Law plays an important role in reshaping and enforcing governance efforts in radical shifts and can function as a catalyst for transitioning governance towards sustainability. This article assesses the capacity of law to facilitate decarbonization as a radical societal shift. It argues that decarbonization demands fundamental and systemic restructuring in law and legal thinking. This should also be reflected in legal scholarship and, most importantly from the point of view of this article, in the methodological choices and approaches that legal scholarship relies on to study societal challenges. To that end, the article develops a new methodological approach (disciplinary comparison) through which to study law's capacities in respect of decarbonization as a radical societal shift. Disciplinary comparison can be used to gain information on both the friction and the synergies between legal disciplines. This new methodological approach will contribute to increasing insight into law's capacities for the radical, cross-sectoral change necessitated by the need to decarbonize societies.

The specific characteristics of each national system of judicial review reflect the indigenous legal framework and well-established administrative culture. It is necessary, therefore, to contextualize judicial review against the background of the idiosyncrasies of the local legal and administrative systems and what the national system regards as ‘unlawful’ decision making. An analysis of the contemporary jurisprudence of the Irish courts – in the specific context of enforcement of environmental impact assessment law – reveals a complex web of principles, which continue to evolve and to be influenced by European Union (EU) law. The article maps the development of these principles and assesses whether the standard of review (or the intensity of scrutiny) applied by the Irish courts is compatible with the EU law principle of effective judicial protection.

This commentary is an update to an article in an earlier issue of Transnational Environmental Law (E. Couzens, ‘Size Matters, Although It Shouldn’t: The IWC and Small Cetaceans. A Reply to Stephenson, Mooers and Attaran’ (2014) 3(2) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 265–78) on the treatment of small cetaceans by the International Whaling Commission (IWC). That article discussed an unsuccessful proposal submitted by Monaco, at the 64th meeting of the IWC in 2012, for a resolution on highly migratory cetaceans. Monaco renewed its proposal in 2014 and, on that occasion, did generate sufficient support for a resolution to give contracting parties to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling a mandate to initiate debate over small cetaceans in other fora. Following this IWC Resolution, in December 2015, the United Nations General Assembly included a clause proposed by Monaco in its Resolution on Oceans and the Law of the Sea. The nature of international law is such that it is difficult to force change without upsetting a delicate equilibrium. Monaco’s initiative, however, may provide significant momentum towards a solution for what remains the real and under-acknowledged problem that there is virtually no international law applicable to small and/or highly migratory cetaceans.

Recent geopolitical and environmental events have created a new urgency for a just energy transition and a socially inclusive modernization of the energy sector. This article critically evaluates the extent to which Article 194(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as the competence provision of EU energy law, is congruent with the energy justice framework emerging from social sciences. It establishes the substantive scope and justiciability of Article 194(1) TFEU, including the legal principles and so-called ‘guiding principles’ of the provision relating to the internal market, environmental protection, and energy solidarity. The article analyzes the potential and shortcomings of Article 194(1) TFEU in contributing to more equitable decision-making processes in EU energy law. It concludes by evaluating the provision as a regulatory instrument that facilitates the (re)balancing of competing interests of the energy sector. This research further concludes that social considerations of energy justice cannot be sufficiently addressed through Article 194(1) TFEU.

Ownership has been a key tool in the exploitation of nature for centuries. However, ownership could also shield natural entities from extraction and pollution if it were vested in them, rather than in humans or corporations. Through a case study of German constitutional property law, this article examines the normative content of this constitutional right. It argues that in owning themselves, natural entities would have numerous tools to fend off human interference with their self-determination. Constitutional property law would require any harmful activity affecting the natural entity to be based upon legislation and necessary to achieve a public purpose. The natural entity would enjoy broader access to justice. Courts would also often award appropriate remedies; where the natural entity would be awarded only compensation, this would be unsatisfactory because money cannot replace nature. The article finds that constitutional property law offers the potential for further protection from human interference, which has not been realized because of anthropocentric value judgments prevalent in German legal doctrine. Ecocentric approaches to ownership and invalidity as a standard remedy would play an important role in unlocking the full potential of ownership for environmental protection.

A crucial question for international law is how to allocate regulatory jurisdiction over transboundary problems between sovereign states. Insufficient clarity can trigger disputes such as that regarding the legality of the EU Directive that extends its ETS to all flights taking off from or landing at an EU airport, including those by non-EU carriers. This article uses this dispute as the vehicle to examine sovereignty in an increasingly interdependent world. It argues that a state’s decisional inviolability is central to sovereignty. Decisional sovereignty allows a state to regulate actors or activities with a link to its territory when these affect the state’s domestic affairs, rather than leaving the state at the mercy of an actor’s home state or of other states from the territory of which the problem emerges. Moreover, allocation of regulatory jurisdiction in conformity with decisional sovereignty reduces the incentives to free-ride on other states’ regulatory efforts and incentivizes international cooperation.

In recent years, some scientists have called for research into and potential development of ‘solar geoengineering’ technologies as an option to counter global warming. Solar geoengineering refers to a set of speculative techniques to reflect some incoming sunlight back into space, for example, by continuously spraying reflective sulphur aerosols into the stratosphere over several generations. Because of the significant ecological, social, and political risks posed by such technologies, many scholars and civil society organizations have urged governments to take action to prohibit the development and deployment of solar geoengineering techniques. In this article we take such calls for a prohibitory or a non-use regime on solar geoengineering as a starting point to examine existing international law and governance precedents that could guide the development of such a regime. The precedents we examine include international prohibitory and restrictive regimes that impose bans or restrictions on chemical weapons, biological weapons, weather modification technologies, anti-personnel landmines, substances that deplete the ozone layer, trade in hazardous wastes, deep seabed mining, and mining in Antarctica. We also assess emerging norms and soft law in anticipatory governance of novel technologies, such as human cloning and gene editing. While there is no blueprint for a solar geoengineering non-use regime in international law, our analysis points to numerous specific elements on which governments could draw to constrain or impose an outright prohibition on the development of technologies for solar geoengineering, should they opt to do so.

