Recently, political scientists and economists have redoubled their attempts to understand the “Rise of Europe.” However, the role of the Catholic Church has been curiously ignored in most of this new research. The medieval West was shot through with Catholic values and institutions, and only by factoring in the Church can we understand the peculiar European development from the high Middle Ages onward. More particularly, the 11th century “crisis of church and state” set in train a series of developments that were crucial for the Rise of Europe. The Church was the main locale in which the development of representation, consent, and early bureaucratic institutions took place, and it contributed to creating, integrating, and maintaining the European multistate system. This note demonstrates that current scholarship has failed to factor in ecclesiastical influences and it shows how these gaps can be filled by a more careful reading of prior historical scholarship.

This article presents a symposium on the “indirect effects” of the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence on the place of religion in the educational sphere. The symposium showcases empirical research providing critical insight into how the Court's decisions may influence related domestic debates, raise public consciousness, and change how social actors perceive their rights and articulate their right claims in the area of religion and education. The research underpinning this symposium represents a clear departure from existing scholarship in this domain: it examines the impact of the Court not from the top-down (Court impact on states and their legislative frameworks) but from grassroots level upwards, in seeking to understand whether, how and to what extent Court decisions influence grassroots level actors' conceptions of their rights in the domain of religion and education and their efforts to secure new rights vis-à-vis their states.

The introductory paper of this symposium compares the impact of “political secular” governing regimes in the countries of both the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Western Europe. The overall objective is to assess the impact of political secularism in both regions, as a key component of inter-religious and cultural discord and contention with significant political ramifications. The concept of “political secularism,” a contentious term, often lacking in analytical clarity, is briefly assessed. That is, what does “political secularism” mean and what does it look like both within and across Europe and the MENA? Opinions differ from scholar to scholar. As there is no consensus regarding the meaning of the term “political secular,” a core contribution of this introduction is to examine what the term means analytically in the contexts of the MENA and Western Europe.

The article brings into focus a series of political arguments of Stanley Hauerwas's “theological politics” and argues that these arguments are in stark contrast with the theoretical perspective of a political rule by a god-like Leviathan, an image inherited in modern and contemporary political culture from the early modern English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. The first section focuses on Hauerwas's arguments regarding the political potential of the term “Catholicity” to represent an alternative to the coercive politics reinforced by the post-Enlightenment nation state. The second section proposes a reflection on the way the Church's Catholicity may be expressed politically without falling into the temptation of involving the Leviathan to sort out the issues generated by its diversity. The concluding section illustrates how Hauerwas uses his approach of a universal unity of Christians “without Leviathan” in his exhortation addressed to American Christians to say “no” to Donald Trump's version of communal unity that is rather based on “total allegiance” to the United States and on “repressive politics”.

Egalitarian preferences and benevolence are significant elements of Islamic social justice, which is one of the main pillars of Islam's ethico-political system. Surprisingly, empirical investigations about attitudinal implications of Islamic social justice values are rare. This is one of the first studies examining the correlations between Islam, social justice values, and regime preferences. It proposes that benevolence and egalitarian distributive preferences will induce democratic support and mediate the effect of religiosity on democratic orientations. Seemingly unrelated regression estimations using a Muslim-only sample from the sixth wave of the World Values Surveys support these hypotheses. The effects of social justice values are exclusive to support for democracy and not to support for authoritarian systems. Furthermore, religiosity increases support for democracy through intermediate mechanism of social justice values. These results imply that, next to principles of ijtihad, ijma, and shura, Islamic social justice values can induce pluralistic ideas in Muslim majority societies.

Since the emergence of the Islamic State, considerable debate has arisen over the relationship (or lack of therein) between its ideological discourse and broader Islamic exegeses and learning. This paper aims to connect these wider discussions to its self-defined ideological standpoint as set out in its magazine, Dabiq. All 15 of these, published between June 2014 and July 2016, amounting to more than 900 pages, are examined to assess their authors’ (1) analysis of the Qur'an (2) use of classical scholarship, and (3) engagement with contemporary readings of Islam.

This paper deals in a qualitative discourse analysis with the role of Islamic organizations in welfare delivery in Germany and the Netherlands. Referring to Jonathan Fox's “secular–religious competition perspective”, the paper argues that similar trends of exclusion of Islamic organizations from public social service delivery can be explained with discourses on Islam in these two countries. The analysis, first, shows that in the national competitions between religious and secular ideologies on the public role of religion, different views are dominant (i.e., the support for the Christian majority in Germany and equal treatment of all religions in the Netherlands) which can be traced back to the respective regimes of religious governance. However, and second, when it comes to Islam in particular, in the Netherlands, the perspective of restricting all religions from public sphere prevails which leads to the rather exclusivist view on Islamic welfare that dominates in Germany, too.

