While public opinion research has expanded rapidly in the Islamic world since 2001, little scholarly work has examined interviewer effects related to an enumerator's religious adherence. We find that the perceived religiosity of an interviewer impacts respondents' expressions of personal piety and adherence to Islamic cultural norms in a sample of approximately 1,200 women in Greater Cairo. Muslim women indicate that they are more religious and adherent to Islamic cultural norms when interviewed by an enumerator donning the Islamic headscarf. Conversely, members of Egypt's minority Coptic Christian community report that they are less adherent to Christianity when interviewed by a veiled enumerator. Through psychological processes of strategic self-presentation of identity and impression management, the veil may trigger Muslim respondents to express what they perceive to be socially desirable (i.e., more devout) responses; in contemporary Egypt, being perceived as pious may elicit social and economic benefits. Christians appear to deemphasize their religious identity to avoid appearing at odds with the dominant, Muslim majority to which the enumerator appears to belong. Younger, poorer and less educated women — who may be most susceptible to concerns about social desirability — show the largest effects.

We test for relationships between anti-Muslim attitudes and opinion and competing religious identity and religious belief variables in an evangelical Christian constituency. Original survey data from a statewide sample of 508 likely voters in Oklahoma are subjected to a robust regression analysis to determine (1) indicators of holding Christian nationalist beliefs and (2) the relationship between belief measures of Christian nationalism, evangelical Christian identity, and subsequent anti-Muslim sentiment. Christian nationalism is more prevalent among self-identified evangelicals. Christian nationalist beliefs and strong belief in Biblical literalism are significantly related to negative and restrictive views of Muslims. Anti-Muslim sentiments in the form of general disapproval and the desire to limit Muslim worship are shaped more by beliefs than identities or behaviors. Evangelical self-identification does not help us disentangle domestic opinion regarding Muslims as well as measures that disentangle beliefs from identity.

How does Turkey's Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) act as an instrument of foreign policy (FP)? What are the factors that allow such an instrumentalization of Islam in Turkish FP? In addressing these questions, this paper uses semi-structured expert interviews from Bulgaria and the Netherlands. Although both countries host a sizeable Muslim minority, these populations differ in their characteristics and historical ties with Turkey. Comparing Diyanet’s role in the Netherlands with its recent Turkish-Muslim diaspora, and in Bulgaria with its centuries-old Muslim minority allows us to reveal variation in the practical engagement strategies that Diyanet adopts in different country contexts. Thus, this paper advances two main claims; first, Diyanet serves as a primary FP tool of Turkey in countries with a significant Turkish-Muslim minority. Secondly, this instrumentalization destabilizes secularization projects both at home and abroad.

One of the essential characteristics of a democratic regime is the separation of Church and state. The elected governors of a democratic regime's institutions require sufficient autonomy in order to make policy that is within the bounds of the constitution and which cannot be contested or overruled by non-elected religious leaders or institutions. However, this requirement is often confused by scholars and politicians to mean that a democracy must also be secular. Therefore, the idea of an “Islamic democracy” for example, is often derided as a contradiction in terms. Using quantitative data from Grim and Finke (2006) and Fox (2006) on cross-national Church and state relationships, this article argues that once the core autonomy prerequisite has been fulfilled, further separation of Church and state is not necessarily associated with higher levels of democracy. In fact, the data indicate that there is a wide range of Church-state arrangements which gives religion the possibility of a central role in political life while maintaining a high quality of democratic rights and freedoms. Drawing on the statistical results of this analysis, the article concludes by rethinking about the possibilities and limits for “public” religion to strengthen democratization processes.

