The claim by global trade modelers that the potential contribution to global economic welfare of removing agricultural subsidies is less than one-tenth of that from removing agricultural tariffs puzzles many observers. To help explain that result, this paper first compares the OECD and model-based estimates of the extent of the producer distortions (leaving aside consumer distortions), and shows that 75% of total support is provided by market access barriers when account is taken of all forms of support to farmers and to agricultural processors globally, and only 19% to domestic farm subsidies. We then provide a back-of-the-envelope (BOTE) calculation of the welfare cost of those distortions. Assuming unitary supply and demand elasticities, that BOTE analysis suggests 86% of the welfare cost is due to tariffs and only 6% to domestic farm subsidies. When the higher costs associated with the greater variability of trade measures relative to domestic support are accounted for, the BOTE estimate of the latter's share falls to 4%. This is close to the 5% generated by the most commonly used global model (GTAP) and reported in the paper's final section.

In recent years, more countries have increasingly turned to explicit, codified trade policy instruments of the international trading system such as antidumping measures. Countries have also increasingly participated in the institutions established to facilitate trade in the international system, such as the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding. Given these phenomena, a natural question to consider is why haven't countries resorted to the WTO's safeguards provisions at a similar pace? This paper focuses on the economic incentives generated by reforms in the Uruguay Round, and argues that in order to address the relative unpopularity of the application of safeguards measures, further reforms must be made to WTO's Antidumping Agreement and the rules of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.

The dispute resolution procedures of the World Trade Organization allow sanctions to be imposed when a country is unwilling to bring a WTO-inconsistent trade measure into conformity. Apart from the fact that the procedure for triggering the retaliation process has ambiguities that need to be removed, the retaliation itself has some undesirable economic features. This paper looks at why compensation is not preferred to retaliation and then examines five economic features of the temporary trade retaliation that WTO may permit under certain conditions. Both efficiency and equity concerns are raised. The paper concludes with some suggestions for reforming this part of WTO dispute resolution during the review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding that is due to be completed by May 2003.

For almost a decade, executives, scholars, and trade diplomats have argued that filtering, censorship, localization requirements, and domestic regulations are distorting the cross-border information flows that underpin the internet. Herein I use process tracing to examine the state and implications of digital protectionism. I make five points: First, I note that digital protectionism differs from protectionism of goods and other services. Information is intangible, highly tradable, and some information is a public good. Secondly, I argue that it will not be easy to set international rules to limit digital protectionism without shared norms and definitions. Thirdly, the US, EU, and Canada have labeled other countries policies’ protectionist, yet their arguments and actions sometimes appear hypocritical. Fourth, I discuss the challenge of Chinese failure to follow key internet governance norms. China allegedly has used a wide range of cyber strategies, including distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks (bombarding a web site with service requests) to censor information flows and impede online market access beyond its borders. WTO members have yet to discuss this issue and the threat it poses to trade norms and rules. Finally, I note that digital protectionism may be self-defeating. I then draw conclusions and make policy recommendations.

In the first dispute on renewable energy to come to WTO dispute settlement, the domestic content requirement of Ontario's feed-in tariff was challenged as a discriminatory investment-related measure and as a prohibited import substitution subsidy. The Panel and Appellate Body agreed that Canada was violating the GATT and the TRIMS Agreement. But the SCM Article 3 claim by Japan and the European Union remains unadjudicated, because neither tribunal made a finding that the price guaranteed for electricity from renewable sources constitutes a ‘benefit’ pursuant to the SCM Agreement. Although the Appellate Body provides useful guidance to future Panels on how the existence of a benefit could be calculated, the most noteworthy aspect of the new jurisprudence is the Appellate Body's reasoning that delineating the proper market for ‘benefit’ analysis entails respect for the policy choices made by a government. Thus, in this dispute, the proper market is electricity produced only from wind and solar energy.

The Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) has been an integral part of the GATT/WTO since 1989 and shoulders a fundamental responsibility in making the regime more transparent. This paper asks: how has the TPRM responded to demands from developing countries for information and transparency? The paper uses a typology of information systems to explain the evolution of surveillance in the trade regime and asks whether the TPRM was assigned the functions of an ideal-type information system. The paper, then, evaluates the performance of the TPRM against its given mandate of increasing transparency to promote improved adherence with trade rules. It presents, for the first time, empirical evidence on the content of reports and the participation of countries, to highlight persisting content- and participation-related challenges. It discusses the capacity challenges within the WTO Secretariat and briefly outlines efforts made by developing countries to boost surveillance capacity at home. The paper ends by outlining priorities for monitoring in the trade regime: generating specific information that developing countries need, supporting domestic capacity for surveillance (including from non-official sources), and concentrating on improved peer review and follow-up procedures.

Plurilateral agreements in the WTO context allow sub-sets of countries to agree to commitments in specific policy areas that only apply to signatories, and thus allow for ‘variable geometry’ in the WTO. Current WTO rules make it much more difficult to pursue the plurilateral route than to negotiate a preferential trade agreement outside the WTO. We argue that this is inefficient from a global welfare and trading system perspective and that WTO Members should facilitate the negotiation of new plurilateral agreements on regulatory matters.

This paper examines the statistical relationship between world trade and world income (GDP) over three different epochs: the pre-World War I era (1870–1913), the interwar era (1920–1938), and the post-World War II era (1950–2000). The results indicate that trade grew slightly more rapidly than income in the late nineteenth century, with little structural change in the trade–income relationship. In the interwar and post-war periods, the trade–income relationship can be divided into different periods due to structural breaks, but since the mid 1980s trade has been more responsive to income than in any other period under consideration. The trade policy regime differed in each period, from the bilateral treaty network in the late nineteenth century to interwar protectionism to post-war GATT/WTO liberalization. The commodity composition of trade has also shifted from primary commodities to manufactured goods over the past century, but the results cannot directly determine the reasons for the increased sensitivity of trade to income.

Depending on how one classifies market intervention, trade liberalization disciplines can be lenient or strict. Perhaps the most important distinction in this respect is that between government intervention labeled as a ‘market access restriction’ and that defined as ‘domestic regulation’. Both the GATT and the GATS declare market access restrictions (such as import quotas or limitations on the number of service suppliers) to be, in principle, prohibited. In contrast, domestic regulations (such as internal taxes, health standards, and safety requirements) are treated with much more deference. They are, in essence, only prohibited when discriminatory or more trade restrictive than necessary. Notwithstanding these major legal consequences, the distinction between market access and domestic regulation remains unclear. Based on a recent WTO dispute condemning the United States for banning online gambling, this article is an attempt to clarify the distinction. Starting from broad similarities, it finds crucial differences in this respect between GATT and GATS. For both, however, the paper's basic point is that a domestic regulation should not be regarded as a market access restriction simply because it has the effect of banning certain imports. To do otherwise risks seriously undermining the regulatory autonomy of WTO Members beyond anything imagined by the drafters of the WTO treaty.

The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), authorized by the 1979 Enabling Clause under GATT, allows importing nations to extend preferential tariff treatment to the products of developing countries. India recently brought a successful WTO complaint challenging aspects of the EC preference scheme, claiming that it impermissibly discriminated among developing countries. We analyze the law and economics of discrimination within GSP schemes, assessing the implications of the Appellate Body decision in the case brought by India, and noting the economic costs and benefits of imposing tight nondiscrimination obligations on trade preferences for developing countries. We conclude that the case against discriminatory preferences is at best an uneasy one, both in legal and in economic terms. We also note that the ostensible justification for GSP schemes in the fist instance – to promote growth and development – is unlikely to be served terribly well by existing GSP policy.

