In 1850, five expeditions sailed for Baffin Bay with the common purpose of searching the Canadian Arctic for Sir John Franklin's missing North-west Passage expedition. They were all headed for different destinations and should have found themselves wintering many hundreds of miles apart; but, as chance would have it, three of them, led by Captain Horatio T. Austin, RN, Admiral Sir John Ross and the whaling master William Penny, were thrown together by ice conditions and by events. They wintered in close proximity to one another and were obliged to divide among themselves the search of the surrounding area. Ross's little private venture was too poorly equipped to contribute much, but the other two achieved very promising results: Austin's men discovered the first traces of the Franklin expedition on Devon Island and, in cooperation with Penny, located Franklin's first winter quarters on Beechey Island. In the following spring, sledge parties went out to explore hundreds of miles of new coastline; Austin found no further trace of Franklin, but Penny found persuasive evidence to suggest that the missing expedition had sailed up Wellington Channel (as, indeed, it had done, though it had not remained in that area). With the work of the travelling parties concluded, and after some conversation between Austin and Penny on 11 August 1851, all three expeditions set course for home.

Shipping on the Kara Sea section of the Soviet Northern Sea Route—to and from the mouth of the Yenisey river from the west—had been established on a regular, indeed routine, basis by the 1931 navigation season, when 16 freighters took part (Belov, 1959, p 379). At the other end of the sea route, however, the situation was radically different. Between 1923 and 1931 the mouth of the Kolyma had been served each season by only one, occasionally two, of the freighters Stavropol', Kolyma and Leytenant Shmidt; without icebreaker escort, these vessels would fight their way through the ice of the Chukchi Sea and Proliv Longa to the mouth of the Kolyma (Belov, 1959, p 216–56, p 385–403). The 1932 season saw a dramatic change.

We used fossil Chironomidae assemblages and the transfer function approach to reconstruct summer air temperatures over the past 300 years from a High Arctic lake in Hornsund, Svalbard. Our aims were to compare reconstructed summer temperatures with observed (last 100 years) seasonal temperatures, to determine a potential climate warming break point in the temperature series and to assess the significance and rate of the climate warming trend at the study site. The reconstructed temperatures were consistent with a previous proxy record from Svalbard and showed good correlation with the meteorological observations from Bjørnøya and Longyearbyen. From the current palaeoclimate record, we found a significant climate warming threshold in the 1930s, after which the temperatures rapidly increased. We also found that the climate warming trend was strong and statistically significant. Compared with the reconstructed Little Ice Age temperatures in late eighteenth century cooling culmination, the present day summer temperatures are >4°C higher and the temperature increase since the 1930s has been 0.5°C per decade. These results highlight the exceptionally rapid recent warming of southern Svalbard and add invaluable information on the seasonality of High Arctic climate change and Arctic amplification.

In a recent interesting contribution to this journal, G.A. Mawer suggested that Antarctica was first so named in 1890 (Mawer 2008). New evidence however reveals that Antarctica first received its modern one-word name as early as 1840 at a congress of Italian scientists. The new name was soon adapted for other languages, and its use in English can be traced from 1849. A hypothesis is advanced as to why alternative French and German names were coined later in the century. The first map to use the new place name was published in 1843, and the first map to show a complete outline of the continent, estimated from expedition reports, was produced in 1844. But nothing could become the settled name of the south polar continent until its existence was confirmed at the turn of the twentieth century.

In this article the author isolates an anecdote from Roland Huntford's account of the Scott and Amundsen expeditions’ meeting on 4 February 1911 at Framheim, the Norwegian base in the Bay of Whales. In this anecdote, Lieutenant Victor Campbell allegedly told Roald Amundsen that a British motor sledge was ‘already on terra firma’, which consequently led Amundsen to worry that a British motor-sledge had already travelled across the Great Ice Barrier to reach the Beardmore Glacier. The author demonstrates the primary evidence that indicates that this anecdote is unrealistic: Amundsen's journal further indicates that he did not consider Scott's vehicles a threat. This ‘terra firma’ myth has skewed our modern understanding of events, ascribing to Amundsen an erroneous motivation (a supposed fear of the British motor sledges) to explain and excuse his too-early start for the south pole in September 1911, which was an error that nearly led to a Norwegian death (that of Lieutenant Kristian Prestrud). In reality, fear of Scott's motor sledges was not the reason for Amundsen's ‘false start’. This article concludes with a discussion on the hazards of attributing ‘hidden motivations’ to historical figures without citation of primary evidence, and recommends that Huntford include clearly-cited references and endnotes for the next edition of his joint biography of Scott and Amundsen, in keeping with modern standards of scholarship.

