As human behaviour is influenced by law, so law is influenced by human behaviour whenever the latter serves to bring about changes in existing legal situations. Law may be substituted for freedom of action; a regime of freedom may be restored where law prevailed; one set of rules may be succeeded by another set of rules. What are the kinds of human behaviour capable of so changing legal situations, and thereby entitled to the name “sources of law”? Here, an obvious distinction presents itself between material behaviour, and acts of communication with regard to future behaviour. A further classification would segregate mere acts of acceptance or rejection from positive behaviour contributing substance to the law. Let us illustrate these distinctions by examples from international relations.

International law, both conventional and customary law, has been subject to rapid transformation and crystallization in the last few decades. This is especially the case in the field of international environmental law. Conduct that was not prohibited under international law at the time of initiation can now be characterized as contravening a number of newly and widely recognized principles and norms of international environmental law. Principles that may be said to have gained such wide recognition in international law as well as domestic law, albeit to varying degrees, include the precautionary principle, the polluter-pays principle and the sic utere tuo principle described below. Such principles have been invoked in a wide variety of international disputes with the aim of halting activities undertaken within one state having environmentally injurious transboundary consequences in other states or territories beyond the jurisdiction of any state (e.g., the High Seas).

The problem of financing the United Nations—a recurrent problem in fact since 1945—has become an acute financial and political one, since 1956. In November 1956 and in December 1960, the General Assembly decided to assess UN members part of the expenditures incurred for peace-keeping operations in the Middle East and Congo in accord with the scale approved for raising the ordinary annual budget.

During the last few years, constitutional democracy has again become a hotly debated issue among constitutional scholars, political scientists and philosophers in Europe and the United States. Several scholars have written profound comments on the ideals of constitutionalism and democracy, and their place in contemporary political systems. While many proclaim the enduring validity of constitutional democracy, others make a plea for a radical redefinition of the concept.

On 31 May 2002, the EC Regulation on insolvency proceedings entered into force. As from that date, insolvency proceedings that are opened in any of the Member States of the European Union will in principle qualify for recognition in the other Member States, with the exception of the Kingdom of Denmark. On the whole, the Regulation contains the same provisions as the European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings that was ready for signature in 1995, but which never entered into force. Like the 1995 Convention, the present Regulation mainly contains provisions pertaining to the conflict of laws and only a few rules of uniform law. Moreover, the Regulation contains the same plurality of insolvency proceedings as the 1995 Convention: in addition to main insolvency proceedings that are recognised in the other Member States, territorial insolvency proceedings may be opened in the Member States where the debtor has an establishment.

This article is a prospective analysis of whether the established principles for delimitation of the continental shelf within 200 NM will apply for delimitation of outer continental margins. On the basis of the established normative jurisprudence of delimitations within 200 NM it can namely not be ruled out that the established equitable criteria and methods for delimitation, for finding an equitable solution, were solely set to prevail in delimitations within 200 NM.

Title commands delimitation and the title for the zone beyond 200 NM differ from the title within 200 NM. Wherein the distance criterion is the title for the zone within 200 NM, geological and geomorphologic criteria are the basis of the title for the legal continental shelf that extends 200 NM. Accordingly, the established normative principles in delimitation of continental shelves beyond 200 NM are susceptible to differ from the established prevailing principles within 200 NM and may have an important impact on delimitations in the continental outer margins.

In conclusion it is held that the established equitable criteria and methods in order to find an equitable solution in delimitations within 200 NM are likely not to apply mutatis mutandis for delimitations beyond 200 NM

So much has been said and written about the events which led up to the involvement of the International Court of Justice in the financial consequences of the United Nations actions in Egypt (1956) and in the Congo (1960) that I shall try to be as brief as possible here.

1. Domicile is “… l'une des notions les plus fuyantes et les plus insaississables de nos systemes juridiques”. Are these words of Lagarde applicable to the notion of domicile as a connecting factor in the Netherlands conflict of laws? The present article sets out to cast some light upon this question. After a survey of the manifestations of domicile, usually referred to in Netherlands private international law as woonplaats or domicilie, as a connecting factor, attention will be paid to the hypothetical usefulness in private international law of the Netherlands Civil Code provisions devoted to woonplaats. Subsequently Netherlands judicial decisions will be reviewed in order to find out which elements – if any – are ascribed by Netherlands courts to the concept of domicile. As a result of this investigation a few distinctions into categories of cases will be made, giving rise to the question whether the meaning of domicile in private international law differs according to the legal question(s) it is intended to serve.

L'époque de la formation du capitalisme, époque qui s'étend entre le quatorzième et le dix-huitième siècle, représente incontestablement l'une des plus intéressantes périodes de l'histoire de l'humanité. L'accroissement considérable des forces productives au sein de la féodalité a ébranlé tout le système féodal, qui résistait encore avec beaucoup de fermeté aux nouvelles forces sociales, à la nouvelle classe, à la classe capitaliste, à la bourgeoisie, qui était en voie de formation sous le régime féodal et qui, conformément au développement des forces productives, se mettait en marche nécessairement vers de nouveaux rapports de production et qui, à leur base et en relation avec eux, s'efforçait déjà dans le cadre de l'ordre juridique féodal de former de nouvelles normes juridiques qui devaient servir à la protection des intérêts de la bourgeoisie naissante qui était en train de se constituer comme classe, ou bien, plus précisément, aux intérêts concrets de la bourgeoisie existante dans diverses périodes et dans certains Etats de cette époque. Parmi ces nouvelles catégories de normes juridiques, les normes de collision représentent, sans contredit, une des plus intéressantes catégories, tout d'abord parce qu'elles sont, en tant que forme de réglementation juridique, employées pour la première fois dans le droit à cette époque, en second lieu parce qu'elles réglementent une catégorie de rapports de droit privé entièrement nouvelle, qui est spécifique, dans la formation historique, à l'avènement et au développement du capitalisme, étant donné qu'elle correspondait justement aux rapports de production capitaliste et en tout premier lieu c'est à eux que correspondait cette catégorie de rapports de droit privé, tout ceci se rattachant d'ailleurs au développement quantitatif déterminé et à l'amplification des relations économiques et juridiques internationales. Tous ces faits expliquent que le Droit international privé n'a pu se former en tant que discipline juridique spéciale et même en tant que phénomène juridique, comme il s'était formé en réalité, tant que les forces productives ne soient parvenues à un état déterminé dans l'évolution, à savoir à un état qui conditionnait et imposait nécessairement des rapports de production capitalistes, de sorte que, à la différence de toutes les autres branches du droit et de presque toutes les autres disciplines juridiques, le Droit international privé apparait comme une manifestation entièrement nouvelle, comme une catégorie nouvelle de la période capitaliste, en tant que forme juridique qui peut se constituer, et par conséquent qui peut servir même à la formation juridique des rapports sociaux de la formation sociale capitaliste, en tant que formation sociale d'un degré qualitativement plus élevé.

Some twenty-five years have passed since the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments was first drafted and it seems to be doing rather well. It is in force in all twelve Member States of the European Community and has become a familiar part of the work of numerous courts in Europe handling commercial disputes. Its success is borne out by the conclusion of the Lugano Convention of 16 September 1988, extending the scheme of the Brussels Convention to the Member States of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which obtained in only three years after signature the necessary ratifications for its initial entry into force on 1 January 1992. In addition, there is much support among scholars from Eastern Europe for the accession of their countries to the Lugano Convention (which, unlike the Brussels Convention, provides for accession independently of membership of the European Community or EFTA).