White evangelicals overwhelmingly supported Donald Trump in the 2016 election, producing extensive debate as to who evangelicals are, what it means to be an evangelical in the United States today, and whether the electoral results are surprising or not. This paper offers empirical clarity to this protracted discussion by asking and answering a series of questions related to Trump's victory in general and his support from white evangelicals in particular. In doing so, the analyses show that the term “evangelical” has not become a synonym for conservative politics and that white evangelical support for Trump would be higher if public opinion scholars used a belief-centered definition of evangelicalism rather than relying on the more common classification strategies based on self-identification or religious denomination. These findings go against claims that nominal evangelicals, those who call themselves evangelicals but are not religious, make up the core of Trump's support base. Moreover, strong electoral support among devout evangelicals is not unique to the 2016 election but rather is part of a broader trend of evangelical electoral behavior, even when faced with non-traditional Republican candidates. Finally, the paper explores why white evangelicals might support a candidate like Trump. The paper presents evidence that negative partisanship helps explain why devout evangelicals—despite Trump's background and behaviors being cause for concern—coalesced around his presidential bid. Together, the findings from this paper help make sense of both the 2016 presidential election and evangelical public opinion, both separately and together.

Using a nationwide survey of American Muslims conducted in 2004, we evaluate models of political participation, specifically the influence of religious characteristics, political resources, social structures, and political awareness on Muslims' reported political participation. American Muslims reported extremely high rates of political participation in comparison to the general public and in this regard are model citizens. Using path analysis, our findings concluded that religious beliefs were negatively associated with political participation, while measures of religious resources were positively related to participation. Social structures had mixed influence in most cases statistically indistinguishable from zero. Political resources and measures of political awareness, specifically feelings of anxiety following 9/11, were positively associated with participation.

Research has documented that religious minorities often face the brunt of religious discrimination. Yet formal tests, using global collections, have been lacking. Building on the religious economy theory and recent work in law and politics, we propose that minority religions face discrimination from the state because they represent unwanted competition for the state supported religion, are viewed as a threat to the state and larger culture, and lack support from an independent judiciary. Drawing on the recently collected Religion and State-Minorities collection on more than 500 minority religions, we find support for each of the propositions, though the level of support varies based on the targets of state discrimination. In general, the support is strongest when explaining discrimination against minority religion's institutions and clergy, but weakens when explaining more general discrimination against the membership.

The public opinion literature shows that cues about the policy positions of social groups influence citizens’ political attitudes. We assess whether cues about religious groups’ positions affect attitudes on three issues: protection of homosexuals in the workplace, improving the socio-economic conditions of African-Americans, and government-provided health insurance. We argue that such cues should shape issue attitudes and condition the impact of religious and political orientations on those attitudes. That should be especially true on issues closely connected to religion and for citizens with low levels of political awareness. We assess this argument with a survey experiment pitting pairs of religious groups on opposite sides of issues. We find that religious group cues matter primarily for cultural attitudes, among less politically-aware individuals, and for the religiously unaffiliated, Democrats, and liberals. The dominant effect is negative, moving these groups away from the positions of religious leaders and especially evangelical leaders.

The role of religiosity as an important predictor of partisan identification has been well researched over the years, with most of our understanding of religion focused on Christianity. However, it is not clear that religiosity operates equally for the partisan identification of non-Christian religious groups. One of the most discussed religious minority groups in the United States today is Muslim-Americans. Numbering between 2.3 million and 7 million, Muslim-Americans have been the focus of considerable debate regarding religion and American political inclusion. We argue that religiosity does influence Muslim-American party identification, however not in the same manner as with other groups. While the two major political parties encourage religiosity among Protestants, Jews, and Catholics, they are either silent or opposed to religiosity among Muslims within their parties. Thus, religiosity among Muslim-Americans may not necessarily lead to partisan identification with either Republicans or Democrats. Rather, high levels of religiosity, coupled with perceptions of discrimination against Muslims, may lead many to oppose both major political parties and instead identify with “none of the above.” This is not to say that Muslim-Americans reject civic engagement or political participation in the United States, but rather the two political parties have not carved out a space to welcome Islam, as they have for Christianity and Judaism. We examine new data from the 2007 Muslim-American Public Opinion Survey to assess the predictors of partisan identification among Muslims in the United States.

