In her response to my case comment in this issue of Transnational Environmental Law, Laura Burgers purports to disagree with my analysis on two points. Firstly, she suggests that we disagree on the method that a court should use to interpret the duty of care of corporations on climate change mitigation. Secondly, she disagrees with each of the four inconsistencies that I identify in the decision by the District Court of The Hague (the Netherlands) in Milieudefensie v. Royal Dutch Shell. In this rejoinder, I respectfully disagree with her characterization of our disagreement.

It is sometimes assumed that, in order for animals to be adequately protected by the legal system, their status first needs to change from property to person in one fell swoop. Legal personhood is perceived as the necessary requirement for animals to possess legal rights and become visible in law, distinguished from legal things. In this article I propose an alternative approach to animal legal personhood, which construes the road towards it as a gradual transition rather than a revolution. According to this alternative approach, animals become increasingly visible in law when their existing simple rights are shaped to function more like the rights of humans. Instead of a condition for the possession of rights, legal personhood should then be regarded as a (potential) consequence of growing animal rights.

This article takes stock of the many private and public instruments enacted transnationally to tackle the pressing problem of deforestation, ecosystem conversion, and associated human rights violations caused by international demand for and trade in agricultural commodities. The article argues that non-financial due diligence based on no-conversion criteria, and in line with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, holds considerable potential for ensuring deforestation-free value chains by enrolling and scaling up firm-level supply-chain management systems and private standards. The article introduces the main features of a possible European Union measure that disciplines via non-financial due diligence the placing on the market of commodities and products associated with deforestation, ecosystem conversion, degradation of forests and ecosystems, and associated human rights violations. Such a measure would also have the effect of streamlining initiatives enacted by private authority.

English common law and United Kingdom legislation provide various – overall liberal – jurisdictional grounds for hearing foreign tort claims. The article examines these grounds with reference to recent and ongoing oil pollution nuisance litigation involving Royal Dutch Shell Plc and its Nigerian subsidiary operating in the Niger Delta. Particular attention is given to the factors taken into account by the court in exercising its discretion to allow service out of the jurisdiction in cases of pollution taking place abroad under the principle of forum non conveniens. Following the widely commented decision of the United States Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Corporation, which ruled against the extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort Statute, it is easy to forget that the rules of jurisdiction vary from country to country and that different legal systems apply similar concepts in often radically different ways. Attention is also given to the future development of English jurisdictional law and practice in the context of environmental nuisance.

This commentary considers the intellectual property (IP) system from a global environmental law perspective by exploring the extent to which patent-related treaties, such as the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and the World Intellectual Property Organization Patent Cooperation Treaty, can facilitate implementation of global environmental standards in the field of biodiversity law. It provides practical guidance to countries that wish to introduce patent disclosure-related mechanisms into their legal systems with a view to mainstreaming instances of global justice, fairness and equity, and raises awareness of the limitations arising from their extant IP obligations. Global environmental law standards have exercised an undeniable influence on the political discourse in international IP policy making in the field of patent disclosure. Still, many patent disclosure requirements that pre-date the Nagoya Protocol apply only to genetic resources the provenance of which is the same country that established the requirement. However, if a country designates its patent or IP office as a compliance checkpoint under the Nagoya Protocol, then the disclosure requirement should encompass at least the genetic resources originating from all countries that are contracting parties to this instrument. This could allow the fulfilment of a core monitoring obligation of the latter, while enabling wider synergies and transparency within the IP system.

The Southern Bluefin Tuna dispute of the late 1990s will long be remembered as one of the most important fishery disputes of all time, influencing both ocean governance and international dispute settlement. This commentary explores the legacy of that dispute with a particular emphasis on the growth and development of the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna and how the regime is functioning with the addition of several new members. We will focus also on the specific challenges to the conservation and management of the southern bluefin tuna. This includes biological parameters and the legal and political landscape of global fisheries conservation generally. Finally, we will explore emerging conservation strategies to assist the recovery of this highly valuable fish species.

