The physicist Richard Gott defends the Copernican principle, which claims that when we have no information about our position along a given dimension among a group of observers, we should consider ourselves to be randomly located among those observers in respect to that dimension. First, I apply Copernican reasoning to the distribution of evil in the universe. I then contend that evidence for intelligent extraterrestrial life strengthens four important versions of the argument from evil. I remain neutral regarding whether this result is a reductio of these arguments from evil or the statement of a genuine evidential relationship.

Can fictionalists have faith? It all depends on how we disambiguate ‘fictionalists’ and on what faith is. I consider the matter in light of my own theory. After clarifying its central terms, I distinguish two fictionalists – atheistic and agnostic – and I argue that, even though no atheistic fictionalist can have faith on my theory, agnostic fictionalists arguably can. After rejecting Finlay Malcolm's reasons for thinking this is a problem, I use his paradigmatic agnostic fictionalist as a foil to explore a variety of ways in which to describe agnostic fictionalists, none of whom pose a problem for my theory.

Theists typically believe that God knows all truths. However, accounts of divine omniscience almost always focus on the scope of God's knowledge or perhaps on whether certain kinds of facts are there to be known by God, such as counterfactuals of creaturely freedom or future contingent facts. Very rarely do these accounts include for analysis the nature of God's knowledge. In this article, I develop an acquaintance theory of God's knowledge where acquaintance with an epistemic relation that guarantees that the truth of God's beliefs is necessary for knowledge. I argue that this view achieves an ideal way of knowing, worthy of the divine being.

When it comes to religion, lack of conclusive evidence leads many reflective thinkers to embrace agnosticism. However, pure agnosticism does not necessarily have to be the final word; there are other attitudes one might reasonably adopt in a situation of epistemic uncertainty. This article concentrates on J. L. Schellenberg's proposal that non-doxastic propositional faith is available even when belief is unwarranted. Schellenberg's view is rejected since his envisaged notion of faith conflicts with important epistemic aims. Instead, it is suggested that a combination of hope and ‘occasional’ faith constitutes a substantive religious pro-attitude rationally available in situations of epistemic uncertainty.

This article examines in detail chapters 8–11 of Anselm's Proslogion, in which he addresses the problem whether perfectly just God can consistently spare sinners who deserve eternal condemnation. The article argues that Anselm's discussion is framed by two doctrines that permeate the Proslogion: that God is the being than which none greater can be conceived and that God is ontologically simple. Anselm presents several principles about justice and mercy for consideration, some of which should be modified or rejected. The article offers a sympathetic construction of the perspectival solution he offers to the problem, but concludes that some important questions remain unanswered.

In this article, I argue that faith's going beyond the evidence need not compromise faith's epistemic rationality. First, I explain how some of the recent literature on belief and credence points to a distinction between what I call B-evidence and C-evidence. Then, I apply this distinction to rational faith. I argue that if faith is more sensitive to B-evidence than to C-evidence, faith can go beyond the evidence and still be epistemically rational.

You don't know that p unless it's on account of your cognitive abilities that you believe truly that p. Virtue epistemologists think there's some such ability constraint on knowledge. This looks to be in considerable tension, though, with putative faith-based knowledge. For at least on a popular Christian conception, when you believe something truly on the basis of faith this isn't because of anything you're naturally competent to do. Rather, faith-based beliefs are entirely a product of divine agency. Appearances to the contrary, I argue in this article that there's no deep tension between faith-based knowledge and virtue epistemology. Not if we learn to conceive of faith as a kind of extended knowledge.

This article responds to recent arguments that worshipping God cannot be obligatory. It shows how a respect-based account of worship is compatible with the claim that only God is worthy of worship, and compatible with the view that worship is very different from attitudes we owe to creatures. Then, it develops a respect-based account in enough detail to show how our moral motivations to respect creatures generate an obligation to worship God. The upshot is an analysis of worship which can weather recent arguments that worshipping God is not morally motivated.

Central to a theory of the atonement is one's position on forgiveness and satisfaction. These two issues are interrelated, but it is unclear whether one takes precedence over the other. Specifically, must one make satisfaction to remove the guilt incurred by sin prior to forgiveness, or can a victim forgive a wrongdoer independently of any work of satisfaction? Richard Swinburne argues that satisfaction must precede forgiveness, but I defend the view that forgiveness is a manifestation of love, and as such satisfaction is not required prior to forgiveness. Instead, I argue that forgiveness can and should precede satisfaction, and I highlight important implications of this view for a theory of the atonement.

