While our intuition is that religious elites influence the political behavior of their audiences, just how that influence takes place is essentially unknown. Among many possible mechanisms, we investigate a new one: the effects of the decision-making process information that is included in elite statements. We believe that “process cues” paralleling those preferred by respondents bolster trust in the source and augment the ability to form determined attitudes. We test this proposition in the context of a survey experiment that focuses on environmental racism. We present competing arguments provided by a reverend and a professor, variably assigning the arguments and presence of elite process cues. We find that process cues do affect trust and attitudinal ambivalence, but in ways that challenge some pervasive assumptions about the integrity and importance of religious groups in politics.

This article compares the difficulty in achieving a public stance of neutrality toward sexual orientation with the difficulty in achieving neutrality toward religious belief. Strict separation treats religion as a private commitment, with firm limits on government cooperation with religion and strong protection for free exercise. Formal neutrality discounts religion as a basis either for conferring special benefits or for withholding generally available benefits. Positive neutrality attends to the practical effects of public policy, sometimes requiring an abandonment of nonestablishment in favor of policies that allow for greater protection for free exercise of religion. I argue that none of these forms of neutrality establishes impartiality regarding either religious belief or same-sex marriage. First, Michael McConnell's “disestablishment” approach to sexual orientation and same-sex marriage instantiates are neither neutrality nor civic equality. Second, while formal neutrality may render an establishment more inclusive, it may exclude those whose beliefs and practices are not deemed in accordance with public purposes. Third, although positive neutrality may remove burdens from same-sex couples whose conscientious convictions may impel them to marry, it may still favor some kinds of practices over others.

The article addresses the relationship between religion and politics, and combines theories on religious change with theories on political cleavages. Empirical evidence is presented from a Norwegian survey of new forms of religiosity and political attitudes. Woodhead and Heelas (2004) have posited the hypothesis that a silent revolution is taking place where (traditional) religion is giving way to what they call “spirituality of life.” This article questioned the assumption that the individualistic and consumer-oriented New Age movement of the 1980s and 1990s has developed into a new religious movement that is concerned with life quality and social questions. According to the literature on political cleavages, certain demands have to be fulfilled before a social divide or a conflict develops into a full political cleavage. With respect to alternative religion, the empirical analysis reveals that the main obstacle is related to the lack of a collective ideological platform.

Compassionate conservatism is usually dismissed on the American political left as an empty slogan intended to mystify the real roots and aspirations of conservative politics. However, conservative Christian organizations and churches now conduct well-coordinated compassion campaigns on contested social issues such as sexual and reproductive rights. Through compassion campaigns, the Christian right also disseminates particular forms of political pedagogy regarding sexuality and compassion for followers who are subject to the movement's influence. Here, I turn to Hannah Arendt to analyze the politics of compassion at work in the ex-gay movement and in antiabortion projects such as Silent No More. This article presents evidence for a turn to compassionate pedagogies on the Christian right, analyzes these projects, and suggests ways that Arendt's political thought can inform our readings of conservative Christian compassionate discourse and political practices.

This article analyzes political participation and the attitudes of Muslim-Americans. Assessing national patterns, the first part highlights several regression models, discerning the impact of race/ethnicity, gender, foreign born status, age, and education on political activity and attitudes. I also compare changes in voting patterns among respondents between the 2000 and 2004 elections. The second half is based on in-depth interviews of Muslims from St. Louis, Missouri, probing more directly particular shifts in views and participation since September 11. Among the national sample, South Asians and Middle Easterners largely supported Republican George W. Bush in 2000, while African-Americans voted for Democrat Al Gore. However, by 2004, race and ethnicity were no longer statistically significant factors dividing the Muslim vote; instead, support largely went to Democrat John Kerry. Changes in voting patterns between 2000 and 2004 were also evident in the St. Louis sample of South Asians and Middle Easterners. They generally cited unfavorable views of Muslim treatment both at home and abroad since the War on Terror began as major reasons for these changes. Partisan and voting shifts were not evident among African-Americans, who have been consistent Democrats. However, many African-Americans in addition to Middle Easterners and South Asians reported heightened interest in politics and similar changes since September 11. Only Bosnians, who are relatively new to the United States, report few changes. This is largely because they have yet to develop firm political identities. Among both samples, Muslim-Americans generally exhibit high rates of participation in various political activities, many reporting increasing interest and involvement since September 11. Therefore, regardless of the hardships they may currently feel, Muslim-Americans are not hiding in the shadows but are fully participating in the political sphere.

