In ‘The Foundations of Mathematics’, Frank Ramsey separates paradoxes into two groups, now taken to be the logical and the semantical. But he also revises the logical system developed in Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica, and in particular attempts to provide an alternate resolution of the semantical paradoxes. I reconstruct the logic that he develops for this purpose, and argue that it falls well short of his goals. I then argue that the two groups of paradoxes that Ramsey identifies are not properly thought of as the logical and semantical, and that in particular, the group normally taken to be the semantical paradoxes includes other paradoxes—the intensional paradoxes—which are not resolved by the standard metalinguistic approaches to the semantical paradoxes. It thus seems that if we are to take Ramsey’s interest in these problems seriously, then the intensional paradoxes deserve more widespread attention than they have historically received.

We consider a simple modal logic whose nonmodal part has conjunction and disjunction as connectives and whose modalities come in adjoint pairs, but are not in general closure operators. Despite absence of negation and implication, and of axioms corresponding to the characteristic axioms of (e.g.) T, S4, and S5, such logics are useful, as shown in previous work by Baltag, Coecke, and the first author, for encoding and reasoning about information and misinformation in multiagent systems. For the propositional-only fragment of such a dynamic epistemic logic, we present an algebraic semantics, using lattices with agent-indexed families of adjoint pairs of operators, and a cut-free sequent calculus. The calculus exploits operators on sequents, in the style of “nested” or “tree-sequent” calculi; cut-admissibility is shown by constructive syntactic methods. The applicability of the logic is illustrated by reasoning about the muddy children puzzle, for which the calculus is augmented with extra rules to express the facts of the muddy children scenario.

Various natural deduction formulations of classical, minimal, intuitionist, and intermediate propositional and first-order logics are presented and investigated with respect to satisfaction of the separation and subformula properties. The technique employed is, for the most part, semantic, based on general versions of the Lindenbaum and Lindenbaum–Henkin constructions. Careful attention is paid (i) to which properties of theories result in the presence of which rules of inference, and (ii) to restrictions on the sets of formulas to which the rules may be employed, restrictions determined by the formulas occurring as premises and conclusion of the invalid inference for which a counterexample is to be constructed. We obtain an elegant formulation of classical propositional logic with the subformula property and a singularly inelegant formulation of classical first-order logic with the subformula property, the latter, unfortunately, not a product of the strategy otherwise used throughout the article. Along the way, we arrive at an optimal strengthening of the subformula results for classical first-order logic obtained as consequences of normalization theorems by Dag Prawitz and Gunnar Stålmarck.

We analyze and compare geometrical theories based on mereology (mereogeometries). Most theories in this area lack in formalization, and this prevents any systematic logical analysis. To overcome this problem, we concentrate on specific interpretations for the primitives and use them to isolate comparable models for each theory. Relying on the chosen interpretations, we introduce the notion of environment structure, that is, a minimal structure that contains a (sub)structure for each theory. In particular, in the case of mereogeometries, the domain of an environment structure is composed of particular subsets of Rn. The comparison of mereogeometrical theories within these environment structures shows dependencies among primitives and provides (relative) definitional equivalences. With one exception, we show that all the theories considered are equivalent in these environment structures.

We introduce an extension of the propositional calculus to include abstracts of predicates and quantifiers, employing a single rule along with a novel comprehension schema and a principle of extensionality, which are substituted for the Bernays postulates for quantifiers and the comprehension schemata of ZF and other set theories. We prove that it is consistent in any finite Boolean subset lattice. We investigate the antinomies of Russell, Cantor, Burali-Forti, and others, and discuss the relationship of the system to other set-theoretic systems ZF, NBG, and NF. We discuss two methods of axiomatizing higher order quantification and abstraction, and then very briefly discuss the application of one of these methods to areas of mathematics outside of logic.

The success of the AGM paradigm—the theory of belief change initiated by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson—is remarkable, as even a quick look at the literature it has generated will testify. But it is also remarkable, at least in hindsight, how limited was the original effort. For example, the theory concerns the beliefs of just one agent; all incoming information is accepted; belief change is uniquely determined by the new information; there is no provision for nested beliefs. And perhaps most surprising: there is no analysis of iterated change.

In this paper it is that last restriction that is at issue. Our medium of study is dynamic doxastic logic (DDL). The success of the AGM paradigm The particular contribution of the paper is detailed completeness proofs for three dynamic doxastic logics of iterated belief revision.

