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The second-order problem of other minds
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 April 2023
Abstract
The target article proposes that people perceive social robots as depictions rather than as genuine social agents. We suggest that people might instead view social robots as social agents, albeit agents with more restricted capacities and moral rights than humans. We discuss why social robots, unlike other kinds of depictions, present a special challenge for testing the depiction hypothesis.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Target article
Social robots as depictions of social agents
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Author response
On depicting social agents