This article compares the representations of aboriginal people, and especially the Yellowknife leader Akaitcho, in the journal written by John Franklin during his first expedition (1819–1822) and the narrative he published in 1823. In the introduction to his 1995 Champlain Society edition of Franklin's journal, Richard Davis claims that when revising the journal for publication, Franklin changed his original entries so as to present an unfavourable, stereotyped image of Akaitcho to the British reading public. However, comparison of the relevant passages shows that, while Franklin evidently viewed Akaitcho with distrust during much of the expedition, he later, and on reflection, changed his opinion so that it became much more favourable, and accordingly altered the journal entries in order to do Akaitcho justice. These facts cast doubt on the interpretation of the first Franklin expedition put forward by Davis and others.

Since the 1970s, a number of writers have endorsed the belief that Dr John Richardson very probably committed discreditable, and possibly even criminal, acts during the first Franklin expedition (1819–1822). These acts, they allege, were concealed from the public by Franklin and Richardson, who inserted a fabricated account into Franklin's 1823 narrative. This paper examines the evidence and arguments put forward by the originator of this theory, the historian Richard Glover. It concludes that Glover was motivated primarily by a desire to vindicate the good name of another explorer, Samuel Hearne. Richardson had suggested that Hearne's narrative was not an entirely reliable account of his travels, and in Glover's view, these remarks had seriously damaged Hearne's reputation. Glover therefore sought to characterise Richardson as a deceitful man of exceptionally poor judgement, upon whose claims no reliance could be placed. Later writers, engaged in a re-evaluation of Britain's imperial activities in the Canadian north, have accepted and expanded on Glover's theories. However, an examination of the primary sources cited by Glover and others demonstrates that there is no solid basis for the revisionist version of the 1819–1822 expedition.

Fifty dogs were ordered from Greenland for use on Douglas Mawson's Australasian Antarctic Expedition (1911–1914). Twenty-one more were later donated to the expedition by Roald Amundsen, when he reached Hobart after his successful attainment of the South Pole. Numerous pups were born during the expedition. This note gives the details of the individual dogs during the expedition, including their names (and why they were so named), descriptions (when known), and fates.

One of the last frontiers of the pre-Christian Sámi religion and cosmology from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can be found recorded as embedded systems of knowledge on a range of noaidi-shaman drums kept in museums across Europe. Missionaries and clergymen as well as explorers who sought interest in the magical powers of the Sámi noaidi collected these artefacts during witchcraft trials and persecutions throughout Sápmi, the Sámi homeland areas. Insomuch as the drums being taken away from their owners and shipped from their homelands to other countries, their safeguarding, security and preservation as ancient sources of knowledge in museums is seldom discussed. As a consequence, the investigation presented here is a case study concerning the disappearance of a Sámi noaidi drum sent to a museum in France that has its origins in Swedish Sápmi, which I was informed about in 2017 prior to a visit to Paris for a seminar concerning the Sámi and their culture in Finland. The loss of the drum has only recently become known, and raises a series of important questions concerning responsibilities museums have with regard to the protection of property belonging to the Sámi as well as the repatriation and return of cultural heritage with regard to historical artefacts.

Recent research suggests that the members of the 1897 Andrée balloon expedition could have survived if they had marched towards the depot at Seven Islands instead of the Cape Flora depot after the forced landing at 82°56’N 29°52’E, and furthermore, that they reasonably should have done so given what they knew about the ice drift in the area. This paper comprises an analysis of the expedition’s depots based on a review of original sources, and the results elucidate Andrée’s initial decision to march towards Cape Flora. The Seven Island depot was not yet laid when Andrée departed in his balloon, and the information he had at the time indicated that it was highly uncertain that depot could be laid at all. Moreover, he knew it might be difficult to find the depot even if it had been laid since no exact position for it could be determined in advance. If he arrived at the Seven Islands without being able to obtain supplies there, Andrée knew he would have to continue all the way to Nordenskiöld’s old hut in Mossel Bay. Cape Flora, on the other hand, was certain to offer both supplies and shelter.