Republicans made major efforts to win a larger share of the Jewish vote in 2004 by emphasizing their strong support for Israel. They partially succeeded, but did not make a dent in the overall loyalty of American Jews to the Democratic party, since they lost approximately as many votes because of Jews' negative reactions to the party's evangelical base. We argue that both Israel and worries over evangelical influence in the country reflect concerns about Jewish identity, above and beyond disagreements on specific social issues. We compare American Jewish voting behavior and liberalism to the voting behavior of non-Jews in 2004 using a survey of Jews from the National Jewish Democratic Coalition and the American National Election Study. For non-Jews, attitudes toward evangelicals are closely linked to social issues, but for Jews this correlation is small. The Jewish reaction to evangelicals is more of an issue of identity and the close ties of evangelicals to the Republican Party keep many Jews Democratic. Attitudes toward evangelicals are far more important for Jewish voting behavior than for non-Jewish voters.

Is the origins of life debate occurring in the United States an illustration of the culture wars? To address this question we examine attitudes toward evolution using data from the 2006 General Social Survey. Multinomial logistic regression models indicate that attitudes about whether humans today evolved from earlier species of life are more fully explained by orthodox Christian doctrine, not religious tradition, as the culture wars thesis suggests. However, an isomorphism between orthodox Christine doctrine and conservative political ideology has not occurred. While a liberal political ideology is strongly related to acceptance of evolution, these data suggest that only a certain group of political conservatives, those who accept orthodox Christian doctrine, reject evolution as sound scientific theory. Additionally, respondents who “don't know” if evolution is “true” or “false” differ from both the believers and skeptics in that they appear to lack the exposure to either science or orthodox Christian doctrine that would give them clear guidance about what to think in regards to evolution.

The role of religiosity as an important predictor of partisan identification has been well researched over the years, with most of our understanding of religion focused on Christianity. However, it is not clear that religiosity operates equally for the partisan identification of non-Christian religious groups. One of the most discussed religious minority groups in the United States today is Muslim-Americans. Numbering between 2.3 million and 7 million, Muslim-Americans have been the focus of considerable debate regarding religion and American political inclusion. We argue that religiosity does influence Muslim-American party identification, however not in the same manner as with other groups. While the two major political parties encourage religiosity among Protestants, Jews, and Catholics, they are either silent or opposed to religiosity among Muslims within their parties. Thus, religiosity among Muslim-Americans may not necessarily lead to partisan identification with either Republicans or Democrats. Rather, high levels of religiosity, coupled with perceptions of discrimination against Muslims, may lead many to oppose both major political parties and instead identify with “none of the above.” This is not to say that Muslim-Americans reject civic engagement or political participation in the United States, but rather the two political parties have not carved out a space to welcome Islam, as they have for Christianity and Judaism. We examine new data from the 2007 Muslim-American Public Opinion Survey to assess the predictors of partisan identification among Muslims in the United States.

Starting from theories of secularization and of religious individualization, we propose a two-dimensional typology of religiosity and test its impact on political attitudes. Unlike classic conceptions of religiosity used in political studies, our typology simultaneously accounts for an individual's sense of belonging to the church (institutional dimension) and his/her personal religious beliefs (spiritual dimension). Our analysis, based on data from the World Values Survey in Switzerland (1989–2007), shows two main results. First, next to evidence of religious decline, we also find evidence of religious change with an increase in the number of people who “believe without belonging.” Second, non-religious individuals and individuals who believe without belonging are significantly more permissive on issues of cultural liberalism than followers of institutionalized forms of religiosity.

Legislators' responsiveness to constituency preferences is an accepted cornerstone of American representative democracy. Focusing on key domestic anti-terrorism votes during the 109th Congress, this study explores whether or not the presence of Muslim-Americans in a district influenced House members' roll-call behavior. We apply and test two competing theories of representation: the congruence theory and the minority backlash hypothesis. Using original data on Muslim-American constituency size, our analysis indicates little evidence of a representational backlash and some evidence that both Democratic and Republican members are positively responsive in their roll-call behavior to the presence of Muslim voters in their districts.