Written as a response to the article ‘Does Size Matter? The ICRW and the Inclusion of Small Cetaceans’ by Sean Stephenson, Arne Mooers and Amir Attaran, this commentary considers how important global and regional biodiversity- or conservation-related conventions have deliberately avoided the issue area of cetacean management. One of the effects of this is that so-called ‘small cetaceans’ – approximately 70 species – are left largely unregulated. This article differs from that of Stephenson and his co-authors, who argue that the ‘only appropriate’ forum for dealing with the issue is the International Court of Justice. Instead, it is argued here that the ‘Future of the IWC’ compromise process may yet represent the best course for bringing small cetaceans under IWC management authority. Another alternative was recently suggested in a draft resolution put forward by Monaco in 2012 – and is likely to be put forward again in 2014 – which advocated involving the United Nations General Assembly in the issue. The issue is both complicated and important, and a solution is needed.

United Kingdom Supreme Court Justice Robert Carnwath has urged the judiciary to develop ‘common laws of the environment’, which can operate within different legal frameworks, tailored where necessary towards specific constitutions or statutory codes. One such mechanism with the potential for repositioning environmental discourse in both common law and civil law jurisdictions is the doctrine of the public trust. Basing their arguments upon a heritage of civil law and common law, supporters of the public trust doctrine are currently testing its scope in United States federal courts via groundbreaking litigation aimed at forcing the federal government to uphold its duty to protect the atmosphere. This article considers whether common law judicial resourcefulness can transform a transatlantic hybrid of uncertain parentage into a powerful tool of environmental protection.

Law plays an important role in reshaping and enforcing governance efforts in radical shifts and can function as a catalyst for transitioning governance towards sustainability. This article assesses the capacity of law to facilitate decarbonization as a radical societal shift. It argues that decarbonization demands fundamental and systemic restructuring in law and legal thinking. This should also be reflected in legal scholarship and, most importantly from the point of view of this article, in the methodological choices and approaches that legal scholarship relies on to study societal challenges. To that end, the article develops a new methodological approach (disciplinary comparison) through which to study law's capacities in respect of decarbonization as a radical societal shift. Disciplinary comparison can be used to gain information on both the friction and the synergies between legal disciplines. This new methodological approach will contribute to increasing insight into law's capacities for the radical, cross-sectoral change necessitated by the need to decarbonize societies.

This article argues that an improved legal methodology is needed to ensure that states’ greenhouse gas emissions mitigation obligations are specified in line with best available science and the equity principle. In this vein, the article explores the extent to which the ‘meta-equity assessment’ of states’ emissions by the Climate Action Tracker (CAT) can contribute to this aim. The article finds that the CAT's PRIMAP Equity tool, embedded in the Potsdam Real-time Integrated Model for the probabilistic Assessment of emission Paths, offers the best available approach to distributing a global carbon budget among states in line with equity criteria recognized by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The emissions data and global pathways used in the PRIMAP Equity tool can be updated. The major challenge ahead lies in understanding which of the emissions and temperature pathways can be applied in the legal context, and how.

This commentary is an update to an article in an earlier issue of Transnational Environmental Law (E. Couzens, ‘Size Matters, Although It Shouldn’t: The IWC and Small Cetaceans. A Reply to Stephenson, Mooers and Attaran’ (2014) 3(2) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 265–78) on the treatment of small cetaceans by the International Whaling Commission (IWC). That article discussed an unsuccessful proposal submitted by Monaco, at the 64th meeting of the IWC in 2012, for a resolution on highly migratory cetaceans. Monaco renewed its proposal in 2014 and, on that occasion, did generate sufficient support for a resolution to give contracting parties to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling a mandate to initiate debate over small cetaceans in other fora. Following this IWC Resolution, in December 2015, the United Nations General Assembly included a clause proposed by Monaco in its Resolution on Oceans and the Law of the Sea. The nature of international law is such that it is difficult to force change without upsetting a delicate equilibrium. Monaco’s initiative, however, may provide significant momentum towards a solution for what remains the real and under-acknowledged problem that there is virtually no international law applicable to small and/or highly migratory cetaceans.

