Scholars who study American political institutions have tended to
specialize in a single body such as the U.S. Congress or the federal
courts. However, a growing movement among judicial scholars argues that
the courts cannot be understood in isolation, but instead must be
understood as a part of the larger system of government. As Neustadt
(1980, 26) has reminded us, in reality the U.S. system of government
features “separated institutions sharing powers.” Alexander
Bickel (1962) was one of the first voices in what one could label the
Governance as Dialogue movement. Bickel said that the courts must engage
in a “continuing colloquy” with the more political branches of
government and with other political actors, refuting the judicial
supremacy approach that was popular at that time. In Constitutional
Dialogues (1988) and in his other writings, Louis Fisher has argued
that the courts, and especially the U.S. Supreme Court, do not have the
sole responsibility of interpreting the U.S. Constitution, but that
constitutional interpretation involves a very complicated dialogue among
various political actors. Others, such as William N. Eskridge (1991a;
1991b), have argued that the interactions between the courts, the
executive, and Congress are a highly complex multiple-player game. Recent
literature on the interactions between courts and Congress has been
growing steadily, and includes, among others, works by Geyh (2006); Devins
and Whittington (2005); Barnes (2004); Pickerill (2004); Miller and Barnes
(2004); and Lovell (2003).