Despite recurring rounds of trade liberalization under GATT/WTO auspices, complemented by unilateral reforms, many developing countries have not been able to integrate into the world economy. This paper argues that, from the perspective of the poorest countries, a multi-pronged strategy is required to strengthen the global trading system and that much of the agenda must be addressed outside the WTO. The most important contribution the WTO can make from a development perspective is to improve market access conditions – for goods and services – and ensure that trade rules are useful to developing countries. Enhancing trade capacity requires concerted action outside the WTO (‘aid for trade’) as well as unilateral actions by both industrialized and developing countries to reduce anti-trade biases.

The digitalization of trade is a reality, and yet the regulation of the world trading system as embedded in the World Trade Organization (WTO) only tangentially, if at all, touches upon this issue. True, digitalization of the economy, the fourth industrial revolution as it is colloquially referred to, is a recent phenomenon, and to some extent post-dates the conclusion of the Uruguay round agreements (1994). True also, however, is the reality that the world trading system has shown a remarkable inability to adjust to modern business realities in its multilateral rule architecture. To the extent these transformations are being reflected in new rules, they are being introduced in regional or bilateral frameworks, albeit in an incomplete fashion. It is also the case that the world is witnessing several different regimes around data and information economy developing in the world today – most notably in the US, Europe, and China. As always, part of the reason that international frameworks have not been born stems from the fact that international rules rarely occur before domestic regulatory and legal regimes are well developed.

Two broad interpretations currently prevail in the literature on developing country participation in the GATT. The first suggests that developing countries spent most of their time in the GATT negotiating to be relieved of various commitments, focusing on the pursuit of industrialization through import substitution and/or free-riding on the commitments made by their industrial counterparts. The second interpretation suggests that developing countries spent the majority of their time in the GATT either as ‘quiet bystanders’ lacking the expertise or political representation to participate fully, or else attempting to redress biases in the institution's design. The problem with both of these interpretations is that while each has merit neither offers a sufficiently rounded account of developing country participation. Our purpose in this paper is to offer an alternative account of developing country participation that shows more accurately the extent and variation of that participation. We argue that throughout the development of the GATT developing countries were active participants that consistently sought to have an impact on the nature and direction of the multilateral trading system. We also argue that while the energy of developing countries was often directed towards negotiating more favourable treatment for themselves, this was a result more of the asymmetrical manner in which the GATT was deployed and a consequence of their relative underdevelopment than of a desire to free-ride on the favourable trading conditions created by the concession exchanging activities of others.

This paper reviews the extent of reductions in tariffs on environmental goods (EGs) by country participation in the negotiations mandated by a Doha Ministerial Decision in November 2001. Symptomatic of the cleavages across countries throughout the Round, little progress was achieved during the negotiations in defining an approach to a multilateral reduction in protection of EGs. Conflicting interests and differing perceptions of the benefits from increased trade in EGs was reflected in the different approaches proposed by members (request and offer, integrated project, list approach, hybrid approach), and for the few countries (13) that adopted a list approach, there was little overlap across submissions. For all income groups, on average, EGs are less protected than other goods and countries reduced protection by about 50% from initial levels in 1996 leaving little room for further exchange of market access. Difficulties in applying the two complementary conceptions of EGs: (i) ‘goods for environmental management’, and (ii) ‘environmentally preferable products' are reviewed and mentioned as reasons for the lack of progress during the negotiations. Inspection of the submission lists against a ‘core list’ of 26 EGs drawn up by the WTO shows that this ‘core list’ was mostly made up of products in which developed countries had a comparative advantage, and that countries that submitted lists generally avoided including on their lists the most highly protected goods.

This study offers new conclusions on the economic cost of a failed Doha Development Agenda (DDA). We assess potential outcome of the Doha Round as well as four protectionist scenarios using the MIRAGE Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. In a scenario where applied tariffs of World Trade Organization (WTO) economies would go up to currently bound tariff rates, world trade would decrease by 9.9% and world welfare by US$353 billion. The economic cost of a failed DDA is here evaluated by the difference between a cooperative scenario (DDA) and a protectionist one (US$412 billion in terms of welfare). Another point of view is to compare a resort to protectionism when the DDA is implemented with a resort to protectionism when the DDA is not implemented. The findings show that this trade agreement could prevent the potential reduction of US$809 billion of trade and, therefore, acts as an efficient multilateral ‘preventive’ scheme against the adverse consequences of trade ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ policies.