The problem of extending the AGM paradigm to include iterated change has been discussed for years, but systematic discussions have appeared only recently (see Segerberg, 2007 and forthcoming, but also van Benthem, 2007; Rott, 2006; Zvesper, 2007).

Kripke’s theory of truth offered a trivalent semantics for a language which, like English, contains a truth predicate and means of self-reference; but it did so by severely restricting the expressive power of the logic. In Kripke’s analysis, the Liar (e.g., This very sentence is not true) receives the indeterminate truth value, but this fact cannot be expressed in the language; by contrast, it is straightforward to say in English that the Liar is something other than true. Kripke’s theory also fails to handle the Strengthened Liar, which can be expressed in English as: This very sentence is something other than true. We develop a theory which seeks to overcome these difficulties, and is based on a detailed analysis of some of the linguistic means by which the Strengthened Liar can be expressed in English. In particular, we propose to take literally the quantificational form of the negative expression something other than true. Like other quantifiers, it may have different implicit domain restrictions, which give rise to a variety of negations of different strengths (e.g., something other than true among the values {0, 1}, or among {0, 1, 2}, etc). This analysis naturally leads to a logic with as many truth values as there are ordinals—a conclusion reached independently by Cook (2008a). We develop the theory within a generalization of the Strong Kleene Logic, augmented with negations that each have a nonmonotonic semantics. We show that fixed points can be constructed for our logic, and that it enjoys a limited form of ‘expressive completeness’. Finally, we discuss the relation between our theory and various alternatives, including one in which the word true (rather than negation) is semantically ambiguous, and gives rise to a hierarchy of truth predicates of increasing strength.

We show that if we interpret modal diamond as the derived set operator of a topological space, then the modal logic of Stone spaces is K4 and the modal logic of weakly scattered Stone spaces is K4G. As a corollary, we obtain that K4 is also the modal logic of compact Hausdorff spaces and K4G is the modal logic of weakly scattered compact Hausdorff spaces.

Sound and complete semantics for classical propositional logic can be obtained by interpreting sentences as sets. Replacing sets with commuting dense binary relations produces an interpretation that turns out to be sound but not complete for R. Adding transitivity yields sound and complete semantics for RM, because all normal Sugihara matrices are representable as algebras of binary relations.

We prove that every first-order formula that is invariant under quasi-injective bisimulations is equivalent to a formula of the hybrid logic . Our proof uses a variation of the usual unravelling technique. We also briefly survey related results, and show in a standard way that it is undecidable whether a first-order formula is invariant under quasi-injective bisimulations.

Here, we provide a detailed description of the mutual relation of formulas with finite propositional variables p1, …, pm in modal logic S4. Our description contains more information on S4 than those given in Shehtman (1978) and Moss (2007); however, Shehtman (1978) also treated Grzegorczyk logic and Moss (2007) treated many other normal modal logics. Specifically, we construct normal forms, which behave like the principal conjunctive normal forms in the classical propositional logic. The results include finite and effective methods to find a normal form equivalent to a given formula A by clarifying the behavior of connectives and giving a finite method to list all exact models.

In this paper we consider an independence-friendly modal logic, IFML. It follows from results in the literature that qua expressive power, IFML is a fragment of second-order existential logic, , that cannot be translated into first-order logic. It is also known that IFML lacks the tree structure property. We show that IFML has the ‘truncated structure property’, a weaker version of the tree structure property, and that its satisfiability problem is solvable in 2NEXP. This implies that this paper reveals a new decidable fragment of . We also show that IFML becomes undecidable if we add the identity symbol to its vocabulary by means of a reduction from the tiling problem.

This paper begins an axiomatic development of naive set theory—the consequences of a full comprehension principle—in a paraconsistent logic. Results divide into two sorts. There is classical recapture, where the main theorems of ordinal and Peano arithmetic are proved, showing that naive set theory can provide a foundation for standard mathematics. Then there are major extensions, including proofs of the famous paradoxes and the axiom of choice (in the form of the well-ordering principle). At the end I indicate how later developments of cardinal numbers will lead to Cantor’s theorem, the existence of large cardinals, and a counterexample to the continuum hypothesis.

