For a multilateral system to be sustainable, it is important to have several escape clauses which can allow countries to protect their national security concerns. However, when these escape windows are too wide or ambiguous, defining their ambit and scope becomes challenging yet crucial to ensure that they are not open to misuse. The recent Panel Ruling in Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit is the very first attempt by the WTO to clarify the scope and ambit of National Security Exception. In this paper, we argue that the Panel has employed a combination of an objective and a subjective approach to interpret this exception. This hybrid approach to interpret GATT Article XXI (b) provides a systemic balance between the sovereign rights of the members to invoke the security exception and their right to free and open trade. But has this Ruling opened Pandora's box? In this paper, we address this issue by providing an in-depth analysis of the Panel's decision.

This essay examines the effect of power asymmetries and imperfect markets on US trade policy, two issues often neglected in the conventional literature. We suggest that when the distribution of power is skewed and markets do not conform to the world of standard trade theory, open international markets will not exist unless the disproportionately most powerful state can make a credible commitment to free trade. We suggest that these two conditions characterized the post-World War II trade environment and partially explain why the United States encouraged the formation of the postwar international trade regime. To demonstrate this argument, we examine the voting rules, dispute settlement procedures, and regional trading arrangements that characterized the three postwar trade organizations: the stillborn International Trade Organization, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the World Trade Organization. We argue that the rules of these institutions empowered their member states to punish any US attempts to ‘cheat’. In so doing, it made free trade their welfare-maximizing strategy choice.

The negotiation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) greatly expands the purview of the World Trade Organization (WTO) into domestic regulatory standards. This evolution immediately raises the question of whether other regulatory standards, including competition policy, environmental standards, and worker rights, should be added to the WTO agenda. Indeed, the Doha Declaration opened the door for negotiations on the environment and competition policy but not labor standards. In this paper I review the logic and evidence for this decision based on economic arguments for multilateral management of market externalities, policy coordination problems, and systemic trade issues. The review concludes that, conditional upon the protection of intellectual property rights in the WTO, a strong case may be made for including competition rules. The case is weaker for environmental regulation (if by that is meant a set of WTO rules on permissible standards) and quite weak for core labor standards.

The current dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) creates a particular challenge for WTO Members with limited exports since litigation costs are more or less independent of the commercial stakes involved in a dispute. Small Members with small trade stakes may therefore find it too costly to pursue legitimate claims. Reviewing the aims and practices of small claims procedures at the national and supranational level, we analyse whether a similar institution could be introduced at the WTO. While a strong empirical case can be made for such an innovation, the legal and political challenges should not be underestimated. As an initial step, we make a prima facie case that the current dispute settlement system effectively discriminates against small claims and hence owners of small claims, and thus, in particular, against least developed countries, small island economies and low income developing countries. This empirical task is carried out in Part 2. In Part 3 we explain what small claims procedures are at the national level, what purpose they serve, how they are organized in different jurisdictions involving alternative design features, and what challenges they have faced. Part 4 explores the issues raised by adding a small claims procedure in the WTO context, and indicates specific design features that could address them.

On 16 December 2011, Russia gained the approval of 153 other member states to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). During its arduous eighteen-year accession, Russian officials reformed a wide range of laws and policies that could affect trade.1 Russia made these changes because senior Russian officials believed that improved governance would pay off in greater foreign investment, and that investment in turn would stimulate economic growth.2 President Vladimir Putin acknowledged ‘countries compete in the attractiveness of their business climate … quality of state institutions and effectiveness of the court and legal system’. Ivan Tchakarov, chief economist at the Russian brokerage Renaissance Capital, asserted ‘By becoming a WTO member, Russia will have to import … rules and regulations that will address the very issues that foreign investors usually complain about, like corruption, the protection of minority shareholders, the independence of the judiciary.’3

In this article, we explore the conditions under which firms engage in transnational lobbying and foreign venue shopping in the framework of WTO dispute settlement. Classical World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement cases mostly originate in domestic firms instigating their public authorities to bring a complaint against foreign trade barriers incompatible with WTO law. In recent years, however, we have witnessed the rise of WTO cases in which firms get a foreign government to file a case against its own authorities. By analysing transnational lobbying by EU firms in the WTO footwear case filed by China against the EU, and by US firms in the WTO gambling case Antigua brought against the US, we highlight the increasing resemblance between trade disputes and investment disputes.

Many WTO members have been engaging in efforts at the regional level to liberalize services trade even as they are negotiating under the GATS. This duplication of negotiating effort might appear misplaced, unless regional trade agreements can actually produce results going beyond those at the multilateral level and thus serve the interests of their members. This paper explores in what areas regional agreements on services have surpassed the GATS in terms of delivering on three key objectives set out by all service agreements, namely the promotion of transparency, stability, and liberalization for services trade. The paper comments on how countries may evaluate where to best direct their negotiating efforts, according to the type of service activity in question, and suggests that regional agreements can prove to be useful in supporting and pushing forward multilateral services liberalization.