Recent geopolitical and environmental events have created a new urgency for a just energy transition and a socially inclusive modernization of the energy sector. This article critically evaluates the extent to which Article 194(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as the competence provision of EU energy law, is congruent with the energy justice framework emerging from social sciences. It establishes the substantive scope and justiciability of Article 194(1) TFEU, including the legal principles and so-called ‘guiding principles’ of the provision relating to the internal market, environmental protection, and energy solidarity. The article analyzes the potential and shortcomings of Article 194(1) TFEU in contributing to more equitable decision-making processes in EU energy law. It concludes by evaluating the provision as a regulatory instrument that facilitates the (re)balancing of competing interests of the energy sector. This research further concludes that social considerations of energy justice cannot be sufficiently addressed through Article 194(1) TFEU.

The specific characteristics of each national system of judicial review reflect the indigenous legal framework and well-established administrative culture. It is necessary, therefore, to contextualize judicial review against the background of the idiosyncrasies of the local legal and administrative systems and what the national system regards as ‘unlawful’ decision making. An analysis of the contemporary jurisprudence of the Irish courts – in the specific context of enforcement of environmental impact assessment law – reveals a complex web of principles, which continue to evolve and to be influenced by European Union (EU) law. The article maps the development of these principles and assesses whether the standard of review (or the intensity of scrutiny) applied by the Irish courts is compatible with the EU law principle of effective judicial protection.

Ownership has been a key tool in the exploitation of nature for centuries. However, ownership could also shield natural entities from extraction and pollution if it were vested in them, rather than in humans or corporations. Through a case study of German constitutional property law, this article examines the normative content of this constitutional right. It argues that in owning themselves, natural entities would have numerous tools to fend off human interference with their self-determination. Constitutional property law would require any harmful activity affecting the natural entity to be based upon legislation and necessary to achieve a public purpose. The natural entity would enjoy broader access to justice. Courts would also often award appropriate remedies; where the natural entity would be awarded only compensation, this would be unsatisfactory because money cannot replace nature. The article finds that constitutional property law offers the potential for further protection from human interference, which has not been realized because of anthropocentric value judgments prevalent in German legal doctrine. Ecocentric approaches to ownership and invalidity as a standard remedy would play an important role in unlocking the full potential of ownership for environmental protection.

A crucial question for international law is how to allocate regulatory jurisdiction over transboundary problems between sovereign states. Insufficient clarity can trigger disputes such as that regarding the legality of the EU Directive that extends its ETS to all flights taking off from or landing at an EU airport, including those by non-EU carriers. This article uses this dispute as the vehicle to examine sovereignty in an increasingly interdependent world. It argues that a state’s decisional inviolability is central to sovereignty. Decisional sovereignty allows a state to regulate actors or activities with a link to its territory when these affect the state’s domestic affairs, rather than leaving the state at the mercy of an actor’s home state or of other states from the territory of which the problem emerges. Moreover, allocation of regulatory jurisdiction in conformity with decisional sovereignty reduces the incentives to free-ride on other states’ regulatory efforts and incentivizes international cooperation.

A citizens’ initiative was launched in 2016 in the Swiss canton of Basel-Stadt, demanding that the rights catalogue in the Cantonal Constitution be complemented by a fundamental right to life and a right to bodily and mental integrity for non-human primates. This initiative became the subject of a three-year legal dispute that ended with a decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in September 2020, ruling that the initiative is legally valid and must be put to the people for a vote. This case note discusses the key developments in the dispute, including the groundbreaking decision by the Constitutional Court of Basel-Stadt, which held that cantons are free to ‘expand the circle of rights holders beyond the anthropological barrier’. The authors, who were involved in the drafting of the initiative and acted as legal advisers in the judicial proceedings, offer first-hand insights into legal strategies and shed light on the importance of the case in the context of the ongoing efforts to secure rights for primates around the world.