A citizens’ initiative was launched in 2016 in the Swiss canton of Basel-Stadt, demanding that the rights catalogue in the Cantonal Constitution be complemented by a fundamental right to life and a right to bodily and mental integrity for non-human primates. This initiative became the subject of a three-year legal dispute that ended with a decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in September 2020, ruling that the initiative is legally valid and must be put to the people for a vote. This case note discusses the key developments in the dispute, including the groundbreaking decision by the Constitutional Court of Basel-Stadt, which held that cantons are free to ‘expand the circle of rights holders beyond the anthropological barrier’. The authors, who were involved in the drafting of the initiative and acted as legal advisers in the judicial proceedings, offer first-hand insights into legal strategies and shed light on the importance of the case in the context of the ongoing efforts to secure rights for primates around the world.

This article examines rosewood trafficking in the Casamance region of Senegal to determine whether acts of massive deforestation committed in the context of a non-international armed conflict can be prosecuted before the International Criminal Court (ICC) as war crimes of pillage and destruction of property under Article 8(2)(e)(v) and (xii) of the Rome Statute, respectively. It examines two of the main challenges resulting from the application of these provisions to acts of massive deforestation in the light of the ICC Elements of Crimes. Firstly, the article addresses the delicate issue of the establishment of a nexus between these acts and the related non-international armed conflict. Secondly, it discusses whether natural resources may qualify as ‘property’ for the purpose of Article 8(2)(e)(v) and (xii). It then offers avenues of reflection regarding the determination of ownership of these resources to fulfil the requirements of the Rome Statute.

One question left unanswered by the 2015 Paris Agreement is exactly how the world will meet the daunting technological challenges that lie ahead. This article proposes a global strategy to build up human capital oriented towards two bodies of knowledge: alternative, non-fossil systems of energy generation, delivery and consumption; and a deeper understanding of climate systems that might be geoengineered to reduce atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. Simply committing funding to climate technology is insufficient; a global climate technology policy must take into account the unique growth properties of human capital, and the conditions under which it can grow.

Human capital should be the focus of an international climate agreement for three reasons. Firstly, the wrong kind of human capital (attached to fossil fuel-related methods of energy generation and consumption) has helped to create an unfavourable political economy for climate policy. Secondly, the right kind of human capital (broader, and building on fundamental understandings of energy systems and climate systems) can create a more favourable political economy for climate policy. Thirdly, the technological changes needed for both mitigation and geoengineering technologies are so profound that a human capital stock must be developed with a conscious focus on radical technological change that can be delivered quickly. While individual countries may pursue an enlightened human capital policy on their own, cooperation at the international level would maximize the scale economies of inventive effort.

Public access to environmental information is a recurring theme in many international environmental law regimes. Nigeria has ratified and committed itself to many such regimes over the years. And yet, until recently, it had a culture of secrecy in (environmental) governance that was sustained by legislation, with the attendant harm to the environment and public well-being. This changed in 2011, with the enactment of the Nigerian Freedom of Information (FOI) Act. This article uniquely assesses the value of the Nigerian FOI Act in relation to what may largely be considered international best practice principles on public access to environmental information as generally reflected in the UNECE’s Aarhus Convention. Even though Nigeria is not a party to it, it is argued that the Convention is still legally and politically relevant to Nigeria. This comparative analysis will reveal areas where the Nigerian FOI Act aligns with, probably goes beyond, but also falls short of best practice, thus leading to some suggestions for improvement in the Act in order to ensure better public access to environmental information.

Based on an original database of 49 rights-based biodiversity (RBB) lawsuits filed around the world, this article hypothesizes that rights-based norms and institutions are becoming increasingly important in legal challenges aimed at biodiversity protection. We explain retrospectively the antecedents and characterize early RBB litigation by constructing a typology of cases and legal arguments that litigants and courts have used to establish the connection between biodiversity and rights protection. We then, prospectively, draw on our RBB case database and the trajectory of human rights and climate change (HRCC) litigation to anticipate likely trends, opportunities, and obstacles for future RBB cases. We posit that future RBB cases will build on the foundations laid by pioneering RBB cases, will apply lessons from HRCC litigation, and will systematically frame biodiversity loss as a rights issue.

After more than three decades of negotiations, the international response to climate change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) appears to have come full circle. At COP27, parties to the UNFCCC agreed to establish a multilateral fund to address loss and damage from global temperature rise, an idea that was initially put forward by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in the early 1990s. Employing a historical critique, which draws upon archival and doctrinal research and interviews with key informants who participated in the early days of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change, this article examines the AOSIS proposal in its wider historical context, and provides reflections for the renewed endeavour to negotiate a multilateral fund on loss and damage, in particular with a view to achieving justice for climate victims.