This paper provides a legal-economic analysis of the Appellate Body decision in Brazil–Retreaded Tyres. We develop a simple economic model that we use to analyze the market structure and environmental externalities that were most relevant to this case. We start by analyzing Brazil's policies in a model in which tyre retreading generates a positive production externality through the delay it provides society before a used tyre becomes a waste product with the potential to harm society through its adverse impact on human health and the environment. We examine the different welfare implications of (i) a production subsidy for retreading of once-used Brazilian tyres, (ii) a tariff on imports of retreaded tyres, and (iii) a ban on imports of retreaded tyres. While a production subsidy is the first-best instrument to address this type of externality, there are reasons to believe that it might be infeasible. The welfare implications of the other measures depend importantly on the magnitude of the positive production externality. From the lens provided by this economic analysis, we draw three primary insights. First, we identify the critical piece of empirical information that the Panel and Appellate Body require to make a rational judgment of the utility of the Brazilian policies contested in the dispute – i.e., the size of the underlying externality associated with retreading. Second, if the justification for the original import ban on retreaded tyres was based on the argument that it was a second-best Brazilian policy designed to combat a large externality, then Brazil's failure to enforce a ban on used-tyre imports has the troubling result of eroding those potential welfare gains through a reduction in equilibrium production (and consumption) of Brazilian retreaded tyres. Third, the Brazilian policy that exempted from the ban retreaded imports from MERCOSUR partners also has the same troubling feature. The second and third points are congruent with the reasons for the Appellate Body's determination that the Brazilian policy did not qualify under the chapeau of Article XX. We examine the WTO jurisprudence of Article XX(b), in order to compare the methodology developed under this jurisprudence to the type of examination of changes to total welfare from implementing one policy relative to a postulated alternative policy that most economists would follow. We find that the WTO jurisprudence in this area is internally incoherent, and also fails to evaluate the types of concerns that an economic-welfare analysis would evaluate.

Trade and environment constitute regimes in international relations: they are vehicles for cooperation between nation states that permit governments to address various subjects such as commercial non-discrimination, reduction of pollution, reciprocity and sustainable development. The issues of food safety and agricultural biotechnology (i.e., genetically modified organisms or GMOs) have been raised in both regimes, and have been managed in different and arguably inconsistent manners. In the trade regime, food safety and ag-biotech are mainly subject to the US-backed principle of ‘scientific risk assessment’ established in the WTO's Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, while in the environment regime they would likely be addressed through the more politically based ‘precautionary principle’, promoted by the EU and represented in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Both the trade and environment regimes are rules-based, but conflict between them diminishes the force of precision and obligation needed to make rules effective. Furthermore, there is a danger that regime conflict could expand, thereby reducing the opportunity to promote an optimal relationship between science and society in the future.

This paper studies the government procurement of services from foreign suppliers by conducting a statistical analysis of data submitted by Japan and Switzerland to the WTO's Committee on Government Procurement. Using several metrics, the paper examines whether the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) has led to greater market access for foreign suppliers in services procurement. Our results indicate that despite the GPA, the proportions of services contracts awarded to foreigners have declined over time for both countries and that in the absence of this decline, the value of services contracts awarded to foreign firms would have been more than 15 times higher in the case of Japan and nearly 68 times more in the case of Switzerland. We also find that for the same services categories, the Japanese government is not purchasing as much from abroad as its private sector is importing from the rest of the world, a finding that further points to the home-bias in that government's public purchase decisions.

This Article attempts to explore the challenges in situating a multilateral digital trade agreement within the legal framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Section 1 of the article discusses the broad challenges that digitization poses for the international legal framework for trade regulation. I argue first that the traditional classification of products into goods and services under the WTO system is structurally incompatible with the digital economy. I also argue that striking the appropriate balance between trade liberalization and the pursuit of legitimate public policy objectives in a digital trade agreement will be uniquely challenging because certain features that are intrinsic to the digital industry and business strategies of established players in the digital market raise serious anticompetition challenges. A multilateral agreement regulating digital trade needs to acknowledge and address these challenges. Section 2 surveys the efforts that have been undertaken to regulate digital trade as manifested in the WTO Work Program on Electronic Commerce. Acknowledging that the digital trade agenda of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement could be used as a benchmark for discussions on e-commerce at the WTO, I argue that future negotiations for a multilateral digital trade policy will not benefit from using the TPP's digital trade agenda as a benchmark. The TPP does not reconcile systemic tensions between the digital economy and the extant WTO system or address the anticompetition challenges that are unique to the digital ecosystem.