Few studies examine religiosity-of-interviewer effects, despite recent expansion of surveying in the Muslim world. Using data from a nationally-representative survey of 800 Moroccans conducted in 2007, this study investigates whether and why interviewer religiosity and gender affect responses to religiously-sensitive questions. Interviewer dress affects responses to four of six items, but effects are larger and more consistent for religious respondents, in support of power relations theory. Religious Moroccans provide less pious responses to secular-appearing interviewers, whom they may link to the secular state, and more religious answers to interviewers wearing hijab, in order to safeguard their reputation in a society that values piety. Interviewer traits do not affect the probability of item-missing data. Religiosity-of-interviewer effects depend on interviewer gender for questions about dress choice, a gendered issue closely related to interviewer dress. Interviewer gender and dress should be coded and controlled for to reduce bias and better understand social dynamics.

Across Europe populist radical right (PRR) parties advertise themselves as defenders of Christian identity and values, but they do not seem to strongly attract religious Christian voters. This article tests a general framework for understanding this religion gap in 13 countries. Findings extend earlier research on religiosity and radical right attitudes, provide insight on East-West differences in the PRR phenomenon, and lend conditional support to the notion of a “vaccine effect” suggested by prior research.

While there have been many approaches to classifying religious traditions in the social sciences (see Hackett and Lindsay 2008), the most popular approach is the religious tradition classification scheme, which was most carefully systematized by Steensland et al. (2000). Their widely-embraced article argued that the most accurate typology of religiosity was to sort individuals into seven distinct groups: evangelical Protestant, mainline Protestant, black Protestant, Jewish, Catholic, other religious groups, and no religion. This approach has become popularly known as “reltrad” and its usage in academic writing is voluminous. A brief search of Google Scholar indicates that over 900 published articles and books utilized the reltrad framework. However, the implementation of this typology has never been fully and accurately operationalized.

Evangelicals garner much attention in polling and public opinion research, yet measuring white evangelicals remains elusive, even opaque. This paper provides practical guidance to researchers who want to measure or analyze evangelicals. In the social sciences, many have adopted a detailed religious affiliation approach that categorizes evangelicals based on the religious tradition of the denominations to which they belong. Others have used a simpler self-identification scheme, which asks respondents if they consider themselves “born-again or evangelical”. While the affiliation and self-identification schemes are predominant, a practical examination of these approaches has been absent. Using several waves of the General Social Survey and the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, we compare them. We find almost no statistical differences between the two measurements in prominent demographic, political, or religious factors. Thus, we suggest that for most a simple question about broad religious affiliation followed by a born-again or evangelical self-identification question will suffice.

The prominence of evangelical Christians in the electoral base of the Republican Party is a noted feature of recent American elections. This prominence is linked to a key stereotype that saturates public discourse: “born-again/evangelical Republicanism.” The stereotype fuses religious and partisan social group membership to create a composite social label. Using a social categorization approach, which challenges the assumptions and methods of existing research, the present analysis asks whether voters embrace this stereotype in their definitions of self. The article employs confirmatory factor analysis of religious and partisan identity constructs from a national internet survey, the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, and finds evidence of the presence of this religious-partisan stereotype in individual self-views, and of the backlash that it has produced, particularly among citizens that are exposed to public discourse on American elections.

Religious identity serves as a central cleavage in American politics. However, little attention has been granted to how gendered views of authority conveyed in religious doctrine shape political identities and attitudes. Using a nation-wide sample of adult Americans, we demonstrate that gendered notions of divine and human authority exert considerable influence on political thinking. In particular, belief in a masculine God and preferences for traditional gender roles strongly relate to political conservatism. Adherence to gendered notions of authority influences political identity and policy preferences, even when controlling for more conventional indicators of religiosity. Accounting for gendered beliefs about authority also partially explains well-documented gender gaps in American politics, providing insight into women's apparently contradictory tendencies toward both political liberalism and religiosity. The relationships uncovered here, coupled with the continued salience of both gender and religion in contemporary political campaigns, underscore the importance of attending to the gendered dimensions of authority.

