*Note: This letter was originally slated to appear in the September, 2001 issue of PS: Political Science and Politics, but due to editorial mishap the publication was delayed. PS apologizes for the delay.

September 11, 2001, stands as a watershed in American history. Not since the War of 1812 have civilian targets in the United States been so savagely assaulted by foreigners; and the British burning of government buildings in the nation's capital did not begin to approach the degree of carnage inflicted by terrorists in New York City, Washington, D.C., and on Flight 93 over Pennsylvania. Even the Japanese surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, directed toward a military target, now seems less shocking than the murder of over 3,000 mainly civilian people on 9/11.

The attacks by terrorists against the United States on September 11, 2001, left a scar on the American psyche that will never fully heal. This date, too, will live in infamy, along with the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The brutality of the attacks on 9/11 awakened the American people to two central facts of the new century: first, we continue to live in a hostile world, despite the end of the Cold War, and, second, we are vulnerable to adversaries who not only reject our way of life but seek to destroy it.

Reflections on the future of American foreign policy following the September 11 terrorist attacks are best understood as part of a debate that has been on-going since the end of the Cold War. At the heart of this debate are questions of power and national purpose, themes that have long been at the heart of analyses of American foreign policy and are not unique to the post Cold War era. In this symposium I argue that as important as questions of power and purpose are, they constitute only two of the three essential pillars on which any analysis of American foreign policy must build. Questions about the third pillar, responsibility, have been relatively unexplored. Studies of power provide insight into the ability of the United States to act on the international stage. Studies of purpose, or national interest, provide insight into the range of goals that can be pursued or should be pursued in conducting foreign policy. Studies of responsibility direct our attention to questions of obligation, accountability, and definition of community. Only by examining all three pillars can one obtain a full picture of American foreign policy and reach judgements about its content.

“An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two reasons. The one is that, independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy. The second is that, in doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed.”

James Madison, The Federalist, No. 63.

One of the most peculiar aspects of the U.S. foreign-policy process is the low regard in which the non-military institutions of foreign affairs are held by the rest of the federal government.The author would like to acknowledge the research assistance of James Bralski and David Rothstein in preparing this article. Distrust of the State Department and its diplomatic milieu is deeply embedded in U.S. political culture, never far beneath the surface in Congress, the White House, and other agencies of the executive branch. As a result, the State Department is routinely neglected in each of its primary areas of responsibility: the development and articulation of foreign policy; the conduct of private and public diplomacy; and the transfer of foreign assistance. The State Department's marginalized status, codified and institutionalized with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, persists in the administration of President George W. Bush. The costs of this bureaucratic neglect are difficult to gauge. They can be detected, however, in the mixed signals coming from the myriad government agencies regarding U.S. foreign policy, in the problems experienced by the foreign service in recruiting and retaining personnel, and in the failure of many aid programs to achieve their stated goals. Widely publicized accounts of the State Department's interagency disputes and lack of clout undermine the credibility of foreign service officers (FSOs) as they engage daily with foreign governments and private citizens.

For this occasion, I decided to tackle a topic of, I hope, some historical and theoretical interest, of current policy importance and one that might have interested James Madison.I would like to thank Alan Gerber and Eric Schickler for their help on this work. A useful clarifying point came from Morris Fiorina. Matthew Glassman helped with the references. That topic is supermajority rule in the U.S. Senate—that is, the need to win more than a simple majority of senators to pass laws. Great checker and balancer though Madison was, this feature of American institutional life would probably have surprised him and might have distressed him.

The “rally-round-the-flag effect” sparked by the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington and by President George W. Bush's prompt launching of the War on Terrorism cries out for the kind of timely analysis that political scientists sometimes can provide. A rally effect is the sudden and substantial increase in public approval of the president that occurs in response to certain kinds of dramatic international events involving the United States. The September 11 rally effect is distinctive for at least three reasons. First, of all the recorded rally effects, it is the largest. Bush's approval rating soared in the Gallup Poll from 51% on September 10 to 86% on September 15.The president's approval rating is the percentage of survey respondents who answer “approve” to the question: “Do you approve or disapprove of the job [name] is doing as president?” This 35-point increase nearly doubles the previous record, the 18-point boost triggered by his father's launch of Operation Desert Storm in January 1991. Second, the further increase in Bush's approval rating to 90% on September 22 represents the highest rating ever recorded for a president (Morin 2001). Third, the September 11 rally effect has lasted longer than any in the history of polling. As of November 10, 2002, Bush's approval rating was 68%—22 points below its peak but still much higher than his rating 13 months earlier.