In her response to my case comment in this issue of Transnational Environmental Law, Laura Burgers purports to disagree with my analysis on two points. Firstly, she suggests that we disagree on the method that a court should use to interpret the duty of care of corporations on climate change mitigation. Secondly, she disagrees with each of the four inconsistencies that I identify in the decision by the District Court of The Hague (the Netherlands) in Milieudefensie v. Royal Dutch Shell. In this rejoinder, I respectfully disagree with her characterization of our disagreement.

Climate change uniquely affects those who are at the intersection of several inequalities simultaneously, such as those based on gender, age, and disability. This makes them ‘directly affected’ by climate change, which is crucial in establishing ‘victim status’ under Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights. At the same time, as a result of unequal power relations, intersectional victims face exclusion from, or minimal participation in, political decision-making processes concerning climate change. This further justifies their claim to victim status as a matter of procedural climate justice. As agents of change, intersectional victims, namely elderly women and girls with disabilities, can be empowered to contribute to climate decision making, thereby reshaping unjust power relations. The article examines two climate cases currently before the European Court of Human Rights: Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland, brought by elderly women, and Duarte Agostinho et al. v. Portugal and 32 other States, brought by children and young people.

In recent years, some scientists have called for research into and potential development of ‘solar geoengineering’ technologies as an option to counter global warming. Solar geoengineering refers to a set of speculative techniques to reflect some incoming sunlight back into space, for example, by continuously spraying reflective sulphur aerosols into the stratosphere over several generations. Because of the significant ecological, social, and political risks posed by such technologies, many scholars and civil society organizations have urged governments to take action to prohibit the development and deployment of solar geoengineering techniques. In this article we take such calls for a prohibitory or a non-use regime on solar geoengineering as a starting point to examine existing international law and governance precedents that could guide the development of such a regime. The precedents we examine include international prohibitory and restrictive regimes that impose bans or restrictions on chemical weapons, biological weapons, weather modification technologies, anti-personnel landmines, substances that deplete the ozone layer, trade in hazardous wastes, deep seabed mining, and mining in Antarctica. We also assess emerging norms and soft law in anticipatory governance of novel technologies, such as human cloning and gene editing. While there is no blueprint for a solar geoengineering non-use regime in international law, our analysis points to numerous specific elements on which governments could draw to constrain or impose an outright prohibition on the development of technologies for solar geoengineering, should they opt to do so.

This article takes stock of the many private and public instruments enacted transnationally to tackle the pressing problem of deforestation, ecosystem conversion, and associated human rights violations caused by international demand for and trade in agricultural commodities. The article argues that non-financial due diligence based on no-conversion criteria, and in line with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, holds considerable potential for ensuring deforestation-free value chains by enrolling and scaling up firm-level supply-chain management systems and private standards. The article introduces the main features of a possible European Union measure that disciplines via non-financial due diligence the placing on the market of commodities and products associated with deforestation, ecosystem conversion, degradation of forests and ecosystems, and associated human rights violations. Such a measure would also have the effect of streamlining initiatives enacted by private authority.

China's climate governance is distinguished by the contrast between an abundance of policies on climate change and the lack of legally binding laws. This article argues that Chinese courts bridge this difference, which fosters a ‘rule of climate policy’ rather than a strict rule of law. The effective authority of Chinese climate policy is made possible in practice both by provisions of the Chinese Constitution and the prevailing use of legal reasoning. China's constitutional design of ‘ecological civilization’ delegates the duty and the power of managing climate change issues to the executive branch of its government. Most Chinese documents on climate governance have no binding legal force, which means, according to positive law, that they cannot serve as legal grounds for judicial decisions. Chinese judges, in deciding climate-related disputes, must combine legal provisions and non-binding materials to achieve regulatory goals. They use non-legal materials to support statutory or contractual interpretations and determine the existence or limits of rights, which alters the meaning and scope of existing legal terms and principles. This rule of climate policy is possible in the courtroom because judges justify public policy considerations with arguments of principle that are substantiated in various non-binding climate plans.

Written as a response to the article ‘Does Size Matter? The ICRW and the Inclusion of Small Cetaceans’ by Sean Stephenson, Arne Mooers and Amir Attaran, this commentary considers how important global and regional biodiversity- or conservation-related conventions have deliberately avoided the issue area of cetacean management. One of the effects of this is that so-called ‘small cetaceans’ – approximately 70 species – are left largely unregulated. This article differs from that of Stephenson and his co-authors, who argue that the ‘only appropriate’ forum for dealing with the issue is the International Court of Justice. Instead, it is argued here that the ‘Future of the IWC’ compromise process may yet represent the best course for bringing small cetaceans under IWC management authority. Another alternative was recently suggested in a draft resolution put forward by Monaco in 2012 – and is likely to be put forward again in 2014 – which advocated involving the United Nations General Assembly in the issue. The issue is both complicated and important, and a solution is needed.

