A team of two brothers enters a baking contest. Their cake wins the first-place prize of £500. Will they demand £500 each? Of course not. Winners must split the prize. We often ignore this when we claim credit for team accomplishments. We take more credit than we deserve. I apply this idea to baking competitions and academic production but it applies equally to other arenas with teams of varying sizes.

Running a marathon is not solely a personal achievement; rather it sets an example. Because of the nature of this example, it constitutes an achievement that deserves our praise (contrary to what has recently been argued in this Journal).

I explain why research in non-applied, non-interdisciplinary, non-historical philosophy is worthwhile. The key move in the explanation is the realization that many philosophical problems can be put in the form of a set of highly plausible yet apparently jointly inconsistent claims regarding a fundamental notion.

Over the last few decades, several scientific studies have attempted to measure the effectiveness of prayer in bringing about healing. But can we really test the therapeutic effect of prayer in the same way that we test conventional medicinal treatments? On the contrary, in this article, I present three arguments in support of the conclusion that such attempts to measure the effectiveness of prayer are based on flawed assumptions. One implication of this is that the failure to draw a positive statistical relationship between prayer and healing does not constitute good evidence against the value of prayer.

Forcehimes poses a parity between libraries and downloading books online and concludes that the im/permissibility of one of them entails the im/permissibility of the other and vice versa. Karjiker rejects this parity, arguing that the magnitudes of these two are vastly different and while libraries do not lead to a considerable market failure, downloading ebooks does. In this article, I try to clarify some points, show a kind of parochialism in Karjiker's arguments, propose a thought experiment to neutralize the magnitude problem, and justify Forcehimes’ main idea.

An introduction to the role of U. T. Place in the development of modern physicalism.

This article discusses how difficult it is to be morally consistent when choosing what to eat. Applying a moral justification in a consistent manner may result in some unorthodox diets. I distinguish two ways in which we might be inconsistent in our approach to food. We might fail to apply our morals in a consistent way, or we might fail to put our morals into practice at all. I argue that the latter represents a greater failing. Given the complexity of making food choices, the former is more excusable.

What happens after we die? This might be taken as an eschatological question, seeking some explanation or reassurance around the destiny of an immortal soul or some such vital element of our very being. But there is another sense that has at least as much importance. What should we do with dead bodies?

The recent explosion in the discovery of exoplanets and our incipient ability to detect atmospheric biomarkers recommend reflection on the conceptual implications of discovering – or not discovering – extrasolar life. I contend that evidence for intelligent extraterrestrial life is evidence against the existence of God, because if there are intelligent extraterrestrials, there are likely to be evils in the universe even greater than those found on Earth. My reasoning is based on Richard Gott's Copernican Principle, which holds that in the absence of information to the contrary, we should take ourselves to be typical observers.

What is a human body? Some reasons are given for thinking that, in the primary case, it is a body that is both of and suitable to a rational animal.

In society, power and responsibility are often linked, supporting the idea that with great power comes great responsibility. I assert that this link between power and responsibility is a form of the Act–Omission Distinction, a principle in ethics that there is a morally relevant distinction between doing something and omitting to do something, e.g. a difference between killing someone and letting someone be killed. As such, using trolleys, elected spider-men, and real-life cases such as R v Stone & Dobinson, I contest this casual relationship between power and responsibility and argue the relationship to be correlative as both power and responsibility are often simultaneously caused by consent.

Moran argues that the ancient Greek philosophers did not really do moral philosophy because they conflated self-regard with other-regard. I argue that on the contrary questions of what is in a person's own interest are moral questions and that self-interest should play a part in moral philosophy.

While life has been increasing in length an increasing proportion of that life is in a state of poor health and decrepitude. Indeed, an increasing proportion of life is in that poor state because of its increased length. Medicine always fails to catch up, and increasingly so in providing a life of good health overall set by the end point of inevitable death. This requires a change in attitude from the zealous concentration on medical interventions whose chief aim is to increase the length of life, and a move to being able to consider more readily refusing some medical treatments, along with a more resigned attitude to our death, which must come anyway.