Are majority-Muslim countries laggards when it comes to developing liberal economic institutions? Using an Index of Economic Freedom and its component parts, this study finds that Muslim-dominant countries (>50% of the population) are positively associated with free-market capitalism. Protestant dominance is also positively correlated, but the association stems from just two components of the index, mainly “legal security and property rights protection.” Surprisingly, Protestant countries correlate negatively with “small government” and “freedom to trade,” two critical components of free-market capitalism. Muslim dominance shows positive correlations with all areas except for “legal security and property rights.” The results are consistent when assessing similar variables measuring property rights and government ownership of the economy collected by the Varieties of Democracy Project. Capitalistic policies and institutions, it seems, may travel across religions more easily than culturalists claim.

We conduct a multilevel examination of the relationship between religiosity and democratic citizenship norms and behaviors using International Social Survey Program data. We analyze how democratic engagement varies according to individual and national average religious involvement in 28 predominantly-Christian democracies. We find that (1) individual-level religious attendance is positively linked to both what people say (norms) and what they do (participation); (2) nations with higher aggregate national attendance participate less politically; and (3) the relationship between individual-level religious engagement and citizenship varies by national religious context. More specifically, individual religious attendance matters more where it is more distinctive (i.e., in more secular countries). Individual-level religious participation is generally conducive to citizenship, but its impact is context-dependent.

A growing non-legal scholarship explores the domestic implementation of international court judgments in national law and policy. Yet little attention has been paid to the indirect effects of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law: namely, the ways in which its judgments may raise public consciousness, change how social actors articulate their claims, and/or prompt mobilization among civil society actors. This paper conceptualizes the significance of the indirect effects of ECtHR judgments in the domain of religion and education. Drawing on a constitutive approach to the law it explains the potential impact of such indirect effects. Second, it presents analytical concepts such as legal mobilization, which underpin the country-based case studies included in this symposium. Third, it provides an overview of the ECtHR religion and education-related case law which sets the stage for examining the nature and effects of the shadow of that case law in different country contexts.

For centuries, Rome and Istanbul have been representing and epitomizing two empires and two entities with both significant spiritual and temporal power: the Papacy and the Caliphate. During the 19th and the 20th centuries, these institutions underwent significant changes in a context of state secularization: in the case of the Papacy, there was a loss of temporal power and its “reduction” to a mainly moral authority; the Caliphate, on the other hand, was abolished after World War I, succeeded by the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), a bureaucratic body under state control, founded in the era of Kemalist secularism. Despite these changes, today both institutions still play a significant role in the public life and public policies of the Italian and the Turkish republics. While the Vatican is able to influence the Italian public sphere and public discourse through both its influence on common people and its lobbying activities in relation to political decision-makers, in Turkey the Diyanet has become the main tool in the reshaping of Turkish society (both by the Kemalists and, later, by Erdoğan's AKP). This paper will analyze their influence on the two countries’ public policies in relation to religious pluralism and to family-related issues, to show how different ideas of secularism, institutional arrangements, and historical paths have led to a very different role of the two institutions in the Italian and Turkish political systems.

As of yet, Islamization by secular ruling parties has hardly been investigated in depth. To bridge this gap, the present article reviews the existing literature on Islamization, synthesizes the scattered existing theoretical insights on Islamization by secular actors and applies them to the case of Bangladesh. It argues that, especially when they act in conjunction, three main conditions can drive secular rulers to Islamize public policy: first, the rise of Islamist social movements; second, fierce political competition; and third, (semi-)authoritarian rule. Focusing on the current Awami League (AL) government, the article shows how these three factors have interacted to produce a top-down process of state-led Islamization in Bangladesh.

Islamic finance has been surprisingly undertheorized in the international relations literature. In this paper, I fill this gap by investigating the dynamics of mainstreaming within the Islamic finance regime in global markets. Using the norm diffusion literature, I argue that the development and diffusion of Islamic economics, and the corresponding expertise, have followed three distinct steps. First, Islamic economics initially was a critique of capitalism and world markets; second, it was “nationalized” by the political leaders of major Muslim-majority countries; and third, it became an integral part of world markets. By tracing the development of Islamic finance as part of global politics, I situate it within a theoretical framework and show the wider implications of this economic framework for global politics.