Canada's Progressive Conservative Party faced the prospects of electoral annihilation going into the 2000 election. In the 1993 election, the party suffered what must surely be the most humiliating defeat ever visited upon an incumbent party; its share of the popular vote plummeted from 43% to 16% and it was reduced to a mere two seats (1%, down from 57%). So complete was the collapse that the party—one of the two parties that had alternated in power since Confederation in 1867—lost its official status in the House of Commons.A political party must have at least 12 seats to be recognized officially as a political party. This status confers significant benefits, such as being able to obtain funding and to ask questions at the highly visible question period. Meanwhile, the new party of the Right—the Reform Party—managed to get 19% of the vote and, thanks to the concentration of its support in western Canada, this translated into 52 seats.For an analysis of that spectacular change, see Johnston et al. 1996.

A decade has passed since the Third Wave of democratization brought an avalanche of new, relatively unstable democracies into being, raising the question, “How solid is support for democracy in these countries?” In the intervening years, public support for democracy has faded in some countries, many of which are democratic in name only. It is unclear how long even the pretense of electoral democracy will survive in the Soviet successor states, apart from the Baltics (Brzezinski 2001). The prospects for democracy in Islamic countries seem particularly poor, with some writers arguing that the basic values of Islamic publics may be incompatible with liberal democracy (Huntington 1993, 1996). This article examines this claim, using the 1999–2001 wave of the World Values Survey, which includes 10 Islamic countries, making it possible for the first time to compare the Islamic world with other major cultural zones. We find surprisingly widespread support for democracy among Islamic publics—at least by conventional measures.

Back in olden days instructors' manuals consisted of little more than test banks, and a few film/video suggestions. First to innovate were authors of American government texts. That revolution in support materials has progressed to international politics.

I felt compelled to write this brief essay after glancing through “The Teacher” section of the recent issues of PS. There are several articles exhorting young educators, soon-to-be educators, or those considering pursuing a career in academia to think about what it means to get in front of a classroom and impart that information which we believe will make a world of difference to our students. These eminent scholars with years of cumulative experience offer sage advice, relevant anecdotes, and a rosy perspective on how exploring alternative avenues of information dissemination will make the classroom experience more positive and fruitful for instructor and student alike.

One morning the group of students who were leading my “Ecology and Politics” class that day decided that we should hold class outside, in the garden of a nearby university reception center. We ventured out, into a classic South Carolina spring day, with a bright blue sky and trees full of blossoms. On the way, the group discovered that they had forgotten to bring markers to write on the large pad that they were carrying. I let them continue on, to get started, while I headed back to my departmental office to pick up some markers. When I returned, markers in hand, I was treated to a sight that reminded me of what education might be like: a large open-air tent had been erected in the garden for a reception later in the day, and under the tent were my students, seated in chairs in a circle, in the midst of an animated discussion of spiritual ecology. I took my seat in the circle, enjoyed the beautiful setting, turned in my journal assignment when asked, and contributed a few comments to the discussion.

This is the first article in what will be an ongoing column on mentoring to be published in PS: Political Science and Politics over the next three years as part of the Task Force on Mentoring, established by the APSA Council in the fall of 2002. The Task Force was designed to provide general advice and help with mentoring, with a special focus on the needs of women and minorities. This column describes the general goals of the Task Force and asks for volunteers to help in our work as we establish a more formal mentoring program for political scientists.

With the launch of Perspectives on Politics in 2003, APSA members will now receive one journal a month rather than two journals bundled together every three months. PS will arrive in your mailbox in January, April, July, and October. APSR will show up in February, May, August, and November. Perspectives will come in March, June, September, and December.

APSA announces its 2003 Small Research Grant Program, which supports research in all areas of political science. The Program is competitive, peer-reviewed, and intended to advance opportunities for scholars who are not affiliated with Ph.D.-granting institutions.

APSA is pleased to announce that Anne Norton and Atul Kohli have been named Program Committee Co-Chairs for the 2004 Annual Meeting, scheduled to meet in Chicago, September 2–5.

As they have done every fall but one since 1990,The 2001 APSA-JPSA exchange was cancelled due to the uncertainties of international travel in the wake of the September 11 tragedies. the American Political Science Association and the Japanese Political Science Association (JPSA) exchanged delegates to each other's respective annual meetings. As part of this exchange, William M. Downs (Georgia State University) attended the 2002 JPSA meeting. The conference took place October 5–6 in Matsuyama, the largest city on the southern island of Shikoku, on the campus of Ehime University. The international exchange committee of the JPSA served as an exemplary host for the event, with superb hospitality and arrangements provided by Hiroshi Hirano (Gakushuin University), Toshio Kamo (Osaka City University, President of JPSA), and Yoshiaki Kobayashi (Keio University). A representative of the Korean Political Science Association joined Downs as the conference's only international guests. Some 450 Japanese political scientists participated in the annual meeting, making it one of the best attended JPSA events ever.