This article argues that the Rights of Nature (RoN) framework is compatible with various ideological outlooks and political options. As a result, those initiatives may translate into extremely diverse institutional implementations with contrasted outcomes in terms of power distribution. The institutional design of RoN has deep political implications for various social groups who hold conflicting claims over certain territories. Hence, rather than transforming human-nature relations, RoN primarily transform the power relations between human communities. I delve into three conceptual frameworks that could shape the recognition of RoN and explore their respective distributive implications: green colonialism, environmental justice, and the focus on Indigeneity. Through this critical engagement, I wish to warn against the illusion of a post-political ecology where an ecocentric legal declaration would deliver human-nature harmony without deep political battles, social tensions, and economic confrontations. RoN as an abstract notion does not offer a ready-made toolkit to dismantle the legal architecture of fossil capitalism; nor does it provide clear guidance on the distribution of costs and benefits of the green transition.

English common law and United Kingdom legislation provide various – overall liberal – jurisdictional grounds for hearing foreign tort claims. The article examines these grounds with reference to recent and ongoing oil pollution nuisance litigation involving Royal Dutch Shell Plc and its Nigerian subsidiary operating in the Niger Delta. Particular attention is given to the factors taken into account by the court in exercising its discretion to allow service out of the jurisdiction in cases of pollution taking place abroad under the principle of forum non conveniens. Following the widely commented decision of the United States Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Corporation, which ruled against the extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort Statute, it is easy to forget that the rules of jurisdiction vary from country to country and that different legal systems apply similar concepts in often radically different ways. Attention is also given to the future development of English jurisdictional law and practice in the context of environmental nuisance.

‘Mainstreaming’ climate change by embedding climate change considerations in government policies, processes, and operations can bolster the realization of climate mitigation and adaptation goals and reduce risks of counter-productive actions. Some climate laws around the world now contain explicit mainstreaming duties, in parallel with emissions reduction targets and adaptation planning requirements. This article proposes a conceptual model for climate change mainstreaming in government, with two pillars. Firstly, it defines objectives of climate mainstreaming, emphasizing that mainstreaming activities occur along a spectrum of ambition towards a goal of ‘mature mainstreaming’. Secondly, it proposes three complementary pathways to mature mainstreaming – regulatory, institutional, and capacity and capability-building pathways – to classify mainstreaming activities, and barriers to and enablers of mainstreaming. Grounded in empirical insights from a leading jurisdiction (Victoria, Australia), the model can assist governments to clearly articulate mainstreaming objectives and to identify, prioritize, and monitor mainstreaming initiatives to help in achieving their climate policy goals.

Increasing research has been devoted to examining collaborations between public and private actors in environmental regulation under neoliberal democracies. However, this public-private interaction in authoritarian regimes remains understudied. This article seeks to address this gap in the literature through an empirical examination of the interaction between environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and procuratorates in China's environmental public interest litigation. We find emerging complementarity: NGOs focus on new issues and target high-profile defendants to increase the socio-legal impact of their civil litigation, whereas procuratorates increasingly engage in administrative litigation against government agencies. This complementarity is shaped by the different legal opportunities for Chinese NGOs and procuratorates, as well as their respective institutional objectives and capacities. Their divergent regulatory preferences have also fostered synergy between these two actors, allowing them to collaborate on legal experimentation and innovation.

The Southern Bluefin Tuna dispute of the late 1990s will long be remembered as one of the most important fishery disputes of all time, influencing both ocean governance and international dispute settlement. This commentary explores the legacy of that dispute with a particular emphasis on the growth and development of the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna and how the regime is functioning with the addition of several new members. We will focus also on the specific challenges to the conservation and management of the southern bluefin tuna. This includes biological parameters and the legal and political landscape of global fisheries conservation generally. Finally, we will explore emerging conservation strategies to assist the recovery of this highly valuable fish species.

Law – through regulation, criminalization and litigation – provides key mechanisms for mitigating the harmful effects of oil disasters. At the same time, these mechanisms also enable the perpetuation of oil disasters under an extractivist imperative. This disaster tolerance is the point of departure for this article's examination of the legal response to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster over the last decade. Based on a methodology that combines a social harm approach with the political ecology of Felix Guattari, we firstly present a reconceptualization of harm inflicted by oil corporations across three registers: environment, society, and subjectivity. We subsequently introduce the concept of transversal harm, which allows us to move beyond the criminal and civil damage of corporate crime and negligence and to capture the collective and continuous impact of oil extractivism, as opposed to the exceptional impact of oil disasters. Transversal harm opens new avenues for assigning corporate responsibility and reducing disaster tolerance as the by-product of environmental law.