This study uses data from the Religion and State Round 2 dataset to examine the trends in religious discrimination and religious support between 1990 and 2008, finding a statistically significant increase in both variables. These findings are based on a longer time span and more comprehensive variables than previous studies, remain constant when controlling for world region and majority religion, and predate the events of September 11, 2001. This undermines the aspects of secularization theory which predict a decline in religion's public influence. Furthermore, economic development, one of the processes predicted by secularization theory decrease religion's public influence, is correlated with increased religious discrimination and support.

The recent Arab revolutions/rebellions/protests have raised once again an old question: what features should the Arab political systems ideally have? Inescapably, perhaps, the case of Turkey frequently appears as a model to be emulated in the Arab world. A variety of actors, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama, from Rashid Ganouchi to Hillary Clinton has in fact viewed Turkey in that role. Even though, many intellectuals and academics usually raise doubts about the suitability of Turkish model for the Arab world (see, for example, Mamedov and Makarov 2011), it may still prove fruitful to consider the case of Turkey more seriously.

This article questions the assumption that — prior to July 2013 when the Egyptian military removed former President Mursi from power — the Muslim Brotherhood was in the process of implementing an Islamic state that would have involved a reversal of secularization and an upheaval to the status quo in terms of fundamental shifts in institutions and legal categories. Rather, the article argues that the Muslim Brotherhood evolved to embrace secularism of a certain sort-a statism in which it is the state that determines the boundaries of religion and politics. It illustrates this by looking at the role the Muslim Brotherhood envisaged for the Supreme Constitutional Court — and how this relates to the religious scholars of al-Azhar — in the formulation of legislation and in the assessment of whether legislation conforms to Article 2 of the constitution, both the 1971 one and the 2012 one, which was suspended in July 2013. In addition, the article will show how the Muslim Brotherhood has defined the public order with a particular focus on the idea of the Islamic “framework,” the rights of non-Muslim minorities, and personal status law.

High voter turnout gives legitimacy to the political system and strengthens the stability of a country. Since voter turnout matters, it is important to determine which factors boost electoral participation. While there is a vast literature on turnout focusing on institutional, socio-economic, and contextual indicators, there appears to be a shortage of scholarship on the relationship between religion and turnout. In our study, we evaluate the impact of the Islamic religion on electoral participation. Drawing on a large dataset that incorporates all legislative elections worldwide from 1970 to 2010 and controlling for compulsory voting, the electoral system type, the decisiveness of the election, the competitiveness of the election, the size of the country, the regime type and development, we find that Muslim-majority countries have lower turnout rates than majority non-Muslim countries. We also find electoral participation to be lower in countries where Islamic tenets are more strongly entrenched in politics.

Following the 2007 war between Fatah and Hamas, Palestinian politics appears to have followed the regional trend where the competition between secularism and Islamism is developing into a major political cleavage. Through comparisons of the two movements' ideologies, however, the article questions the relevance of this religious-secular cleavage to explaining Palestinian factional politics. Fatah — the traditional hegemon in Palestinian politics and previously staunchly secularist — has turned increasingly religious in response to the spread of Islamism. Hamas for its part has shed its overly religious rhetoric, absolutist territorial claims, and insistence on a violent solution to the Palestinian problem, in tandem with the deradicalization of the Palestinian population. In finding that both movements have moved toward the center of the political spectrum to maximize support, the article concludes that their rivalry is best understood as a competition for the median voter rather than as an indication of political polarization.

This article investigates the attitudes of Israeli Jews on the proper relationship between religion and the state, using data from the 2009 Israeli National Election Study. Specifically we test whether association with the secular or religious communities structures mass attitudes on this important dimension of Israeli politics. Mass level disagreement in this area dates back to the pre-state period and represents a longstanding cleavage in Zionist thought and Israeli politics. We find that mass attitudes toward religion and public life are associated with religious observance and identification with religious parties and social groups.

In 2005, the European Commission formally inaugurated a “structured dialogue” between European institutions and major faith traditions and non-confessional bodies in Europe. The provision for dialogue was envisaged ostensibly as a mechanism to include religious and non-confessional perspectives in the ongoing construction of the wider European project. The language of “dialogue,” consensus-seeking, and mutual learning dominates both religious and political justification for this formalized provision. Analysis considers emerging praxis in the intervening period (2005–2010) to determine the extent to which consensus-seeking has prevailed over the role of power and interests. Findings indicate that a number of elements relative to the configuration of dialogue praxis have severely inhibited the communicative potential of the provision enshrined in Article 17.

This article applies the conflict-amplification model to the development of Falun Gong. Falun Gong emerged in the early 1990s as a health-enhancing practice and part of the state-sanctioned qigong movement in China. Faced with increasing state suspicion of qigong and fierce competition from other groups, it metamorphosed into a new religious movement in the mid-1990s. State efforts to keep Falun Gong out of the political realm had the effect of releasing the group's political potential and led to its campaign of “truth clarification,” which further alerted the state to its ideological challenge and capacity to mobilize. Through a process of mutual feedback, the antagonism between the two parties culminated in religious violence and in Falun Gong's transformation into a political movement. The organizational evolution of Falun Gong is an illustration of the religion of the nonreligious and the politics of the apolitical in an authoritarian state.