While the WTO now represents most of the world's population, GDP, and trade, the accession process since its founding has been lengthy, and it is getting longer. Compared to its predecessor, the GATT, the WTO applies a much more detailed and legalistic approach to accession, due to its broader scope of policy coverage and the enforcement powers of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. In WTO accession cases, WTO incumbent members have a superior bargaining position. The present study provides evidence that the elapsed time from WTO application to accession has increased with the number of completed accessions, suggesting a process of learning by WTO members to bargain for more demanding concessions from applicants. Regarding the terms of accession, the number of rules commitments has increased, and the level of bound tariffs has fallen, as the number of completed accessions has increased. In view of the difficult cases remaining in order to complete universal WTO membership, the author proposes more flexibility in accession requirements, along the lines of the GATT tradition.

The disciplining of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) by the WTO has been ‘relaxed’ recently as a result of the new context (the Transparency Mechanism) within which notified PTAs are being multilaterally reviewed. This is probably a blessing for a number of reasons, including the success of the multilateral trading system in bringing tariffs down over the years (and the ensuing reduced trade diversion), the fact that modern PTAs deal with many non-trade issues as well (for which no WTO disciplines exist), and the recent empirical literature suggesting overall positive welfare implications for those participating in similar schemes. This paper discusses these and other reasons to support the view that the WTO should rather focus on the multilateral agenda instead of diverting its attention towards disciplining PTAs. In more concrete terms, this paper argues in support of the thesis that the Transparency Mechanism should not be simply a de facto substitute of the previous regime (where outlawing a PTA could not a priori be excluded), but the de jure new forum to discuss PTAs within the multilateral trading system, at least for the time being. A first do-no-harm-policy is one of the rationales for the thesis advocated here.

The WTO is exposed to significant political risks deriving from both the abusive employment of the national security argument, as well as the use of the WTO dispute settlement system to address this problem. This article explores the implications of the first WTO panel decision, adopted in April 2019, in which the argument of ‘essential security interests’ was employed to justify trade restrictions. Article XXI of the GATT 1994 now tends to be invoked in other ongoing disputes, notably by the United States in the dispute settlement cases involving its barriers to steel and aluminum. The article argues that pathways other than WTO litigation should be explored to deal with trade barriers adopted under the argument of national security and, despite the absence of simple solutions, it considers some possible alternatives.

Since 2017, the United States (US) and other World Trade Organization (WTO) members have been violating their legal duties and democratic mandates given by national parliaments to maintain the WTO Appellate Body (AB) as legally prescribed in Article 17 of the WTO Dispute Understanding (DSU). Article 17 defines the AB as being ‘composed of seven persons’, with vacancies being ‘filled as they arise’. Sections 2 and 3 explain why none of the reasons offered by the US for its blocking of the (re)appointment of AB candidates – on grounds unrelated to the personal qualifications of the candidates – can justify the illegal disruptions of the WTO legal and dispute settlement system. EU trade diplomats must exercise leadership using the existing legal powers and duties of the WTO Ministerial Conference and General Council under Article IX WTO – if necessary, based on ‘a majority of the votes cast’ – to complete the WTO selection procedures for filling AB vacancies and protect the AB as legally defined in Article 17 DSU. Sections 4 and 5 explain why the competition, social policy, and rule-of-law principles underlying European ‘ordo-liberalism’ offer coherent strategies for overcoming the WTO governance crises by limiting hegemonic abuses of both US neo-liberalism and Chinese state-capitalism.

This case sheds light on the question whether WTO members, when exploiting their natural resources, can give priority to the needs of their domestic market as opposed to the needs of other WTO Members. From the ruling of the Appellate Body, and the unappealed part of the panel decision, one can conclude that a WTO Member normally must ensure an evenhanded distribution of the natural resources that it decides to mine or harvest amongst the WTO membership. The only difference arises where a Member's citizens or industries face a crisis because of a temporary shortage of an essential product. For those who share an international outlook on the world, this is an acceptable, and even a desirable outcome. The ruling potentially has far-reaching implications for international trade, not only in minerals and metals, but for agricultural and energy goods as well. However, in reaching this laudable result, circumscribing the use of export restrictions, the Appellate Body also made a highly regrettable finding. It ruled that China, because of the wording of its Accession Protocol, was not allowed to invoke a public policy justification for certain of its export restrictions (notably: its export duties, on which it had assumed additional commitments). The underlying assumption that sovereign states can sign away their rights to pursue public policies, such as environmental protection, which are generally admitted amongst the WTO membership, is deplorable.

On 15 August 1971, President Richard Nixon closed the gold window and imposed a 10% surcharge on all dutiable imports in an effort to force other countries to revalue their currencies against the dollar. The import surcharge was lifted four months later after the Smithsonian agreement led to new exchange rate parities. This paper examines the political, economic, and legal issues surrounding this use of trade sanctions to achieve exchange rate adjustments.