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Epistemic authority, episodic memory, and the sense of self

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 January 2018

Jennifer Nagel
Jennifer Nagel*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, M5R 2M8, Canada. [email protected]://individual.utoronto.ca/jnagel/Home_Page.html
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Abstract

The distinctive feature of episodic memory is autonoesis, the feeling that one's awareness of particular past events is grounded in firsthand experience. Autonoesis guides us in sharing our experiences of past events, not by telling us when our credibility is at stake, but by telling us what others will find informative; it also supports the sense of an enduring self.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e24
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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