In a ground-breaking series of books, Canadian philosopher J. L. Schellenberg (2005d; 2007b; 2009; 2013a) has developed a systematic non-theistic, non-naturalist philosophy of religion. One of the core claims within his system is that given our limited evidence (and limited capabilities for assessing what evidence we do have), scepticism concerning the truth of religious propositions is at present the only warranted epistemic response. In this article I draw attention to a potential complication for Schellenberg's assessment of the pragmatic implications of this evidential situation, a complication arising from the distinction between exoteric and esoteric religion.

Sceptical theists attempt to meet the challenge to theism posed by evidential arguments from evil by appealing to the limitations of human cognition. Drawing on an exchange between William Rowe and Michael Bergmann, I argue that consistent sceptical theists must be radically insensitive to certain kinds of evidence about prima facie evils – that is, that they must endorse the claim that not even evidence of extreme and pervasive suffering could justify disbelief in theism. I show that Bergmann's attempt to respond to this problem does not succeed and argue that no alternative response is forthcoming, concluding that the threat of radical insensitivity constitutes a serious and underappreciated difficulty for sceptical theism.

The claim that God is perfectly beautiful has played a key role within the history of a number of religious traditions. However, this view has received surprisingly little attention from philosophers of religion in recent decades. In this article I aim to remedy this neglect by addressing some key philosophical issues surrounding the doctrine of divine beauty. I begin by considering how best to explicate the claim that God is perfectly beautiful before moving on to ask what consequences accepting this claim will have for our broader theorizing in philosophy.

In this article, I consider the most prominent contemporary attempts to reconcile Social Trinitarianism (ST) with monotheism, arguing that within ST, only mereological (part/whole) accounts can ultimately preserve monotheism. A corollary of this is that every other condition (or set of conditions) adduced in defense of a monotheistic ST really entails tritheism, that is, until a part/whole condition is deployed. Such models, I contend, fail necessarily insofar as they attempt to solve a puzzle that is wholly quantitative in nature with purely qualitative considerations. I conclude by remarking that the Social Trinity model propounded by William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland succeeds where the others fail, though this model is itself by no means impervious to weighty objections.

The Nicene–Constantinopolitan profession that the Son of God is begotten, not made, presents the tension that the Son is caused by God but not created. This claim was a point of controversy in the semi-Arian and Eunomian/Anomean disputes of the fourth century. The latter argued that unoriginateness is central to divinity. Hence, the Son, being originate, cannot be of the same nature as the Father. Some philosophers of religion today echo this same conclusion. In this article, I show, contrary to both ancient and modern critics of the begotten-not-made distinction, that the Eastern fathers offer clear differences between begetting and creating, which clarify why the distinction is cogent and necessary within their metaphysics.

Alvin Plantinga theorizes the existence of a sensus divinitatis – a special cognitive faulty or mechanism dedicated to the production and non-inferential justification of theistic belief. Following Chris Tucker, we offer an evidentialist-friendly model of the sensus divinitatis whereon it produces theistic seemings that non-inferentially justify theistic belief. We suggest that the sensus divinitatis produces these seemings by tacitly grasping support relations between the content of ordinary experiences (in conjunction with our background evidence) and propositions about God. Our model offers advantages such as eliminating the need for a sui generis religious faculty, harmonizing the sensus divinitatis with prominent theories in the cognitive science of religion, and providing a superior account of natural revelation.

Leftow's theist concept-nominalism is proposed as a theory of properties which is compatible with God's aseity and sovereignty. In this article, I focus on the question of whether theist concept-nominalism is successful in answering a notorious problem in the literature on properties, i.e. the regress problem. In the second section, I summarize TCN by illustrating what its ontology is and how its theory works. In the third section, the regress problem is recast within the framework of TCN. In the fourth section, I present my solution to this problem. In the final section, several objections to my solution are addressed and replied.

I offer a new approach to the old question of the epistemic value of religious experience. According to this approach, religious experience is a species of desire, desire in this context involving a kind of experience which is cognitive and unmediated. The account is inspired by Levinas and Heidegger, and it involves a conception of experience which is shared by a disjunctivist account of perception. Perceptual disjunctivism is my starting point, and it provides the ground for the ensuing discussion of desire. In the final section of the article I argue that the parallel between perceptual disjunctivism and a Levinasian conception of desire points to a further strength in the account of desire here presented, namely, by suggesting the possibility of a disjunctive style response to scepticism about religious experience.

I present a new First Cause argument that builds on modal notions to derive causal finitism, the thesis that all causal chains are of finite length. An independent uniqueness argument is then supplemented to establish the existence of a unique First Cause.