforward and practical approach, especially when working with large datasets or many cross-level interactions. We demonstrate the relevance of this topic by replicating a recent study of the effects of state post-registration laws on voter turnout (Wolfinger, Highton, and Mullin 2005).

Scholars of state politics and policy have devoted little attention to the public universities where so many of them work. Public higher education is organized at the state level, and its funding and governance have been debated at length in many states in recent years. Moreover, these universities provide opportunities for contributions to a variety of theoretically-grounded research, including the decision to make or buy public services, principal-agent issues and institutional arrangements for governance, the politics of institutional reform, the determinants of government appropriations and budgetary trade-offs, and internal decisionmaking in state-owned enterprises, public bureaucracies, and nonprofit organizations. Research on these issues could not only generate insights relevant to many types of institutions and public services but also contribute to ongoing policy debates over relations between state governments and higher education.