As is known, a logic S is paraconsistent if the rule ECQ (E contradictione quodlibet) is not a rule of S. Not less well known is the fact that Lewis’ modal logics are not paraconsistent. Actually, Lewis vindicates the validity of ECQ in a famous proof currently known as the “Lewis’ proof” or “Lewis’ argument.” This proof essentially leans on the Disjunctive Syllogism as a rule of inference. The aim of this paper is to define a series of paraconsistent logics included in S4 where the Disjunctive Syllogism is valid only as a rule of proof.

Benjamin Schnieder has argued that several traditional definitions of truth-functionality fail to capture a central intuition informal characterizations of the notion often capture. The intuition is that the truth-value of a sentence that employs a truth-functional operator depends upon the truth-values of the sentences upon which the operator operates. Schnieder proposes an alternative definition of truth-functionality that is designed to accommodate this intuition. We argue that one traditional definition of ‘truth-functionality’ is immune from the counterexamples that Schnieder proposes and is preferable to Schnieder’s alternative.

Since Frege’s predicate logical transcription of Aristotelian categorical logic, the standard semantics of Aristotelian logic considers terms as standing for sets of individuals. From a philosophical standpoint, this extensional model poses problems: There exist serious doubts that Aristotle’s terms were meant to refer always to sets, that is, entities composed of individuals. Classical philosophy up to Leibniz and Kant had a different view on this question—they looked at terms as standing for concepts (“Begriffe”). In 1972, Corcoran presented a formal system for Aristotelian logic containing a calculus of natural deduction, while, with respect to semantics, he still made use of an extensional interpretation. In this paper we deal with a simple intensional semantics for Corcoran’s syntax—intensional in the sense that no individuals are needed for the construction of a complete Tarski model of Aristotelian syntax. Instead, we view concepts as containing or excluding other, “higher” concepts—corresponding to the idea which Leibniz used in the construction of his characteristic numbers. Thus, this paper is an addendum to Corcoran’s work, furnishing his formal syntax with an adequate semantics which is free from presuppositions which have entered into modern interpretations of Aristotle’s theory via predicate logic.

Moritz Pasch (1843–1930) gave the first rigorous axiomatization of projective geometry in his Vorlesungen über neuere Geometrie (1882), in which he also clearly formulated the view that deductions must be independent from the meanings of the nonlogical terms involved. Pasch also presented in these lectures the main tenets of his philosophy of mathematics, which he continued to elaborate on throughout the rest of his life. This philosophy is quite unique in combining a deductivist methodology with a radically empiricist epistemology for mathematics. By taking into consideration publications from the entire span of Pasch’s career, the latter decades of which he devoted primarily to careful reflections on the nature of mathematics and of mathematical knowledge, Pasch’s highly original, but virtually unknown, philosophy of mathematics is presented.

The paper presents a particular example of a formula which is a standard tautology of Łukasiewicz but not its general tautology; an example of a model in which the formula is not true is explicitly constructed. Analogous example of a formula and its model is given for product logic.

Certain commentators on Russell’s “no class” theory, in which apparent reference to classes or sets is eliminated using higher-order quantification, including W. V. Quine and (recently) Scott Soames, have doubted its success, noting the obscurity of Russell’s understanding of so-called “propositional functions.” These critics allege that realist readings of propositional functions fail to avoid commitment to classes or sets (or something equally problematic), and that nominalist readings fail to meet the demands placed on classes by mathematics. I show that Russell did thoroughly explore these issues, and had good reasons for rejecting accounts of propositional functions as extralinguistic entities. I argue in favor of a reading taking propositional functions to be nothing over and above open formulas which addresses many such worries, and in particular, does not interpret Russell as reducing classes to language.

Adams famously suggested that the acceptability of any indicative conditional whose antecedent and consequent are both factive sentences amounts to the subjective conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. The received view has it that this thesis offers an adequate partial explication of Ramsey’s test, which characterizes graded acceptability for conditionals in terms of hypothetical updates on the antecedent. Some results in van Fraassen (1976) may raise hope that this explicatory approach to Ramsey’s test is extendible to left-nested conditionals, that is, conditionals whose antecedent is itself conditional in form. We argue that this interpretation of van Fraassen’s results is to be rejected. Specifically, we provide an argument from material inadequacy against a generalization of Adams’ thesis for left-nested conditionals.