Debates over the involvement of religion in the public sphere look set to be one of the defining themes of the 21st century. But while religious issues have attracted a large degree of scholarly attention, the public discourse of religion itself, in terms of the effort to assert and legitimize a role for faith in the public realm, has remained notably under-researched. This article marks an initial step to address this deficiency by deconstructing the public discourse of Christianity in the United Kingdom. It argues that, while appealing for representation on the grounds of liberal equality, the overall goal of this discourse is to establish a role for itself as a principal source of moral authority, and to exempt itself from the evidentially-based standards and criteria that govern public life.

This article explores the impact of Muslim organizations and Muslim political parties in Indonesia and Malaysia and their relationship to democracy. Questions addressed are as follows: How does the political system (broadly described) facilitate or constrain the goals of various Muslim organizations (both groups in society and political parties)? What roles do these Muslim organizations play in impacting politics and where (or in what areas of) in the political process are they most effective? Under what circumstances have Muslim associations and/or parties been a force for (or antagonistic to) democratization? Given the ethnic and regional diversity in Malaysia and Indonesia, the initial hypotheses for these questions are as follows: under authoritarian and semi-authoritarian rule Muslim organizations actually have greater opportunities to polarize rhetoric as they appeal to citizens based on claims of moral supremacy, fulfillment of social welfare needs, and some level of criticism of a restricted or corrupted political order. At different times the Pan-Malayan Islamic Association (PAS), the leading Muslim party in Malaysia (and a dominant opposition party) has had limited appeal to voters. Under more democratic conditions, Islamic groups or parties may need to moderate their appeals, and/or build coalitions with secular or non-Islamic groups in order to win power and influence in the larger political system. Muslim political parties exist in both Malaysia and Indonesia; their power and influence have varied over time. This project aims to explain why these parties have had more support at some times than others and under what conditions they may moderate their demands and policy choices to accommodate pluralist leanings.

The religion and state project is intended to develop and create a set of measures that systematically gauge government religion policy. Round 2 of the religion and state dataset will include 147 variables for 176 states. This update (1) describes the methodology and reasoning behind the new coding, (2) describes the changes between Round 1 and Round 2, (3) compares the religion and state variables to other religion data collections, and (4) discusses the potential significance of this data collection

American Muslim representation in elected office has lagged behind that of other groups of comparable size. Muslims now make up 2% of the total United States population and enjoy much larger concentrations in some urban areas. American Muslims are also disproportionately educated and enjoy a higher average socio-economic status than members of groups with similar numbers that have made strides in terms of political representation in our democracy. Yet Muslims have not made similar advances in the political arena. There are a number of reasons that might account for this situation. Here, we look at one possible explanation that is especially intriguing — and perhaps a bit troubling: the idea that voters make different causal attributions for the behavior of Muslim candidates for office. We employ an experimental design to examine the attributions participants use to “explain” the behavior of hypothetical Muslim and non-Muslim candidates. We conduct two experiments involving distinct political offices: State Attorney General and United States Senator. We find that respondents generally do not attribute behavior differently in the case of Muslim and Christian candidates, except in the case of lax prosecution of a terrorism case. Politically sophisticated respondents assume that a Muslim prosecutor who does not have a large Muslim constituency is sympathetic to Muslim terrorists, but not one with a larger Muslim voting base. Non-sophisticates attribute his behavior to such motivations regardless of the concentration of Muslims in his district.

Although American society is religiously pluralistic, not all religious groups enjoy equal levels of public approval and support. Indeed, America has a history of viewing members of nontraditional religious groups with considerable distrust and suspicion. Two religious groups in particular — Muslims and Mormons — have come under fire in recent years, though not necessarily for the same reasons. Muslims and Mormons have frequently been viewed as outside the mainstream of American culture and, perhaps for that reason, have suffered from discrimination, threats, and violence. This article examines Americans' views of these two important and rapidly growing groups, using social identity theory as the primary vehicle of analysis. The theory proves useful in helping us explain variance in Americans' views of these two groups. While a variety of social, political and religious variables help to explain Americans' views of Muslims and Mormons, religious variables have the greatest impact.