This article maps the shared legal anatomy of climate and environmental lawsuits, in which plaintiffs claim protection for future generations before domestic or international courts. By closely analyzing the litigation strategies of plaintiffs and the inquiry of courts, the article argues that these proceedings revolve around structurally similar legal standards across domestic and international jurisdictions, which correspond to five normative requirements flowing from the rule of law: namely, respect for human rights, certain quality of law requirements, prohibition of arbitrary exercise of governmental powers, non-discrimination, and access to justice. The cross-jurisdictional analysis shows that courts appear to be increasingly willing to protect future generations against arbitrary treatment by present-day decision makers. The article appraises whether such an intergenerationally sensitive reinterpretation of the rule of law could help to change the short-termist paradigm of environmental and climate law.

Over the course of 2021, several local councils across the island of Ireland introduced motions recognizing the ‘Rights of Nature’. To date, little research has been conducted into these nascent Rights of Nature movements, even though they raise important questions about the philosophical, cultural, political, and legal drivers in pursuing such rights. Similarly, much remains unclear as to the implications of such initiatives, both in their domestic context and for Rights of Nature movements around the world. This article contributes to addressing this gap by exploring these themes through an analysis of interviews with key stakeholders conducted across the island of Ireland in June 2022. In particular, it explores the impact of international movements, colonial legacies, cultural heritage, and years of inadequate environmental governance, in motivating local councils to pursue a Rights of Nature strategy.

This article analyzes the role played by the Latin American Water Tribunal (Tribunal Latinoamericano del Agua – TRAGUA) (LAWT) in the resolution of environmental disputes over water resources. Since its inception in 1998, the LAWT has emerged as a non-governmental body with a multidisciplinary composition and a mandate based on both formal and informal sources of law, which holds public hearings in order to address water-related complaints. This article explores whether (and the ways in which) the LAWT is contributing to the resolution of environmental disputes concerning water resources. The main underlying thesis is that, whereas the traditional model for interstate dispute settlement offers only limited possibilities of redress to non-state actors (mainly individuals and groups), the LAWT provides them with the opportunity to present their demands before an environmental justice forum.

In light of the accelerating nature of climate change and its effect, it is unsurprising that various entities increasingly resort to courts and tribunals to seek to address the many harms and wrongs that clearly stem from climate change. This article discusses the opportunities in this context for those who face displacement by the effects of climate change, an issue that is not necessarily at the heart of either climate justice debates or climate displacement debates. Discussions about how to respond to displacement arising in the context of climate change often focus on the ‘protection space’ or ‘assistance space’, in which those affected are conceptualized as actual or potential seekers of protection or assistance, who may or may not be owed refuge elsewhere on account of unmet needs for shelter, support or safety. This article takes a different approach and conceptualizes those affected as potential or actual seekers of justice, who may be owed rectification for inflicted harm. The article thus contributes to emerging scholarship concerning climate change litigation and climate harm reversal, by focusing on the corrective justice potential for those who face the specific issue of displacement stemming from climate change. To this end, the article provides the relevant practical and analytical background, and discusses key recent law and policy developments in both the domestic and cross-border spheres. The article considers not merely the nexus between displacement stemming from climate change and considerations of justice, but also how and where justice in this context is or may be sought.

This article investigates dynamics of mobilization over environmental and human rights norms in the context of undemocratic governments. We test the suggestion in norm diffusion theories that the success of domestic struggles in this context depends on the level of internalization of norms brought about by international pressure. We find that the internalization (or lack thereof) of global norms by the Government of Sudan does not explain its recognition of environmental justice claims in this case. Furthermore, the various litigation efforts pursued by affected people outside Sudan did not influence their campaign. However, a combination of the political climate in the country and a unique political interplay between the government and a distinct group of the affected people may have led to the singular success of their campaign. We use a combination of discourse analysis, legal analysis, norm mapping, and semi-structured interviews to reach conclusions.

This case comment explores the relationship between two intertwined objectives – ensuring security of electricity supply and environmental protection – in the context of the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL and Bond Beter Leefmilieu Vlaanderen ASBL v. Conseil des ministres. The analysis focuses on the application of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive and the Habitats Directive to the facts of the case, which concerns the extension by a ten-year period of the operation of two Belgian nuclear power stations (Doel 1 and Doel 2) as part of a national energy policy strategy to ensure the security of Belgium's electricity supply. The case comment also considers the legal and practical implications that arise as a result of employing the ‘security of electricity supply’ exemption to enable derogation from the requirements of the aforementioned Directives in circumstances where a Member State considers the security of its electricity supply to be under threat.

Climate emergency declarations occupy a legally ambiguous space between emergency measure and political rhetoric. Their uncertain status in public law provides a unique opportunity to illuminate latent assumptions about emergencies and how they are regulated in law. This article analyzes climate emergency declarations in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Aotearoa/New Zealand. It argues that these climate emergency declarations reflect back a set of paradoxes about the legal regulation of emergencies – paradoxes about defining the emergency, how time regulates and contains emergency power, and who gets to respond to the emergency and how. These paradoxes challenge long-held and over-simplified assumptions about emergencies and allow us to see the complex ways in which public law regulates emergencies – a necessity in a climate-disrupted world.