Recent years have seen a proliferation of studies on the determinants of support for the European Union among national publics. Scholars have analyzed economic, political, informational, and identity factors as influences, but there has been less exploration of cultural factors, most notably religion. This article replicates our earlier studies exploring the impact of confessional culture and religious commitment on support for the European Union, expanding the purview from early member states to more recent accessions and candidates for membership. Using Eurobarometer 65.2 (Papacostas 2006), we demonstrate that religion still shapes attitudes toward European integration, but in varying ways and to different extents in several parts of the Union. In early member states, Catholics — especially committed ones — are more supportive of the European Union than Protestants, confirming earlier findings. In more recent accessions, however, religion's impact is weaker and assumes different configurations. Finally, we present evidence that even in the early member states religion is losing its influence over Europeanist sentiment and suggest that this development presents obstacles to further political integration.

Starting from theories of secularization and of religious individualization, we propose a two-dimensional typology of religiosity and test its impact on political attitudes. Unlike classic conceptions of religiosity used in political studies, our typology simultaneously accounts for an individual's sense of belonging to the church (institutional dimension) and his/her personal religious beliefs (spiritual dimension). Our analysis, based on data from the World Values Survey in Switzerland (1989–2007), shows two main results. First, next to evidence of religious decline, we also find evidence of religious change with an increase in the number of people who “believe without belonging.” Second, non-religious individuals and individuals who believe without belonging are significantly more permissive on issues of cultural liberalism than followers of institutionalized forms of religiosity.

Although American society is religiously pluralistic, not all religious groups enjoy equal levels of public approval and support. Indeed, America has a history of viewing members of nontraditional religious groups with considerable distrust and suspicion. Two religious groups in particular — Muslims and Mormons — have come under fire in recent years, though not necessarily for the same reasons. Muslims and Mormons have frequently been viewed as outside the mainstream of American culture and, perhaps for that reason, have suffered from discrimination, threats, and violence. This article examines Americans' views of these two important and rapidly growing groups, using social identity theory as the primary vehicle of analysis. The theory proves useful in helping us explain variance in Americans' views of these two groups. While a variety of social, political and religious variables help to explain Americans' views of Muslims and Mormons, religious variables have the greatest impact.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that Muslim American women who wear the hijab may be particularly vulnerable to the experiences of stigmatization because the hijab represents one of the most obvious and dominant markers of “otherness.” Yet, extant research has surprisingly neglected to systematically examine how such external markers of difference can increase perceptions of discrimination. Drawing from two nationally representative datasets, we examine perceived discrimination among Muslim Americans, and find that veiled women report experiencing both societal and institutional discrimination at much higher rates than their counterparts. In fact, our findings show that the hijab is one of the most important predictors of self-reported discrimination among all Muslim Americans. Interestingly, however, we also find that men are more likely than women to perceive discrimination once we account for the role of the hijab. Our analysis makes an important contribution to existing research by highlighting the unique experiences of a religious minority group and identifies one important and previously underexplored mechanism by which individuals may be targeted for discrimination—the hijab.

This article explores the social origins and consequences of Orthodox-Muslim tensions surrounding the attempts to find a place for religion in Russia's state schools. It demonstrates that the Orthodox-Muslim tensions are an inevitable outcome of what we define as Russia's pattern of “desecularization from above.” The attempts to restore religious education are carried out by alliances of top religious and political elites, which almost by default focus on the state-run schools. These attempts run into serious social and institutional constraints, and generate considerable Orthodox-Muslim tensions and controversies spilling over to public opinion. On the surface, the Orthodox-Muslim tensions often appear in the form ironically resembling “culture wars” between religious traditionalists and secularists in the West. Our survey data indicate that public support for religious instruction in state-run schools has reached high levels and is infused with a noticeable element of religious intolerance. We predict that further attempts to desecularize Russia's state schools “from above” may have destabilizing effects in society and fuel ethno-religious tensions.