Russia’s Arctic policy since 2008 has been influenced by two competing foreign policy lines (discourses): the “Arctic as a resource base” and the “sovereignty discourse”. The “Arctic as a resource base” has been the dominant one since the first Russian Arctic Strategy in 2008. It is primarily about exploiting the vast oil and gas resources estimated to be located there, as well as turn the Northern Sea Route into a “global transport corridor”. In Russia’s Arctic Strategy of 2020, however, there is enhanced emphasis on sovereignty and power balancing in Russian Arctic policy. And the focus on sovereignty was heightened with the amendments to Russia’s Arctic Strategy in March 2023. This increased emphasis on sovereignty, territorial defence and balance of power in Russian Arctic policy is likely to be further reinforced by the growing great-power competition between the USA and Russia, which has gained new momentum following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The linkages between the Arctic and the rest of the world have become more profound and the region is increasingly attracting attention, also from non-Arctic state actors. Parallel to this development, the discussion about the future Arctic is taking place in various arenas, forums and among an increasing number of actors with interest in the region. At a time of high tension in international relations, and an increased likelihood of spill-over to Arctic cooperation, issues of governance of the Arctic region are potentially at stake. This makes it important that scholars are accurate in their analyses; confusing the mandate, responsibilities and purposes of different arenas for cooperation can be unfortunate. This article finds support in the literature on regime complexes and aims to show and analyse the differences between three key players in the Arctic: the Arctic Council, Arctic Frontiers and the Arctic Circle Assembly. In addition to exploring their differences, we ask what role these entities play in shaping policy in and for the Arctic. From mapping out the mandates, roles and responsibilities of the Arctic Council, Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly, and by nuancing their formal and informal aspects, we aim to contribute to clarifying misunderstandings regarding their functions and positions vis-à-vis each other.

By 1890, sealing from southern Norwegian ports had been in decline for some years. The owners of the fleet of strongly built barque rigged ice-sheeted sealers were facing a serious problem. This was simply that their ships did not make money. This paper describes the options that the owners had at a time when the fleets of the world were about to change from sail to steam. There were alternative possibilities for employment of such strongly built ice going wooden ships. These included involvement in Arctic transport, American whaling, and Newfoundland sealing, and on Arctic tourist and polar expeditions. The paper analyses these possibilities and compares the development of the Norwegian fleet with the situation in the Scottish sealing fleet that had faced the same problem some 30 years earlier.

This article tells the story of the dog teams of the British Antarctic Expedition 1910–13. Its purpose is to establish an accurate record of sledge dog involvement in the expedition. It is not concerned with hypotheses about how a better outcome for the expedition might have been achieved, aiming simply to assemble and analyse verifiable evidence in chronological order. A substantial amount of research has been undertaken. Straightforward details about procurement of the dogs and their main Antarctic journeys have been summarised in tabular form as an accessible reference source for future work. A literature review has been undertaken, finding that none of the reviewed works accurately traces the evolving plans and instructions for the expedition’s dog teams. The story starts with Scott’s September 1909 public fundraising prospectus and goes on to the procurement and training of Huskies from Siberia. It traces the challenges, achievements, attitudes and management decisions that shaped the dogs’ main journeys. It finishes with Terra Nova leaving the Antarctic, with the last 13 dogs in January 1913. The dog teams and their handlers performed well in the Antarctic and successfully completed three of their four main journeys. They made a substantial contribution to the expedition.

This article addresses the normative potential of the principle of sustainability to integrate the rules, principles, and procedures of international law applicable in the Arctic, so that Arctic international law can be posited more holistically and systematically. The holistic and integrative approach towards international law is particularly called for in the context of the Arctic, as the inextricable interconnectedness between its changing natural environments, its societal particularities, and its economic and industrial potential is the fundamental characteristic of the Arctic. In line with the purpose of the special issue, this article takes up a harder case of sustainability, in addressing Arctic mineral resource development. This article posits the principle of sustainability as a principle with an integrative function operating behind the primary norms relating to resource development at the international law level. In response to the claim of fragmented nature of the law at issue, this article calls for an academic examination into the normative function of the sustainability principle to forge the relevant and evolving norms applicable in the specific context of the Arctic mineral resource development towards an integral, coherent whole. This aim will be pursued using the analytical methodology employed by the International Law Commission’s (ILC) work on the “fragmentation of international law” (2006) and the “principle of integration” as identified by the International Law Association’s (ILA) work on the international law relating to sustainable development (2002–12). Finally, as an initial attempt to articulate the legal reasoning for such integration, this article examines the legal institution of environmental impact assessment (EIA) as a tool to present a holistic view of the international law on Arctic mineral resource development.