Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-xbtfd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-05T15:39:13.896Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Assessing the potential cost of a failed Doha Round

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 April 2010

ANTOINE BOUET  and
David Laborde
ANTOINE BOUET*
Affiliation:
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC, US, and Centre d'Analyse Théorique et de Traitement des données économiques, Pau, France
David Laborde*
Affiliation:
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC, US
*
*Email: [email protected]
**Email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This study offers new conclusions on the economic cost of a failed Doha Development Agenda (DDA). We assess potential outcome of the Doha Round as well as four protectionist scenarios using the MIRAGE Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. In a scenario where applied tariffs of World Trade Organization (WTO) economies would go up to currently bound tariff rates, world trade would decrease by 9.9% and world welfare by US$353 billion. The economic cost of a failed DDA is here evaluated by the difference between a cooperative scenario (DDA) and a protectionist one (US$412 billion in terms of welfare). Another point of view is to compare a resort to protectionism when the DDA is implemented with a resort to protectionism when the DDA is not implemented. The findings show that this trade agreement could prevent the potential reduction of US$809 billion of trade and, therefore, acts as an efficient multilateral ‘preventive’ scheme against the adverse consequences of trade ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ policies.

Type
Review Article
Information
World Trade Review , Volume 9 , Issue 2 , April 2010 , pp. 319 - 351
Copyright
Copyright © Antoine Bouet and David Laborde 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Anderson, K., Martin, W., and Van der Mensbrugghe, D. (2005), ‘Market and Welfare Implications of Doha Reform Scenarios’, in Anderson, K. and Martin, W. (eds.), Trade Reform and the Doha Agenda, Washington, DC: World Bank.Google Scholar
Axelrod, R. (1981), ‘The Evolution of Cooperation’, Science, 211(4489), 1390–1396.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Bairoch, P. (1995), Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes, University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Baldwin, R. E. and Evenett, S. (eds.) (2008), ‘What World Leaders Must Do to Halt the Spread of Protectionism?’, Center for Economic Policy Research, London.Google Scholar
Baldwin, R. E. and Evenett, S. (eds.) (2009), ‘Murky Protectionism and the Crisis’, Center for Economic Policy Research, London, http://www.voxeu.org/reports/Murky_Protectionism.pdfGoogle Scholar
Berisha, V., Bouët, A., Laborde, D., and Mevel, S. (2008), ‘The Development Promise: Can the Doha Development Agenda Deliver for Least Developed Countries?’, IFPRI Briefing Note, July, IFPRI.Google Scholar
Bouët, A. (2008), ‘The Expected Benefits from Trade Liberalization – Opening the Black box of Global Trade Modeling’, IFPRI Food Policy Review, 8, Washington, DC.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bouët, A., Mevel, S., and Orden, D. (2006), ‘More or less Ambition in the Doha Round: Winners and Losers from Trade Liberalization with a Development Perspective’, The World Economy, 30(8): 1253–1280.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bouët, A., Decreux, Y., Fontagné, L., Jean, S., and Laborde, D. (2008), ‘Assessing Applied Protection across the World’, Review of International Economics, 16(5): 850–863.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boumellassa, H., Laborde, D., and Mitaritonna, C. (2009), ‘A Consistent Picture of the Protection across the World in 2004: MAcMapHS6 version 2’, AgFoodTrade Working Paper and IFPRI Discussion Paper.Google Scholar
Decreux, Y. and Valin, H. (2007), ‘MIRAGE, Updated Version of the Model for Trade Policy Analysis: Focus on Agriculture and Dynamics’, CEPII Working Paper, 15, October.Google Scholar
Decreux, Y. and Fontagné, L. (2006), ‘A Quantitative Assessment of the Outcome of the Doha Development Agenda’, CEPII Working Paper, 10, May.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gamberoni, E. and Newfarmer, R. (2009), ‘Trade Protection: Incipient but Worrisome Trends’, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3183Google Scholar
Hufbauer, G. C. and Schott, J. J. (2009), ‘Buy American: Bad for Jobs, Worse for Reputation’, PIIE Policy Brief N. PB09-2, February, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
INTAL (2009), ‘Recession and Protectionism “Within the Rules”: Risks to the Multilateral trade system’, INTAL Monthly Newsletter, No. 150, January 2009.Google Scholar
Irwin, D. A. (1992), ‘Multilateral and Bilateral Trade Policies in the World Trading System: An Historical Perspective’, in de Melo, de J. and Panagarya, A. (eds.), New Dimension of Regional Integration, Center for Economic Policy Research.Google Scholar
Irwin, D. A. (1998), ‘The Smoot-Hawley Tariff: A Quantitative Assessment’, Review of Economic and Statistics, 80: 326–334.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Isaacs, A. (1948), International Trade – Tariffs and Commercial Policy, Chicago: Richard Irwin.Google Scholar
Jean, S., Laborde, D., and Martin, W. (2006), ‘Consequences of Alternative Formulas for Agricultural Tariff Cuts’, in Anderson, K. and Martin, W. (eds.), Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda, The World Bank and Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 81–116.Google Scholar
Jean, S., Laborde, D., and Martin, W. (2008), ‘Choosing Sensitive Agricultural Products in Trade Negotiations’, IFPRI Discussion Paper No. 788.Google Scholar
Johnson, H. G. (1953), ‘Optimum Tariff and Retaliation’, The Review of Economic Studies, 21: 142–153.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laborde, D. (2008), ‘Mesures et détermination endogène des droits de douane’, Ph.D. thesis, Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour.Google Scholar
Laborde, D. (2009),‘Decomposition of Multilateral Trade Policy shocks in a CGE’, CATT Working Paper, forthcoming.Google Scholar
Laborde, D., Martin, W., and van der Mensbrugghe, D. (2008), ‘Implications of the 2008 Doha Draft Modalities for Developing Countries’, GTAP Conference Paper.Google Scholar
Madsen, J. B. (2001), ‘Trade Barriers and the Collapse of World Trade During the Great Depression’, Southern Economic Journal, 67(4): 848–868.Google Scholar
Martin, W. and Messerlin, P. (2007), ‘Why Is It So Difficult? Trade liberalization under the Doha Agenda’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 23(3): 347–366.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Messerlin, P. (1985), ‘Les Politiques Commerciales et leurs Effets en Longue Periode’, in Lassuderie-Duchene, B. and Reiffers, J.-L. (eds.), Le Protectionnisme, Paris: Economica.Google Scholar
Narayanan, B. G. and Walmsley, T. L. (eds.) (2008), Global Trade, Assistance, and Production: The GTAP 7 Data Base, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University.Google Scholar
Olson, M. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
WTO (2008a), ‘Fourth Revision of Draft Modalities for Non-Agricultural Market Access’, TN/MA/W/103/Rev.2, WTO Secretariat, Geneva.Google Scholar
WTO (2008b), ‘Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture’, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.3, WTO Secretariat, Geneva.Google Scholar
WTO (2009), ‘Report to the TPRB from the Director-General on the Financial and Economic Crisis and Trade-Related Developments’, January, JOB(09)/2.Google Scholar