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Faith and hope in situations of epistemic uncertainty

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 May 2018

CARL-JOHAN PALMQVIST Open the ORCID record for CARL-JOHAN PALMQVIST [Opens in a new window]
CARL-JOHAN PALMQVIST*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Lund, Box 192, 221 00, Lund, Sweden
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

When it comes to religion, lack of conclusive evidence leads many reflective thinkers to embrace agnosticism. However, pure agnosticism does not necessarily have to be the final word; there are other attitudes one might reasonably adopt in a situation of epistemic uncertainty. This article concentrates on J. L. Schellenberg's proposal that non-doxastic propositional faith is available even when belief is unwarranted. Schellenberg's view is rejected since his envisaged notion of faith conflicts with important epistemic aims. Instead, it is suggested that a combination of hope and ‘occasional’ faith constitutes a substantive religious pro-attitude rationally available in situations of epistemic uncertainty.

Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 55 , Special Issue 3: Religious Experience and Desire , September 2019 , pp. 319 - 335
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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