This paper explains Israel's decision to outlaw the Islamic Movement Northern Faction in Israel (IMNF) and examines the methods and strategies adopted by the IMNF and its leaders that prompted the state's actions. Based on the British Defense Regulations from the British Mandate for Palestine, the State of Israel outlawed the IMNF on November 17, 2015, accusing the group of incitement, racism, and terrorism. Sheykh Kamal Khatib, former deputy leader of IMNF, declared that the IMNF had been a tool to serve the Islamic project and regardless of having been outlawed, the movement “would find a “thousand ways” to serve that project.’” I argue that the IMNF's shift in focus from the Palestinians to the larger Muslim community disrupted politics within Israel. Even so, Israel's policy change was based on political and personal calculations, rather than on national and regional security pressures.

This paper examines the impact of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decisions on the field of religion and education in Greece around the issues of the content and objectives of religious education, the exemption thereof, and religious symbols in school. The findings indicate that despite the relevance of ECtHR case law with the specific field in Greece, the Court's role in influencing such national debates is minimal. Drawing on empirical research and discourse analysis, the paper argues that this is due to the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, apparently linked to strategic references to and varying interpretations of the Court's judgments; the unwillingness of actors to litigate in a potentially sensitive, lengthy, and costly procedure; and to a shared belief in the perceived primacy of constitutional provisions on religion and education that precludes the formation of structured mobilizations.

By critically engaging the literature on the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, this paper seeks to show how the normative structure of secularism constitutes, enables, and restricts the discursive space in which Islamists can justify political action. It analyzes changes in Tunisian Ennahda's discourse (2011–2016) as an attempt to navigate between standards of recognition imposed on them by the normative power of secularism on the one hand, and what they can convincingly integrate into their own platform on the other hand.

The issues related to the role of religion in the public education system have been a public topic for a long time, and related debates have been cyclically revived by specific events. In this contribution, we explore the reasons why Italian grassroots actors do not tend to size up the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence and the plurality of juridical regimes dealing with religion and education as windows of opportunity. First, we analyze the intertwinement of different juridical regimes dealing with religion and education, and the national case law on the topic. Then, drawing on original semi-structured interviews, we analyze the indirect effects of the ECtHR case law on the mobilizations and advocacy strategies at the grassroots level around religion and education. Finally, we discuss the research outcomes, outlining how the non-interference of the Court in state-religions regimes may result in the limited impact and effectiveness of the Court's protection of religious freedoms.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that Muslim American women who wear the hijab may be particularly vulnerable to the experiences of stigmatization because the hijab represents one of the most obvious and dominant markers of “otherness.” Yet, extant research has surprisingly neglected to systematically examine how such external markers of difference can increase perceptions of discrimination. Drawing from two nationally representative datasets, we examine perceived discrimination among Muslim Americans, and find that veiled women report experiencing both societal and institutional discrimination at much higher rates than their counterparts. In fact, our findings show that the hijab is one of the most important predictors of self-reported discrimination among all Muslim Americans. Interestingly, however, we also find that men are more likely than women to perceive discrimination once we account for the role of the hijab. Our analysis makes an important contribution to existing research by highlighting the unique experiences of a religious minority group and identifies one important and previously underexplored mechanism by which individuals may be targeted for discrimination—the hijab.

How do we measure religious violence? This study is focused on utilizing new methodological approaches and data sources to measure religiously motivated violence. Previous attempts to measure religious violence concentrated on coding U.S. State Department International Religious Freedom reports or utilizing existing datasets on armed conflict/civil wars. These previous attempts provided state-level data of the levels of religiously motivated violence, but due to data limitations cannot provide more fine-grained measures of specific acts of violence tied to religious motivation. In particular, accounting for varying levels of intensity especially in regards to non-lethal acts of religiously motivated violence is missing. This study builds upon previous attempts focusing on the creation of more fine-grained measures and accounting for its variation at the sub-national level utilizing natural language processing. The data generated are used to examine incidences of reported religious violence in India from 2000 to 2015.

Many hypothesize that religious individualism is associated with progressive moral attitudes. Our analysis of data from US adults from the fourth wave of the Baylor Religion Survey finds that those who navigate moral conjunctures as religious individualists, knowing what God wants them to do “in their hearts” or through “human reason,” are more likely than those who draw on institutional religious sources of authority, like the Bible or religious teachings, to express progressive attitudes on issues of same-sex marriage, divorce, and premarital sex, but not abortion. Our findings indicate that perceived sources of moral authority further explain differences in moral attitudes within the population of religious decision-makers, specifically with regard to issues that are culturally in flux. This supports the idea that religious individualism, even among religious individuals and within religiously conservative traditions, makes people more accepting of contemporary cultural trends in morality.