The rapid development of the Internet has led to a growing electronic cross-border delivery of services. While the WTO negotiations have not caught up to the reality of such service trade, the first GATS case dealing with the Internet, namely ‘United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services’, has advanced matters. This paper distils the substantive conclusions of the case and remaining questions in relation to Internet-supplied services and certain core concepts of the GATS. Moreover, it sheds light on the case's implications for the services negotiations under the ongoing Doha Development Agenda. It concludes that the second ever GATS case has provided an encouraging set of answers to the unresolved questions of the WTO's Work Programme on E-Commerce, mainly confirming the applicability of GATS commitments to electronically supplied services and shaping the concept of technological neutrality. While more work or dispute settlement cases are necessary to clarify the remaining questions, the rulings have paved the way for the GATS to be a more effective discipline for cross-border (electronic) trade. The paper also explains that a ‘chilling effect’ of the rulings on the Doha services negotiations is not warranted.

US safeguard actions have run into problems with the WTO's panel and Appellate Body reviews for failing to ensure that injury caused by non-import factors is not attributed to imports. This paper reviews the subtle legal and economic differences between US trade law (Section 201) and the WTO's Agreement on Safeguards on the non-attribution issue. The paper then resurrects the Kelly (1988) method of attributing injury to various factors as a potential method by which the ITC can ensure that future decisions conform with the Safeguards Agreement. The method is shown to yield results that are consistent with recent ITC safeguard decisions.

The July 2008 attempt by a group of ministers to agree on modalities for the WTO's Doha Round broke down in part because they could not agree on a proposed ‘Special Safeguard Mechanism’ (SSM) for developing countries in agriculture. This paper offers a corrective to the conventional story that the breakdown was due to a simple conflict of interests over the SSM between the United States and India. The term SSM was first used in a Doha Round text in 2004, but neither the principles nor the commercial implications had ever been discussed by ministers before July 2008. The conceptual origins of the SSM go back to proposals in the late 1990s for a ‘Development Box’, but by the time of the ministerial, negotiators had been unable to agree on the purpose of the safeguard, or how it would work, including the agricultural products it would cover, how it would be triggered, the remedies (additional tariffs) allowed, or the transparency requirements for its operation. The SSM was therefore one of the least ‘stabilized’ parts of the text placed before ministers in July 2008. Members were far from reaching a consensual understanding of the SSM, which resulted in a fiasco that might have been avoided. Ministers should not have been asked to engage in a poorly prepared discussion of a sensitive issue, because inevitably they staked out incompatible positions. Members may subsequently find it difficult to back down.

In the OECD countries, the decline of manufacturing and the employment implications have long been matters of concern. Recently, policymakers in several countries have set out to try and achieve reindustrialization. The servicification of firms is related to these concerns and aspirations. However, servicification, and particularly its role in trade policy, has received limited attention. I review micro-level evidence and discuss its implications. I find that imported, domestic and exported services are all important to contemporary firm competitiveness and participation in international value chains. Therefore, historic policymaking divisions between trade in manufactures and trade in services services, between export and import interests, and among modes of supply are becoming less relevant. I conclude by suggesting potential steps forward.

The tension between standards being a response to market failures versus creating barriers to trade characterizes much of their economic analysis. This article explores in more detail the link between international trade and standards based on resolution of a public bad(s) problem. Specifically, a general equilibrium setting is sketched out, drawing on existing analysis in the trade and environmental economics literature, and designed to capture some key stylized facts and basic hypotheses concerning North–South trade where standards are targeted at negative externalities in production. The key conclusions to be drawn are that while a clear theoretical foundation exists for the hypothesis of ‘standards as barriers’ to trade, and the likely benefits of aid for trade programs, this is not the case for the hypothesis of ‘barriers as a catalyst’ for trade, pointing to the need for further research on the latter hypothesis.