The processes undertaken by Arctic states and Antarctic claimant states to submit data to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) demonstrates the robustness of polar governance. The robustness of a governing system reflects its capacity to deal with emerging issues. For the purposes of this article, robustness comprises the effective protection of rights in the absence of prejudice and participant confidence. In the Arctic, unilateral assertion of continental shelf entitlement can proceed due to the nature of the CLCS process and recognition of sovereignty. Combined with the voluntary nature of Arctic governance, the process does not hamper cooperation in scientific research, boundary delimitation or engagement in initiatives such as the Arctic Council. In the Antarctic, a coordinated approach to continental shelf delimitation protected claimant states’ entitlement to a continental shelf and the right of other states not to recognise sovereignty. States demonstrated commitment to the Antarctic Treaty and acted according to accepted norms. Though different in structure, each polar governing system has its own characteristics of robustness. State authority drives participant confidence and regional cooperation in the Arctic. In the Antarctic, norms of behaviour foster system legitimacy and resilience is reinforced by the consequences of abandoning the system. With continued acceptance of the individual governing-system dynamics, emerging issues can be accommodated in both polar regions.

In 1939 Dr Thomas C. Poulter, Director of the Armour Institute, Chicago and a veteran of Byrd's second Antarctic expedition, designed and constructed a 30 tonne wheeled vehicle known as the Snow Cruiser for use with the US Antarctic Service Expedition. Designed for self-contained long-distance travel, the vehicle had many new features including twin diesel engines, independent electric drive and steering on each of its four wheels, and a light aircraft carried on the roof. It was built in Chicago and tested briefly on sand dunes nearby, before being driven to Boston amid much public interest for shipment to Antarctica. At the Bay of Whales the vehicle quickly became bogged down in snow, and never moved farther south than the expedition's winter quarters. Modern evaluation of wheel-snow interaction suggests that the Snow'Cruiser unladen was three to five times too heavy for its tyres to support it on snow surfaces. It was nevertheless a bold attempt to push forward the frontiers of mobility in exploration, which failed in a spectacular fashion. The vehicle was left behind when the expedition returned home, and has subsequently been lost.

In the popular science journal Nauka i Zhizn' [Science and Life], No 10,1969, there is an article by N. Bolotnikov on the two Russians who took part in Scott's last expedition, Anton Omel'chenko, stable-man, and Dmitriy “Geroff”, dog-driver, giving information on their lives before and after the expedition. Both these men are spoken of very warmly in Scott's journal. They appear to have been excellent fellows, who not only worked hard and devotedly with their respective charges, but also got along very well with their British messmates, and it is interesting to know a little more about them.